



There is nobody more qualifed to do justice to the imbrications of liter-
ature and ethical commitment in Africa than Chielozona Eze. With this 
well-accomplished and erudite book, Eze consolidates his position as the 
leading scholar of African ethics in literary contexts. Students and scholars 
of culture and philosophy will fnd this book an invaluable model for their 
own work. 
— Cajetan Iheka, Yale University, author of Naturalizing
Africa: Ecological Violence, Agency, and Postcolonial 
Resistance in African Literature 
Justice is often associated with an ideal state of affairs. Although this is an 
important way to approach the question of justice, realizing justice requires 
more than thinking about ideals. We must consider the aspect of what hap-
pens in situations where injustice is enthroned. This means to think about 
the damage done to individuals and social and political institutions due to 
the prolonged experience of injustice. Chielozona Eze offers in this book an 
outstanding study of these issues. He takes the reader on a journey that cul-
minates in a clear understanding of the connection between political organ-
ization and the contexts of justice. Anyone interested in original ideas about 
justice, based on re-imagination of African conceptual resources, should 
read this book. 
— Uchenna Okeja, PhD. Professor of philosophy,
Rhodes University 
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This book beneftted from my six-month residence at Stellenbosch Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies (STIAS) from July to December 2018. I have also 
profted from the discussions with friends and colleagues: Cajetan Iheka, 
Uchenna Okeja, Amatoritsero Ede, Paul Ugor, Uche Umezurike, Sister 
Mary Okolie, Dike Okoro, and Maik Nwosu. I am grateful to my fellow 
members of Northeastern Illinois University Genocide and Human Rights 
Research Group: Jeanine Ntihirageza, Alfred Frankowski, and Cris Tofolo. 
The congenial atmosphere in the English department and the friendship of 
my colleagues were enabling factors for the birth of this and other works. 
I am immensely grateful to my dear friend, Sangmin Bae, who frst intro-
duced me to some of the most important literature on human rights. 
Northeastern Illinois University granted me a yearlong sabbatical leave 
to work on a different project. The frst two months of the leave were de-
voted to this very work, and I am sincerely grateful to the President Gloria 
J. Gibson and the board of trustees. 

Preface 
What we talk about when we talk about justice 
To help me think through the notion of justice, I present two hypotheti-
cal situations, one of which is paraphrased from John Rawls’s “Original 
Position.” 
First Situation: On the playground are fve children—three boys and two 
girls—playing. A mother to one of them comes around, hands them fve 
oranges, and tells them the oranges are for all of them. There are many 
scenarios that can ensue: They will share the oranges among themselves. I 
imagine the children holding a small conversation in which they establish 
the condition for sharing the oranges: “Everyone gets one orange each,” the 
leader among them would say. “Yes, one person one orange,” another would 
support. That would be the just thing to do. It would be fair. Another sce-
nario is that one of them, perhaps a boy, could seek to have two oranges, 
claiming that he is hungrier than the others. What if he gives three of them 
one orange each and the fourth one gets nothing? Will the three speak up 
against the situation? What language would they use? What if the boys gang 
up and deny the girls their oranges because they are, well, girls? The girls 
object and ask: Why? The boys answer: You are girls, and, according to the 
bible, sin came into the world through women. Therefore, you must pay for 
your sins. 
Second Situation: If, as embryos in the womb—ignorant of the conditions 
of our future lives, though capable of making decisions about the world—we 
were asked to imagine a society in which we all would be born, we would, 
for example, consider the situation in which we are born poor or with disa-
bility, or perhaps one in which we are born into wealth. But because we do 
not know the situation that awaits us, we would most likely strike a middle 
ground. Faced with a situation in which we are allowed to create an ideal 
society, we would most likely opt for a society of fair-minded people free of 
bias, because we might be in disadvantaged positions. 
One of the things I take from Rawls’s hypothetical situation is the power 
of the imagination in the dispensing of justice. If we are able for a while to 
put ourselves in the position of a person denied his or her due, and if we can 
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see reality from that perspective even for a while, we might be compelled 
to rethink our attitude. Of course, the reality is that either most people are 
incapable of imagining reality from other people’s perspectives or they re-
fuse to do so, perhaps because their minds had already been conditioned by 
some narratives about the other. For example, racists refuse to imagine the 
racialized as deserving equal consideration as humans largely owing to the 
stories they have heard about these racialized others. The same applies to 
sexists. It is easy for a man to justify maltreating a woman because of the 
ancient tradition that drummed it into him that women are meant to occupy 
inferior positions in the family and in society. 
The second part of the title of this book, We, Too, Are Humans, seeks to 
capture the voice of those who feel that they have not been treated the way 
humans ought to be treated: fairly. I imagine that if any of the children 
is denied an orange, he or she would ask: Why? Am I not a human being? 
The question, of course, assumes that every person deserves fairness on the 
ground of being human. My discussions in this book issue from this stand-
point, from the perspective of those who perceived that their humanity had 
not been acknowledged by others, and their simple demand that they be 
treated like other humans are. It does not make any difference whether this 
demand is on the village playing ground, among fve hungry children, or 
in the family among siblings regarding their parents’ estates, or even be-
tween spouses, or between parties, villages, countries, tribes, ethnicities, 
and races. Every individual or group wants the same recognition accorded 
to others. The quest to be treated with fairness for the simple fact that we are 
humans constitutes the core of justice. 
Most people associate the term justice with legal practices in the court of 
law and government ministerial positions like in the Department of Justice. 
I too have always done that by instinct. Without ignoring its legal ramif-
cations, I approach the notion of justice from the bottom-up, from the per-
spective of being fair in our relations to others; fair in the distribution of 
respect, recognition, and material and intangible goods. A major concern 
in this book, therefore, is care about the pain we infict on one another by 
the absence of fairness in our cultural, social, and political institutions, and 
in interpersonal relationships. Human rights abuses stem from the absence 
of care and a sense of fairness in our relation to others. I confne my discus-
sions of human rights to the institutions closer to everyday people than to 
government apparatuses. In that regard, therefore, human rights is being 
fair in our quotidian interactions and in the social and cultural institutions 
that regulate them. 
This book is conceived in part as an introduction to the conception of 
justice and human rights, and in part as a more nuanced discussion of issues 
that hinder human fourishing in Africa. I do not set out to provide a com-
prehensive theory of justice and human rights in Africa; rather, relying on 
a general understanding, I seek to make these concepts and issues obvious 





South Africa surprised the world not only with the relatively peaceful tran-
sition from apartheid to democracy but also with the choice not to follow the 
Nuremberg-type trial that would have rightly put behind bars those guilty 
of apartheid crimes. Some critics of the South African Truth and Reconcil-
iation Commission (TRC) claimed that no justice was served. Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, the chair of the TRC, however, proffered a vigorous defense 
of the commission’s approach, arguing that it was indeed justice. It was just 
not the typical retributive model practiced in the West; it was restorative jus-
tice that is closer to the African reality. Restorative justice does not seek to 
punish the offenders; rather, it seeks to rehabilitate and reconcile them with 
the community. I share Archbishop Tutu’s conviction that restorative justice 
is essentially African and essentially universal; justice is meant to restore the 
bond between individuals on the one hand, and on the other, between the 
individual and community. This view provides a prism through which to 
engage contemporary African reality. 
It is fair to argue that the TRC was an extension of the philosophy and 
the moral character of Nelson Mandela who made ordinary virtues of love, 
forgiveness, generosity, empathy, and so on the guiding principles of his pol-
itics. Only they could restore South African people’s appreciation of one 
another’s humanity and therefore create a moral ecology that enables polit-
ical success. I have argued elsewhere that Mandela tapped into the riches of 
empathy and other boundary-transcending virtues as a way to hold together 
and nourish the nascent multiethnic and multicultural society (Eze 2012). 
Indeed, Mandela understood that good politics and human fourishing are 
the two sides of any civic society that the post-apartheid society was aspir-
ing to be. Only restorative justice, one that engages society from bottom-up, 
not the legalistic formulation characterized by retribution, can sustain such 
a society. 
This book argues for the understanding of human rights from the per-
spective of restorative justice and well-being in Africa. To that end, I
examine particular ways in which a new appreciation of human dignity,
justice, fairness, empathy, and caring for others are hindered in the po-











One of the ways they could be promoted is through narratives understood
as the construction of others in all forms of mythmaking and transmission
of knowledge. More particularly, in this work, I focus on how these ideas
are transmitted in African works of the imagination: fction, poetry, and
flms. I pursue simple questions that I believe go to the heart of what it
means to be human: What is the ethical content of the stories we tell about
ourselves and others? How can a recalibration of those stories enhance life
in society? 
Many African scholars have grappled with the lingering effects of co-
lonialism in Africa. Perhaps more still needs to be done in that regard. 
Thankfully, though, there has been an observable turn to a much-needed 
engagement with the African condition beyond the gaze of the West, a turn 
that engages with the many other issues besetting Africa, such as ecological 
violence, sex traffcking, homophobia, and attitudes toward people with dis-
abilities. For example, Cajetan Iheka’s (2018) celebrated book Naturalizing 
Africa: Ecological Violence, Agency, and Postcolonial Resistance in African 
Literature has opened a new vista for engaging the environment in Africa, 
especially in its emphasis on the bond between humans and the unknown. 
Humans are not the center of reality. Ato Quayson’s (2007) Aesthetic Nerv-
ousness pays some attention to the issue of disability in Africa. There are 
now numerous articles that examine other issues that occupy the attention 
of Africans outside the gaze of the West, issues such as witchcraft accusa-
tions, ritual human sacrifce, neo-slavery, and women’s right to their bodies. 
This development no doubt underscores the truth of Frantz Fanon’s saying 
that each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, 
fulfll it, or betray it. Thus, we admit that whereas the Chinua Achebe gen-
eration of African intellectuals rightly interrogated the image of Africa in 
the West, that is, how the West treated Africa, contemporary African in-
tellectuals must interrogate the image of Africa in Africa. Rather than ad-
dressing an imaginary white man, they must focus on human well-being in 
Africa and how Africans can make it possible. Drawing attention to these 
issues and other human rights abuses and inspiring debate about them is not 
merely an academic exercise; discussing these issues, in my understanding, 
has life-and-death consequence. They are integral to our conception of the 
nature of society we want to live in and politics and democracy. 
Justice and human rights are about human lives 
Two unrelated incidents compelled me to start thinking about this book. 
First, in 2008, Tanzanian BBC journalist Vicky Ntetema exposed the out-
break of killings of people with albinism in Tanzania, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda (Ntetema 2008). The body parts 
of these people were harvested and used to prepare potions thought to bring 
good luck and wealth. Each time I thought about the condition of people 












exclamations: “Maman, look, a Negro; I’m scared!” (91). Fanon’s words cap-
ture his feelings of being a black man, a stranger in Europe, in the early part 
of the twentieth century. 
The second incident was in 2015 when Anja Ringgren Lovén, a Danish 
aid worker, saved a two-year-old Nigerian boy whose mother had left him 
on the street to die “because his family thought he was a witch” (Osborn 
2016). This second incident needs more context to be fully appreciated. In 
1876, Mary Slessor (1848–1915), a Scottish missionary, arrived in Calabar 
(Nigeria) for her missionary work. She was horrifed by many aspects of the 
people’s traditions, which included the killing or abandoning of twins be-
cause they were considered “children of the devil.” The mothers of the twins 
were consequently ostracized. Slessor began to rescue and adopt the aban-
doned twins, help their ostracized mothers, and also enlighten the people in 
matters of the inviolability of human life and, by extension, of human rights. 
Coincidentally, Lovén saved the so-called witch boy in the part of Nigeria 
in which Slessor worked and died a century ago. Some troubling questions 
arise in the mind: What exactly has changed in the people’s conception of 
human life and the dignity of the individual from 1876 to 2015? What have 
Nigerians failed to do regarding the inviolability of human dignity? Sadly, in 
some of these cases and others (discussed in Chapter 3), politicians and gov-
ernment offcials are implicated in the belief system that breeds the abuse. 
These two incidents are indisputable cases of abuse of human rights and
dignity, some of which still fnd wide acceptance in many sectors of African
societies. They raise questions of far-reaching implications for conceptions
of justice in Africa. What is the value of human life in Africa? What are Afri-
cans to one another? If it is true that there is no meaning outside of narratives,
or rather that we make sense of our lives by telling them, then what kind of
stories do Africans tell themselves about themselves? What kind of society
do Africans want? What do Africans owe one another in terms of human
relationship? What are the criteria for determining what is right or wrong,
who deserves respect or not, who gets what resources or enjoys what rights?
These are the typical questions that concern justice in general. 
Justice is obviously a legal and political term in liberal societies. Its best 
formulation is found in the American Declaration of Independence: All men 
are created equal and are endowed with certain unalienable rights, which 
include life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. I am drawn to John Rawls’s 
(1999) accessible explanation of justice. Two principles guide his notion of 
justice: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme 
of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advan-





At the core of his theory of justice is the notion that justice is fairness, an 
idea he demonstrates with a thought experiment, called the “original posi-
tion,” and which I have sketched in the preface. This is a condition in which 
people are free, equal, and are able to make without bias choices about the 
principles that would guide their lives. For my purpose in this book, I rely 
on the notion of human dignity or the worthiness of individuals as the basis 
for justice. It states simply that every human deserves fairness because of 
their intrinsic dignity as humans. 
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant states that “humanity itself 
is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any 
other human being […] but must always be used at the same time as an end” 
(Sensen 2011:174). As Oliver Sensen (2011) explains, Kant’s theory about dig-
nity does not state that “someone should be respected because he has dig-
nity, but he has dignity because he should be respected” (74). The issue then 
is that being human alone earns every individual dignity and the right to be 
treated fairly. This right is anchored in our nature. This defnition of dignity 
is also the origin of the thoughts about human rights, strictly understood as 
the concretization of justice. 
There are certain levels of expectations of how we ought to relate and treat 
one another as members of human species. There might be variances across 
cultures and ages, but all people understand that being a human already 
grants you immunity from being eaten by other humans. It also presupposes 
that you be treated with some respect. Thus, when we say “We, too, are hu-
mans,” we are referring to the implicit understanding that humans deserve 
to be regarded and treated in a certain way—at least better than animals— 
and that this has obviously not been the case. The expression means that the 
above (Kantian) condition is not met, that others have either maltreated us 
or failed to accord us respect. By justice, therefore, I refer to the umbrella 
term that captures instances of the application of human dignity in our re-
lation with one another.1 
When we tell stories of people who have been treated unfairly by society, 
we do so to draw attention to the fact that they, too, are humans and there-
fore deserve better. We appeal to the common frame of being, to our dignity 
as members of the common specie. Yet, despite the noble position that we 
have granted to the dignity of all humans, we must admit that it is often a 
contentious issue in many societies that do not believe in the notion of the 
basic equality of all derived from Western thought. One might raise some 
questions, if only to play the devil’s advocate: But must I treat others with 
respect? Must I exhibit fairness in my relation to others? Aren’t we living 
in a competitive world in which the fttest survive? The answers to these 
questions are not obvious. I will address them in my discussion of the im-
portance of the sense of the common good in Chapter 1. For now, though, it 
suffces to keep in mind the interplay between dignity, justice, human rights, 




Perhaps inspired by the Western notion of human dignity and the basic 
equality of all, most contemporary African writers are now more boldly 
questioning the cultural norms and the traditional narratives that control 
their lives, and they do so from the standpoint that we owe one another 
respect and fundamental fairness as humans. In the recent past, they have 
engaged with some of these issues, which had been somewhat ignored in the 
decades of anticolonial writings because of the perceived greater urgency 
of addressing imperialism and its manifestations in Africa. For example, 
whereas the frst two generations of African writers and scholars might 
have defended African polygamy or female circumcision as part of African 
culture, contemporary African women authors write boldly about the psy-
chological and physical pain of polygamy, spousal abuse, female genital mu-
tilation, and so on. Some members of the contemporary African generation 
of writers tell about their alternative sexuality and the shame and pain their 
societies subject them to because of that; they write about the humiliating 
experiences of people living with albinism and so on. Indeed, they expose 
some cultural norms and ancient institutions as apparatuses through which 
injustice and unfairness are perpetuated in society. I interpret their writings 
as seeking to create moral frameworks within which human fourishing can 
be achieved in Africa. 
Nigerian legal scholar Oche Onazi (2013) explains human rights in Af-
rica as being basic to the community, a type of community that is itself 
constituted by expressions of love and empathy and forms of solidarity, 
cooperation, and collaboration. Bonny Ibhawoh (2018) demonstrates in 
his rich history of human rights in Africa that thoughts about justice and 
human dignity have been an important part of African history. Ernest N. 
Emenyonu’s edited Politics & Social Justice: African Literature Today (2014)
provides a notable intervention in the conception of justice in African lit-
erature. Joseph R. Slaughter’s Human Rights, Inc. (2007) and Elizabeth 
S. Anker’s Fictions of Dignity (2012) are trailblazing in regard to the rela-
tionship between human rights and literature. Slaughter’s discussion of the 
Bildungsroman makes a persuasive argument for the power of narrative to 
script human rights. James Dawes’s The Novel of Human Rights (2018) fo-
cuses exclusively on the literature of the United States. Given their scope 
(global literature), these works understandably failed to pay adequate at-
tention to the African contexts and other sources of knowledge production, 
especially regarding the contemporary African condition.2 Slaughter’s and 
Anker’s works emphasize the interplay between human rights discourse and 
law. My thinking about justice and human rights differs from the above in 
its exclusive emphasis on the moral implications of African narratives and 
cultural practices. 
This book begins with the premise that all humans are endowed with im-
mutable rights and shows how discussing specifc African conditions can 






as not only universal but also benefcial for the mental and physical health 
of every individual.3 It also shows how the stories we tell can work against 
human rights and dignity. In all these, I approach justice and human rights 
from bottom-up, not the other way around. I mean that the issue of justice 
and human rights is placed in the hands of ordinary people, who through 
the activation of the virtues of empathy, tolerance, care, and solidarity cre-
ate moral and legal frameworks designed to protect vulnerable members of 
society. In particular, I read the selected literary texts essentially as works of 
imagination that urge their readers to engage the known world and conse-
quently begin the task of creating or heralding a world that is yet unknown. 
However, I do this in idioms familiar to philosophers, environmentalists, 
anthropologists, and human rights activists. This book, therefore, straddles 
literature, philosophy, flm studies, and social and cultural anthropology. 
Justice, human rights, and the power of the ordinary virtues 
One of the reasons most Africans are reluctant to adopt the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is because the language of human 
rights is wrapped in legalisms, and its vocabularies have not yet shed their 
Eurocentric biases. Human rights is presented as sets of laws that are often 
imposed from above or ways of life promoted by NGOs, which are often 
cynically described as mercy-industrial complexes. The risk of this top-
down rather than community-based approach to justice and human rights 
in Africa is that the notion of human rights remains alien to most African 
communities, even though respect for human lives has always been present 
in their midst. The top-down approach focuses almost exclusively on laws 
and governmental apparatuses and less on individuals, communities, and 
cultural institutions. On the contrary, the bottom-up approach, exploring 
the riches of intersubjective interaction and restorative justice, centers on 
basic moral assumptions of human rights and also raises people’s aware-
ness of the gratuitous pain that other people’s words, actions, decisions, and 
cultural or religious practices can infict on others. Additionally, the com-
munity approach to human rights sharpens awareness of the humanity of 
others and highlights the riches of mutual trust and affrmation and seeks 
to make individuals aware of their responsibility in the proper functioning 
of their community. 
Michael Ignatieff argues that the UDHR is a juridical revolution that has 
touched nearly every part of the world. He acknowledges Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
immense contribution to that, especially in her belief that the place for the 
realization of the revolution is “in small places, close to home—so close 
and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world” (Horton
2007). Thanks to the Declaration, people now have more ways to articulate 
their voices when they feel that they have been denied justice. Ignatieff ar-
gues that “the privileges that were once attached to race, gender, and reli-
gion may not be gone, but their moral authority is contested at every turn.
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This is the great achievement of Mrs. Roosevelt’s revolution” (Ignatieff 
2017a:6). In many instances, though, human rights discourse seems to 
have become fxated on the easily measurable external metrics of progress. 
These metrics include whether many states have ratifed the Declaration 
and whether instances of gross human rights abuse have decreased. It has 
also become part of the assumption that human rights conventions, once 
adopted and ratifed, “have some influence on the ‘ordinary virtues’—that 
is, the common practices of trust and tolerance, forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion that are the essence of private moral behavior” (2017a:4). Indeed, many 
people believe “that human rights remains an ‘elite discourse,’ a language 
spoken by lawyers, advocates, victims’ groups, and bureaucrats—not by a 
wider public at large.” Yet what they truly respond to, Ignatieff argues, is the 
language of the ordinary virtues rather than that assumed by the Universal 
Declaration. To be sure, Mrs. Roosevelt did not deny the necessity of the 
universal language of the Declaration and the activism that helps keep it 
alive. The metrics of its success, as Ignatieff suggests, should not be defned 
exclusively in terms of activism or the political sector of the human rights 
revolution. 
Ignatieff fnds a chasm between the language of the Universal Declara-
tion and the ordinary virtues, between local and universal, the citizen and 
the stranger. He states: 
Human rights enjoins us to be tolerant, to recognize the universal 
equality in all human beings. From an ordinary-virtue perspective, 
on the other hand, human beings do not appear clothed in what Marx 
called “species being.” Ordinary virtue accepts no general obligation to 
tolerate anyone. Its motto is “Take people one at a time.” 
(Ignatieff 2017b:212) 
In his apparent dismissal of the universal claim of the UDHR, Ignatieff 
seems to propose a narrow sympathy, implying that we care only about 
those we know and that the locals do not care about universals or about 
what happens to others not related to them.4 This may not paint the entire 
picture of humans as essentially moral beings. 
It is true that we care primarily about those we know and that we cannot 
enforce human rights the way a state enforces its laws, but it is also true 
that humans care about the fate of others they do not know, provided that 
they are made adequately aware of that fate and the people. We cannot care 
about those we do not know, but that is also why we tell stories, as narra-
tives bring us closer to strangers. Because of their nature as moral beings, 
and thanks to the virtues of narratives, humans are also wired toward the 
pursuit of the common good.5 
We can abandon neither the universal aspiration of the UDHR nor the 
activism that helps drive it to the farthest reaches of the earth, and nor can 
we ignore the roots of the Declaration in ordinary virtues and the common 
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good. I suggest that narratives provide a model for bridging the gap be-
tween the universality of human rights aspiration and the concreteness of 
ordinary virtues. Thus, narratability becomes a test of the universal nature 
of concrete rights.6 Elizabeth Swanson Goldberg and Alexandra Schultheis 
Moore (2012:2) argue that stories “render intelligible the philosophies, laws, 
and practices of human rights from multiple, shifting cultural perspectives.” 
Expressed in simpler terms, to know whether any aspect of the UDHR or 
justice in general can be grasped by those to whom ordinary virtues mean 
something, we ask: Can it be told in stories? Stories connect the man in a 
Nigerian village not only with another man or woman in the same or the 
next village but also with another man or woman thousands of miles apart 
on a different continent and of a different race. Narratives link ordinary 
virtues and our interdependence on one another and therefore underline the 
absolute necessity of universal moral frameworks such as respect for other 
lives and caring for the vulnerable.7 
It must be noted that narratives can be double-edged swords. Although
they can elevate the dignity of the others, they can also be used to render the 
same others as strangers; this aspect will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
So, we must establish the kind of narrative that leads to awareness and pro-
motion of justice and human rights (Chapter 1). Mencius, a great moral 
teacher who is best known for giving Confucianism its most profound phil-
osophical grounding, is said to have narrated an incident about a child who 
was about to fall into a well. Mencius states, “Suppose a man were, all of 
a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would 
certainly be moved to compassion” (Mencius 1970:82). Why did he tell this 
anecdote? Why did Jesus Christ tell the parable of the Good Samaritan? 
Why does a writer tell the story of a person living with albinism in Africa 
and who feels shame and insecurity because of his “whiteness” in a land of 
black people? 
I understand that the above anecdotes are read in religious or purely phil-
osophical contexts and may thus not count as typically literary in the same 
way as contemporary African novels do. Whereas the reasons for Jesus’s and 
Mencius’s anecdotes are well known, I think the writer of modern literary 
fction that addresses the human condition, or anthropologists who conduct 
research and relate their observations, engage in no less a morally noble 
task, albeit in a much more complex format that inspires a more expansive 
examination of reality. Admittedly, literary fction is more of an inquiry 
than are parables. Above all, literary fction, focusing on the human condi-
tion, leads to the appreciation of the everyday practice of ordinary life and 
thus of the richness of ordinary virtue. Ultimately, the issue I pursue here is 
how African narratives, including works in social and cultural anthropol-
ogy, testimonies, and cultural texts, bring about a rethinking of what the 
South African philosopher and literary scholar Njabulo Ndebele (1986:156) 
characterizes as the rediscovery of the ordinary—that is, the fundamental 
interpersonal relationship. I examine the way Africans live and relate to one 
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another and how African stories enable this relationship and engender or 
hamper human rights, happiness, and well-being in African communities. 
Well-being is understood as the state of doing well or being happy. It is 
generally understood as an extension of the Greek notion of eudaimonia— 
human fourishing or prosperity. It occupies a central place in Aristotle’s 
(1999) philosophy and refers to the highest human virtue, a condition for 
living a life of enduring happiness and fulfllment. Human fourishing also 
refers to the condition in which every individual achieves optimal welfare in 
freedom; it is also a condition of belonging to communities, helping others, 
and benefting from them in ways that are also captured by the southern 
African concept of ubuntu. More precisely defned, it concerns the condition 
in which all people live in dignity, equality, freedom, and respect for bodies 
as they are. In this book, therefore, I use well-being and human fourishing 
interchangeably to denote the condition of a good life marked by happiness 
and self-fulfllment, guided by the awareness and the pursuit of the common 
good. Expressed in the spirit of human rights, it is a condition in which so-
ciety respects every individual’s dignity and moral sphere.8 
Narratives do not automatically become moral inquiry or create moral 
frameworks because they tell moral tales. One thing is certain, though: They 
make the abstract notions of right or wrong concrete. As Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1988:27) puts it, they disclose a world and make it easier for us to engage 
with it and make a decision. For instance, if a story tells us how a European 
multinational company dumped highly toxic waste in some corners of Af-
rica after the waste had been rejected in Europe, the reader of this account 
might feel that something is not right. If the story then goes on to show 
in detail how, for example, a woman gave birth to a malformed child, the 
reader’s judgment is further enhanced. The story does not need to make a 
judgment. The reader does.9 
Literature is not interested in engaging in the abstract notion of good 
and evil the way philosophy does; it shows the reader an aspect of people’s 
choices, especially in relation to other people’s lives. In this regard, narrative 
allows us to view the features of human actions through a microscope and 
urges us to ask questions about our humanity and the moral frameworks 
that guide it.10 Sartre puts it well when he states that “although literature 
is one thing and morality a quite different one, at the heart of the aesthetic 
imperative we discern the moral imperative” (67). To write about the human 
condition is to make human lives available for judgment. 
For African literature to be read as an inquiry or as capable of highlight-
ing the riches of ordinary virtues, therefore, it must take the African body 
seriously, and it must believe in African moral agency. It must engage with 
questions such as: what is the African body to another African? What are 
Africans to one another?11 Any story that arises out of these conditions, 
therefore, challenges all to respond—that is, to take a position either for or 
against the life and dignity of persons involved. Every decision is further 












Method and structure 
Given the interdisciplinary nature of this book, I have strived to pay equal 
attention to philosophical, literary, and socio-anthropological texts. As a 
philosopher and literary scholar, however, I fnd my discussions fltered 
heavily through philosophical prism. I can only hope that the reader grants 
me this indulgence. The literary works discussed here are not representative 
of the immense range of the corpus of African literature. I have discussed 
many of them in Ethics and Human Rights in Contemporary Anglophone 
Women’s Literature, with emphasis on feminist issues. The justice and hu-
man rights arguments I map out here—that is, my emphasis on the notions 
of dignity, the common good, and human fourishing—can with some nu-
ance apply to most works not represented here. Of acute importance for 
me is the content and quality of a society’s relation to its individuals and 
individuals’ relationship to one another. 
The decisive factor in my choice of literature is the degree to which
these works underline the importance of reading African texts that
show a new understanding of justice and global issues such as ecologi-
cal violence, gender violence, prejudice against those with albinism, and
homophobia. My interest in flms here is restricted to those produced in
Nigeria over the past twenty years and which go by the evocative name
“Nollywood.” Some of these flms have been identifed as promoting the
abuse of human rights through their glorifcation of witchcraft and hu-
man ritual sacrifces. Watching these flms raises important questions
about the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, especially regard-
ing human rights. The flms achieve the exact opposite of what the other
texts do, and that draws critical attention to their role in shaping society’s
moral sentiments. I compare the Nollywood flms with one of the aesthet-
ically and ethically more satisfying flms, namely I Am Not a Witch, also 
on the same topic. 
This book is divided into two thematic sections: (a) justice and the envi-
ronment and (b) mythic consciousness and the (de)construction of differ-
ence, and intimate justice. The frst is fairly straightforward. The second is 
broad and more complex, and in it, I explore the moral implications of the 
attitudes toward various markers of difference in African societies, such as 
color (albinism), gender, ethnicity, “child witches,” and homophobia. I ex-
amine in particular how the narratives around these markers of difference 
shape people’s relationships with other humans to whom these markers ap-
ply and their implication for social and intimate justice. 
The chapters are arranged to make the linear argument that the concern 
for our environment leads to concern for oneself, for the other, and fnally 
for the well-being of community and society. Chapters 1 and 2 center on 
the environment of human rights, conceived in physical and moral terms. 
Chapters 3 and 4 center on social justice and examine the structure and im-
plications of mythic consciousness on human rights. Chapters 5 and 6 focus 
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on intimate justice and are concerned with the violence of normativity. They 
consider in particular the violence of categorization in regard to heterosexu-
ality and its implications within a given patriarchal order. 
The central goal of Chapter 1 is twofold: First, it establishes the need for 
a strong moral framework and the pursuit of the common good in society 
and that justice forms the centerpiece of that. The second purpose is to show 
that narratives help us establish the idea of the common good. Narratives 
appeal to an imagined community that abides by universal frameworks. 
Furthermore, this chapter breaks down the language of human rights in 
idioms that can bring their universal ideas closer to the African reality. 
Chapter 2 presents the argument that awareness of the fragility of our 
environment and human life are the two sides of the same coin of the hu-
man condition. The argument of this chapter is structured in three steps: 
(a) I discuss the environment as an integral part of the common good and 
a moral responsibility for all; (b) I analyze the sociocultural philosophy of 
Wangari Maathai, Africa’s preeminent environmentalist and Nobel Peace 
Prize winner. I discuss her conception of the environment as a vital part of 
the common good; and, fnally (c) I trace the colonial mindset that guides 
the relationship between developed and developing nations concerning eco-
logical violence. Against the backdrop of the above issues, this chapter ana-
lyzes how African writers position ecological violence as a human rights 
issue. I focus in particular on how Nigerian writers and activists such as 
Gabriel Okara, Tanure Ojaide, Ogaga Ifowodo, Nnimmo Bassey, and Helon 
Habila responded to the ecological catastrophe caused by multinational oil 
companies in the Niger Delta. 
Chapter 3 establishes how mythic consciousness creates the phenomenon 
of witchcraft in Africa and how the phenomenon hampers awareness and 
promotion of human rights. The goal of this chapter is to show how stories 
(myths) can be abused, that is, used to block people’s portals of empathy. I 
work from the premise that the respect people have for one another and for 
strangers is correlated to the image of the human person in their stories. 
Chapter 4 enhances the notion of mythic consciousness and discusses 
the major humanistic challenge that people with albinism face: barriers to 
being. In most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, people with albinism are 
viewed as not just different; in some cases, they are murdered, and their 
body parts harvested for ritual purposes. Very few narratives have engaged 
this issue. With the support of ample anthropological evidence, I discuss 
three fctional narratives: Jenny Robson’s Because Pula Means Rain, Tara 
Sullivan’s Golden Boy, and Petina Gappah’s The Book of Memory. I analyze 
the African world from the perspectives of characters with albinism and 
employ Frantz Fanon’s postcolonial theory to shed light on this condition. 
The central concern of Chapter 5 is how the African body is seen as the 
theater of religious and cultural politics, thus rendering it easy to violate 
people’s intimate space. I focus specifcally on the bodies of the members of 














lesbians are seen as imitating a decadent Western lifestyle and are therefore 
corrupting Africa. They are thus subjected to different forms of humilia-
tion, including corrective rape and murder. Countries such as Uganda and 
Nigeria have enacted laws banning “homosexual activities.” Since then there 
have been numerous cases of violence against gays and lesbians. This chap-
ter analyzes selected poetry from the LGBTQ community, the documentary 
flm Call Me Kuchu, and Chinelo Okparanta’s novel Under the Udala Tree. 
In many instances, women are seen only through the prism of utility, all 
in the name of tradition or maintaining the community’s survival. Chapter 
6 discusses the attitudes toward women that see them as means to socie-
ty’s ends and how these attitudes often morph into outright enslavement of 
women. It discusses three novels: Adeyemi Adebayo’s Stay with Me, Buchi 
Emecheta’s The Joys of Motherhood, and Mariama Bâ’s So Long a Letter. 
The conclusion is a meditation on forgiveness as a fundamental aspect 
of restorative justice. Focusing on Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s memoir, A 
Human Being Died That Night, I discuss how the testimonies deposed be-
fore the TRC provide good examples for our understanding of the power of 
narratives to demonstrate the imbrication of justice, ordinary virtues, and 
the common good. 
Notes 
1 I shall be using the terms human rights and social justice as concrete manifesta-
tion of the more abstract term, justice. 
2 To be sure, Anker’s discussion of J. M. Coetzee and Nawal El Saadawi is as 
African as it gets. 
3 It also admits that despite the claim to the universality of human rights, not all 
cultures or societies subscribe to its assumptions. For example, in their Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights, African nations sought to temper the univer-
sality of the UDHR and its focus on the individual with their emphasis on peo-
ple’s rights. See African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,” http://www.achpr.org/instruments/ 
achpr/#a29. 
4 I address Ignatieff’s rich but controversial opinion further in Chapter 1. 
5 This also underscores the moral assumptions of the South African TRC, which 
highlighted the importance of personal and community testimonies. These tes-
timonies did not rely on the force of law but on the possibility of rediscovering 
people’s common humanity by narrating their experiences for ready ears. 
6 By narratability, I mean the ability to put in credible story form relevant values 
or ideas about the human condition. 
7 I will explore this in greater detail in Chapter 1. 
8 I understand that the notion of happiness has been tainted by the American un-
derstanding, which seems to suggest greed and rugged individualism. My uses 
of the concept are far from this. Indeed, it might even be seen as its opposite. I 
take into consideration the individual’s awareness of the common good and the 
consequence of one’s actions on others and the community. It also implies that 
community must not stand in the way of an individual’s moral space. 
9 I admit that the judgement is not a given. Readers do not react in the same way 







10 For literature to be read as moral inquiry or as capable of creating moral frame-
works, instances of right or wrong have to be signaled; narratives have to relate 
to an issue in the public consciousness and therefore urge people to respond. 
There are many ways a narrative can thrust issues into the public consciousness, 
one of which is what a character does, says, or wishes; it is simply the experience 
of a character. Once an issue is suggested by attention to the character’s expe-
rience, there has to be complex interpretation, which includes attention to lan-
guage, style, and other techniques employed in literary production. I will fesh 
out this thinking in Chapter 1. 
11 These are, of course, the universal questions that underwrite every ethical 
inquiry. 
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1 Narratives and the 
common  good 
The fact that the notion of human rights is abstract and in many cases con-
tentious is very much known. Different cultures and societies conceive of 
it in different ways. For example, most Africans associate it with Western 
moral imperialism and specifcally with nongovernmental organizations 
headquartered in New York, London, or Paris. Human rights, they believe, 
is not original to Africa. Yet when confronted with the granular details of 
the contents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), they 
admit that human rights is as African as African people’s respect for their 
elders and neighbors. What, then, accounts for the apparent disconnect be-
tween the noble aspirations of the UDHR and their instantiations in peo-
ple’s lives? 
Africans are not alone in this apparent mistrust of aspects of the human 
condition. Cynicism toward human rights is widespread in the West. For-
mer leader of the Liberal Party of Canada Michael Ignatieff (2017a:4) does 
not believe in the universal claims of the Declaration either; rather, he pro-
poses ordinary virtues as a better alternative, and, for him, ordinary virtues 
mean “the common practices of trust and tolerance, forgiveness and recon-
ciliation that are the essence of private moral behavior.” In June 2013, he led 
a small team of moral inquirers on a journey of discovery, which took them 
to four continents, specifcally to villages, shantytowns, favelas, and poor 
neighborhoods, where they interviewed citizens and dwellers about their 
views of the world and human rights. He states that the most outstanding 
feature in the expression of morality among the people he interviewed is how 
little the people used the universal principles of any kind to justify their re-
lationship to their fellow humans. On the contrary, “they reasoned in terms 
of the local, the contingent, the here and now” (Ignatieff 2017b:208). Rather 
than organize their moral life according to abstract principles of justice, or 
imagining “the human race beyond the veil of ignorance […they imagined] 
themselves: their own refection in the mirror” (208). It is as diffcult to dis-
prove this observation as it is to believe that humans do not care much about 
other humans outside their immediate circle. 
In light of the above, I wonder whether we can truly manage our increas-
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idols of the tribe, idioms rooted in universality. I duly acknowledge the Af-
rican (and postcolonial) mistrust of the discourse of universality because of 
its provenance in Western modernity. However, I argue that we also need 
universals, even while holding on to the virtues rooted in the world we know. 
How then can we bridge the gap between the grandiose language of justice 
and human rights and its practical relevance to people’s lives? How do we 
explain to an average African that accusing his or her neighbor of witchcraft 
is unjust and a gross abuse of the other’s human rights and that this other 
deserves those rights because he or she has intrinsic dignity as a human be-
ing, a universal property? 
I think it is safe to say that any proper understanding of universal human 
rights must take into account its origins in the ordinary virtues of co-feeling,
care, tolerance, and so on. This much is obvious in the many versions of the 
history of human rights in Europe. For example, Lynn Hunt (2007:34–39) 
argues that eighteenth-century European sentimental novels such as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s Julie or the New Héloïse and Samuel Richardson’s 
Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747–1748) provoked a “torrent of emotions” 
and co-feeling in their readers because of the way they shed light on the 
pains of their protagonists and so contributed to the thoughts captured in 
the proclamation of “the rights of man.” Ultimately the notion of empathy, 
this most basic of the ordinary virtues, was an integral part in the thinking 
about universal human rights. As Hunt states, 
novels made the point that all people are fundamentally similar because 
of their inner feelings, and many novels showcased in particular the de-
sire for autonomy. In this way, reading novels created a sense of equality 
and empathy through passionate involvement in the narrative. 
(39) 
Even before the eighteenth century, stories have always been a reliable 
means to appeal to people’s sense of solidarity, as I have already implied in 
my references to Mencius and Jesus. It is therefore worth posing the ques-
tion: What can thoughts about justice and human rights in Africa learn 
from narratives about African lives? 
I seek to achieve two main things in this chapter: First, establish the ab-
solute importance of universal moral frameworks for the existence of decent 
societies and participatory democracy in Africa, and second, show how nar-
ratives can bring us closer to those moral frameworks, part of which is the 
notion of human rights. UDHR and all the subsequent Conventions and 
Covenants gesture toward universal moral frameworks that imagine all na-
tions (indeed, all societies) as parts of a community. When people describe 
their conditions as threatened, they appeal to that community in the knowl-
edge or assumption that all are bound by the frameworks that make us what 
we truly are as humans. As Kay Schaffer and Sidone Smith (2004:3) argue 
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of rights violations and in the larger court of public opinion, life narrative 
becomes essential to affect recourse, mobilize action, forge communities of 
interest, and enable social change.” What they recognize as the larger court 
of public opinion, I call universal moral frameworks and which I under-
stand further down within the context of the common good. In pursuit of 
these goals, I break down human rights in the idioms of ordinary virtues 
that are an essential part of African people’s lives, as surely they are a part 
of lives elsewhere. 
Stories, values, and the community 
James Dawes, the founding director of Human Rights and Humanitarianism 
at Macalester College, has observed that literature and human rights have 
increasingly gained attention in world literature. Much of that attention had 
been devoted to “ideology critique and moral normativization. Critics have 
framed texts by way of ethical paradoxes inherent to the broader human 
rights movement itself” (2018:4). I think such critiques are in order when 
dealing with developed societies of the West, which have some degree of eth-
ical and legal standards.1 The human rights situation in Africa and, perhaps 
increasingly in the West, given the growing coarseness of society, requires a 
return to the basis of society’s moral framework. After the end of apartheid, 
South Africa was faced with the colossal but fundamental and delicate task 
of demonstrating the humanity of all, despite the horrors of the past. The 
task was all the more complex because the colonial and apartheid systems 
had never granted black people that basic affrmation. On the other hand, 
it appears to be impossible to expect black people to extend equal humanity 
to those who had brutally oppressed them for centuries. 
It is perhaps part of Nelson Mandela’s ingenuity and boundary-defying
legacy that his government came up with a simple idea of people telling
one another their stories of suffering in the now famous Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission (TRC). The goal of the TRC was to provide a new
context for understanding justice; it was to create a condition for restor-
ative rather than retributive justice. It was to restore the humanity of all,
the oppressors and the oppressed. As Dawes (2009:395) has observed, “The
TRC was arguably one of the most visible acts of collective storytelling in
the history of human rights endeavors.… It was quite self-consciously an
exercise in narration and healing.” The TRC did not bring about a perfect
peace or economic progress or the acceptance of the humanity of all South
Africans. Its greatest achievement, though, was the creation of moral
frameworks that would make the pursuance of those goals worthwhile and
credible. 
In his justifcation of the modalities of the TRC, Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu (1999:26) states: “Since we were exhorted by our enabling legislation 
to rehabilitate the human and civil dignity of victims, we allowed those who 
came to testify mainly to tell their stories in their own words.” Archbishop 
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Tutu alludes to the special atmosphere surrounding the ritual of testimo-
nies. The TRC created special context and condition that gave the victims 
the feeling of being taken seriously. The victims felt readmitted into the uni-
versal humanity. Of importance is Tutu’s interpretation of the humanistic 
reach of the mandate given to them. He underlines what he believes has 
been one of the immediate results of such an exercise when he relays the 
testimony provided by one of those who had told about their ordeals during 
apartheid. According to Tutu, the man said: 
Archbishop, we have told our story to many on several occasions, to 
newspapers and to the TV. This is the frst time though that after telling 
it we feel as if a heavy load has been removed from our shoulders. 
(26) 
I read the man’s metaphor of a heavy load being removed from his shoulders 
as a feeling of not only relief but also of becoming whole and being a mem-
ber of the human community. I think it is fair to suggest that the man felt 
that justice has been served.2 
Based on Archbishop Tutu’s testimony, it does appear that the ordinary 
act of narration links one’s humanity to that of others in society. It makes 
people, ordinary people, feel their mutual reliance on one another. Their 
dependence is not economic, social, or political; it is moral and to the degree 
that it helps people to appreciate their own dignity and that of others. We 
note in the man’s testimony the special context in which a heavy load has 
been removed from his shoulders. The context is the gathering of the com-
munity as distinct from an audience of one journalist. The gathering of the 
community recalls the origins of storytelling in the caves and small groups 
in the tribe, situations in which people told stories in order to live, as Joan 
Didion (2006) suggests. Every story assumes a community so that there is a 
special bond between the individual (the narrator) and the community (the 
listener). Commenting on Desmond Tutu’s reading of the testimonies of the 
TRC, Eleni Coundouriotis (2006) argues that how one understands dignity 
affects how one perceives political struggle and social and political power. It 
does appear, therefore, that Tutu interprets dignity frst and foremost as be-
ing fully integrated into the human community. His whole political struggle 
has been the creation of a rainbow community. 
What is communicated in the narrative act is the awareness of the moral 
presence of the others in our lives; that is, with the stories come the virtues 
of compassion, care, a common search for truth, and some shared sense of 
justice. Tutu makes a rigorous distinction between the type of justice that is 
communicated through the TRC, which is restorative, and the conventional 
Western understanding of the same, which is retributive. Dignity is integral 
to our understanding of human rights and belongs squarely in the sphere of 
restorative justice. What is restored is precisely what had been denied: the 
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to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is 
enhanced when approached from the South African notion of ubuntu, which 
I discuss in the later part of this chapter. 
As much as every society needs legal frameworks to assure that people’s 
dignity and rights are not trampled upon, laws cannot initiate or sustain 
these virtues in people; they must be initiated in interpersonal relationships 
outside the reach of laws. As Eleanor Roosevelt states, human rights and 
dignity must be sought “in small places, close to home” (Horton 2007). 
Human rights are therefore approached from the bottom up, not the other 
way around. Its approach emphasizes ordinary virtues, and it is in light of 
the ethical and human rights impulses of the TRC that this book examines 
the role of narrative in the promotion of justice and human rights in Africa. 
It asks: What is the relationship between the stories we tell about ourselves 
and others and the dignity we accord humans? What is the image of the 
human person in the stories we tell? 
Literature is about the stories we tell. We do so for many reasons, some 
of which include entertainment, keeping ourselves company, and imparting 
lessons that could be religious, moral, or mundane. Sociologist Arthur W. 
Frank (2010:46) argues: “Stories teach people what to look for and what 
can be ignored; they teach what to value and what to hold in contempt.” 
Frank’s claim is true based alone on the material we select for our stories; 
every choice of material reveals the value system of the person who makes 
that choice. Also, the way a story is arranged—what is highlighted and 
what is suppressed—says much about what is important and what is less 
so. Through a subtle and often complex system of fgures, signs, and sym-
bols, stories thus shape our values and display our moral dispositions to the 
world. 
Walter Fisher (1984:6) argues that regardless of the form our stories take, 
the primary thing in storytelling is “to establish a meaningful life-world.” 
There will be differences in character, conficts, and so on, “but each mode 
of recounting and accounting for is but a way of relating a ‘truth’ about the 
human condition.” What is at stake here is the human community. Who 
deserves to stay in? Who is to be excluded? A person who tells about his 
pain wants that experience to be taken seriously. He or she wants others to 
feel what he or she has felt, if only vicariously. The assumption of co-feeling 
suggests the desire of the narrator to be welcomed into a world, out of which 
his or her experience of pain had forced him or her. He or she wants to know 
that he or she, too, is human. 
At the most obvious and perhaps more immediately and ethically reward-
ing level, stories provide us with characters whose mere existence excites 
our curiosity and, when translated into everyday encounters, reads like the 
questions we might pose to a stranger: Who are you? What is your name? 
Where are you from? What is your value or belief system? These questions 
are, of course, implicit in our curiosity about the characters and signify 
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forces us to engage that world and to interrogate some of our settled biases. 
The encounter between texts and readers becomes truly moral when a re-
lationship is initiated in the form of identifcation with characters, world-
views, or events, or rejection of the same. Either way, judgment is involved; 
every judgment implies responsibility, which is already a moral exercise but 
one whose nature is yet unknown. 
The relationship between literature and ethics is as old as humanity’s ef-
fort to understand the universe. As Martha Nussbaum (1999:15) explains, 
ancient Greek dramatists have always seen literature as a form of ethical 
inquiry. Dramatic poetry was no more than “ways of pursuing, a single and 
general question: namely, how human beings should live.” Aristotle (1996:10) 
identifes the moral importance of narratives when he defned tragedy as 
an imitation of an action that is admirable, complete and possesses 
magnitude; in language made pleasurable, each of its species separated 
in different parts, performed by actors, not through narration; effecting 
through pity and fear the purifcation of such emotions. 
Tragedy is thus a way of re-presenting some painful aspects of human life 
that are deemed important, especially for the purpose of underlining them. 
Aristotle is proposing the most basic co-feeling produced in the audience by
the tragic condition being performed on the stage. Stephen Halliwell (1998:175)
states that pity and fear should be understood as the “capacity to sympathize
with the sufferer.” Thus, what is performed on the stage are those aspects of
the human condition whose goal, among other things, is to bring the audience
emotionally closer to the fgures on the stage. He emphasizes that “Aristotle
does not derive this sympathy from an undifferentiated sense of humanity:
instead, he takes it to be rooted in a felt or perceived affnity between the sub-
ject and the object of the emotion.” In that regard, tragic characters “have to
be within the reach of an audience’s compassion” (175–179). Halliwell’s use of
the word compassion goes beyond the limited scope of sympathy and seems to
be closer to what true stories do in our lives; they help us develop empathy, as
David Swanger (1993) suggests. What is important, therefore, is the fact that
the piece of representation, whether performed on the stage or read in the
pages of a book, unleashes a torrent of emotions in the audience. 
The ordinary virtues and their limits: the need for stories 
As I have sought to establish in the introductory part of this chapter, 
Michael Ignatieff has aptly articulated the growing skepticism associated 
with the notion of universal human rights. For him, human rights and the 
ordinary virtues are in tension, and he privileges the latter. Indeed, for him, 
Human rights enjoins citizens to be morally consistent and universalis-
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will always pull them toward favoring citizens close to home. The meet-
ing point between the language of rights and the ordinary virtues is 
actually the language of compassion, pity, and generosity. 
(2017b:214) 
The core of the tension between human rights and the ordinary virtues,
as Ignatieff argues, lies in the fact that the human rights activist or the
global ethicist is concerned only with the vulnerable universal human be-
ing while ignoring human differences such as race, class, or situation,
and regarding “the distinction, for example, between a citizen and a
stranger as morally irrelevant”; the person informed by ordinary virtues
on the other hand, “the citizen-stranger, the us-versus-them distinction,
was the frst consideration, the starting point for decision making. The
universal human being was rarely if ever the object of ultimate concern”
(2017b:207–208). 
Ignatieff is correct to highlight the basic, individualistic instinct in all 
ethical concerns. We care most about those we know. Yet, when he states 
that majority of those he and his team interviewed rather imagined their 
“own refection in the mirror” (2017b:208) while justifying their behavior, he 
seems to see them as mere narcissists, denying them the power of imagina-
tion to put themselves in the position of peoples elsewhere and to respond to 
their humanity (2017b:208). He seems to paint a particularly bleak picture 
of the human person. There is, in any case, some truth in the suggestion that 
humans are largely ruled by tribal instincts. The other side of that truth is 
that when they get to know other people, they also get to care about them. 
To know is to care. Given that both the universal ethicist and the local ordi-
nary virtue practitioner care about humans, what seems to be at stake here 
is the language in which that care is couched on the one hand, and on the 
other the degree of affnity, that is, the problem associated with knowing 
others. This is indeed the case, unless Ignatieff is implying that the local 
person is essentially xenophobic. 
Perhaps a few questions that the practitioner of ordinary virtues must an-
swer include: Do we have the obligation to save a drowning person, regard-
less of the gender or the color of the person’s skin? What does saving or not 
saving him or her say about our conception of the common good or moral 
frameworks as humans?3 Do we have the obligation to care about civilians 
in war zones or strangers in our midst? Essentially, the difference between 
universal human rights and the ordinary virtues is this: The ordinary vir-
tues urge us to respect somebody because we know him or her. UDHR tells 
us to do the same because he or she is a human being. My sympathy lies with 
the latter, and this does not deny my right to love my relatives more because 
of my obligation to them. But that leaves us with the question of how to 
bridge the gap between the two, the tension between universal human rights 
and the ordinary virtues, without delimiting their impact or making them 
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It is true that to care is necessarily to care about the people one knows. 
But we also live in a world that is increasingly shrinking due to globalization 
and mass migration. Our world is becoming a global village, despite the rise 
of tribal sentiments. This calls for putting the ordinary virtues “on ster-
oids,” to use Carl Pope’s (2010:294) expression regarding the environment. It 
calls for increasing the circle of people we know, or specifcally, to keep our 
horizon open for the yet to be known. So, the question is how to reduce the 
“difference and otherness” (Ignatieff 2017b:210) that dominate the world of 
ordinary virtues and possibly increase the awareness of the togetherness of 
our common humanity. 
Thus far, we have established that a narrative achieves at least two things: 
(1) It delivers the world of others to us and makes it understandable, thus 
making it easier for us to relate to them (Palumbo-Liu 2012:3–9), and (2) 
it provokes some degree of affective identifcation or rejection of what has 
been delivered to us; it conveys values. In both cases, we encounter a new 
world, and this encounter has a lot in common with those we have in real 
life. It differs signifcantly, though, in terms of its composition. In real life, 
we meet people fairly as they are, not always in neatly packaged formats. 
Stories are neatly structured, and the materials that make up their compo-
sition are meticulously selected. As Wolfgang Iser (1980) argues, the act of 
selecting materials for a story heavily affects the manner of its reception. 
The storytellers select materials they believe will achieve the most dramatic 
effect. They plot carefully. 
To explain the ethical content of Aristotle’s defnition of tragedy, Paul 
Ricoeur (1991:21) introduces the notion of emplotment. For him, “the plot 
serves to make one story out of the multiple incidents or, if you prefer, trans-
forms the many incidents into one story.” Even when we narrate the stories 
of our lives, as was the case with the South African TRC, we select only 
materials we believe would make the most impact and arrange them in a way 
that would be most coherent; we hope that our stories would make us less 
strange to our listeners—that is, make it easier for them to apply ordinary 
virtues to us. Through emplotment, the disparate incidents in a particular 
life are organized into a distinct meaning-making narrative. Interpretation 
is not confned to reading; every act of telling is an interpretation that is also 
an appeal to the reader. Stated simply, the story says: Can you feel what I 
feel? Do you understand me? It is the narrator’s ardent wish not to remain 
anonymous or a stranger. 
Stories have, indeed, been the most effective ways of teaching lessons about
life and the dignity of every human. For instance, consider the parable of the
Good Samaritan. When a legal scholar posed a question to Jesus about the
love of God and the nature of our neighbor, Jesus did not engage in abstract le-
galism; he told the story of the Good Samaritan. In this story, a certain Jewish
trader traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho is robbed, severely beaten, and left
for dead. A priest passes by, but pays the man no attention. A Levite does
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is of interest in the parable is the choice of characters: a priest, a Levite, and a
Samaritan. The scholar recognized that the assaulted man’s true neighbor is
neither the priest nor the Levite, who are Jews, but rather the Samaritan, who
is not ethnically related to the assaulted man. The story forced the scholar to
make a moral judgment. Essentially, then, narration is not a blind act. It is
designed to achieve some effects—in this case, to drive home a moral lesson
about the universal nature of love. Thus, in the Samaritan and the business
man, the abstract notion of love of all humans meet the concreteness of care.
In light of Aristotle’s notion of tragedy, narration is a moral act, for the writer
also reveals his or her biases in the act of selection. As I suggested in the in-
troduction, a writer who writes about an issue such as toxic waste disposed
in some part of Africa is already assuming that the reader will be moved to
make a judgment; he or she wants us to care about the people we do not know.
But the writer can never be sure of the reader’s response, and that is why
works of fction are an appeal, albeit a structured and calculated one. 
I am drawn to Jean-Paul Sartre’s (1988:54) timeless observation that “all 
literary work is an appeal. To write is to make an appeal to the reader that 
he lead into objective existence the revelation which I have undertaken by 
means of language.” I understand this appeal in terms of the demands of the 
ordinary virtues, the demand to imagine these otherwise strange persons 
presented to us in stories as if they were our neighbors. Taking this leap of 
imagination is not an easy task, but there lies the seed of the universality of 
human rights. What makes the difference here is whether we are relating to 
a person because he or she is our tribesperson or we are relating to him or 
her simply because he or she is a human being. 
As in the parable, to become engaged in the narrated details of a human 
life is an ethical act, crossing the bridge of foreignness and reaching out to 
the other in a gesture that binds both to the same humanity. This is an act 
that at the least de-exoticizes the stranger. Only when a story presents im-
portant details without forcing itself on the reader does the narrator evoke 
a sympathetic understanding, which takes into account various aspects of 
the lives of individuals as parts of a comprehensive whole. Meaningful links 
between different and often contradictory events are formed in ways that 
lead to insight. It becomes obvious, therefore, that we cannot fully under-
stand a particular incident in a person’s life without knowing many other 
details. This is a special domain of the hermeneutic circle that states that 
“we must understand the whole from the individual and the individual from 
the whole” (Gadamer 1988:68–78). The understanding provided by a narra-
tive in this way is rooted in our imaginative reconstruction of people’s expe-
riences. In this reconstruction, we literally become these otherwise strange 
“others.” We live their lives. It is in this regard that Mark Johnson (1993:x) 
argues that moral reasoning is basically an imaginative activity because it 
“requires imagination to discern what is morally relevant in situations, to 
understand, empathetically, how others experience things, and to envision 
the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular case.” 
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Following Johnson’s defnition of moral reasoning, understanding others’ 
experiences gives us the added advantage of creating a more humane, less 
legalistic community. To be sure, we can never fully understand the other’s 
experience; we can only approximate it by a leap of imagination. We cannot 
do away with legal frameworks either. Stories help us in that regard. Follow-
ing Johnson’s suggestion, morality is always about our actual concrete rela-
tions to others, and these relations can be enhanced by stories. Thus, stories 
help us become moral agents. In the context of the world presented to us by 
stories, what really counts is the fact that these others are humans. Given 
that stories have stripped them of their strangeness, we are then more able 
to relate to them in ways we would want to be related to if we were in their 
position. From this perspective, therefore, the UDHR no longer appears as 
abstract as it sounds, and nor do concepts such as autonomy, dignity, and 
justice. To apply them to the people we know as to those we had not known, 
therefore, becomes a matter of stretching our imagination. 
We tell stories for the sake of the common good 
From the foregoing we can infer that the relationship between narrative and 
morality is indirect—that is, literature affects moral consciousness indi-
rectly by initiating a thought process or identifcation with a world and for 
the sake of the common good. Donald Morrison (2013:182) differentiates 
between the common good and the public good. The public good, as un-
derstood by economists, “is a good that is equally available to others, and 
no one can be effectively excluded from use of the good.” The public good 
is essential to the pursuit of the common good, which is moral, universal, 
and permanent. 
The notion of the common good can be traced back to Aristotle’s concep-
tion of the city-state. Every community, he argues, is established with a view 
of some good. And since every community is “formed for the sake of some 
good” it is clear that “the community that has the most control of all, and 
encompasses all the others, aims both at the good that has the most control 
of all and does so to the highest degree” (Aristotle 2017:2). It is instructive 
that community is central in this assertion; it can be assumed that whatever 
good comes from the act of establishing a community must serve those who 
established it and for whom it is established: all those who live in it. Good 
is then understood as what serves all.4 Aristotle further explains that the 
community comes together “for the sake of living, but it exists for the sake 
of living well” (2017:3). 
What does it mean to live well, for Aristotle? What is the good life for 
which the community exists? For that, we turn to his ethics, specifcally to 
the concept of eudaimonia—human fourishing or prosperity, which I have 
already referred to in the introduction. To add to my discussion in this chap-
ter, human fourishing refers to a condition in which every free individual 
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and respected in their community. This cannot come about without a frame-
work, that is, a standard of acceptable ways of relating to others. There is 
therefore a link between the feeling of dignity and the community. Con-
versely, the community exists to create a space in which individuals achieve 
their highest happiness or fulfllment. The “common good” is the enabling 
condition for individuals to achieve eudaimonia. It is important to note the 
emphasis laid on the individual. Happiness takes place only in the individ-
ual, but it cannot be realized through excluding others. So the community 
exists for all, and all are ethically obliged to ensure its survival. At this stage, 
regarding our discussion of narratives and human rights, we can provide a 
preliminary standard for judging a story: Does it help or hamper the real-
ization of the common good? Does it increase or limit the freedom of indi-
viduals? Does it help to bring the other closer to us, familiarize him or her 
to us so that we can relate to him or her as we would like to be related to if 
we were in his or her situation? 
Dorothea Frede (2013:14–15) argues that the core of Aristotle’s ethics is 
political and that “ethics is part of politics because the life of an entire com-
munity is a higher aim than the life of an individual, has a deeper back-
ground.” Perhaps one might add that in Aristotle’s thinking, the life of a 
community is higher than that of the individual if and only if the commu-
nity truly lives in tune with its calling as a space that assures individual 
freedom and well-being.5 
Ubuntu as an act of storytelling 
To narrate is to situate oneself or at least fctional characters phenomeno-
logically in the manner of “This is me. Here I am.” This is an acknowledg-
ment of oneself as an embodied being. In stories, we articulate a particular 
sense of ourselves. We also get a sense of other selves and the kind of world 
they want to live in; we present ourselves to the other, and we do so in all our 
vulnerability. Stories provide the answer to the questions implicit in the act 
of reading, such as “Who are you?” and “Where are you from?” In a story, 
the narrator says: This is who I am. 
In stories, we aim to achieve the ethical premise of ubuntu articulated in the
now-famous phrase embodying the African traditional conception of com-
munity: “I am because you are.” The dialogical relationship captured in that
expression refects that which exists between texts and readers. I have dis-
cussed ubuntu elsewhere (Eze 2017), but I think it merits more attention, espe-
cially in light of the philosophical contexts of narratives and justice in Africa.
The core of this ethical attitude is captured in the expression “Ubuntu ngu-
muntu ngabantu,” or “A person is a person through other persons.” Desmond
Tutu (1999:31) states that ubuntu “speaks of the very essence of being human.
[It implies] … My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.”
We belong in a bundle of life.” Ubuntu can be seen in this light as a common
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of the abstract nature of human rights, Archbishop Tutu contrasts ubuntu
with the Western notion of the individual. “It is not, ‘I think therefore I am.’
It says rather, ‘I am human because I belong. I participate. I share’” (31). 
Stories present us with a world that draws us into the context of “I par-
ticipate. I share.” We participate or share in other people’s lives and let ours 
open to be shared. As the Nigerian human rights scholar Bonny Ibhawoh 
(2018:32) argues: 
from the standpoint of Ubuntu, there can be no human rights without 
community. What makes Ubuntu as an African moral principle so sig-
nifcant for human rights is that it helps us see individuals not as iso-
lated entities, but as linked in a web of social relationships founded on 
empathy and compassion. 
Ibhawo anchors the notion of human rights in the African traditional moral 
world and in the long history of African liberation struggles, which cul-
minated with Nelson Mandela. The South African philosopher Thaddeus 
Metz (2011:537) argues that the expression “A person is a person through 
other persons” captures 
a normative account of what we ought to most value in life. Personhood, 
selfhood and humanness … are value-laden concepts. That is, one can 
be more or less of a person, self or human being, where the more one is, 
the better. One’s ultimate goal in life should be to become a (complete) 
person, a (true) self or a (genuine) human being. 
I fully agree with this interpretation of the moral agency implicit in that 
expression, especially in light of Metz’s conclusion, that “One becomes a 
moral person insofar as one honours communal relationships” (2011:547). 
His emphasis on the development of moral personhood can also be under-
stood within the context of the UDHR as a call to all to provide an ena-
bling ambience in which every individual can fourish and in which people 
relate to one another in the spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood. In this 
way, moral personhood begins the moment an individual becomes aware 
of the degree to which he or she contributes to the affrmation of others 
because, according to the expression “I am because you are,” it holds that 
this other cannot be who he or she is without oneself. This expression can 
also be taken to mean that our values attain meaning or justifcation only 
within our agreed framework. We are therefore bound to the common good. 
Within the context of ubuntu, therefore, the body is always embedded in the 
community.6 The expression “I am because you are” places the condition 
of the existence of my body in that of the other. The you refers to both the 
singular and plural forms of the second person. Human fourishing implies 
the fourishing of the individual in the company of others. Narratives take 
all the above conditions as given. 
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Every story depends on a reader to make sense of it. Somehow, the story 
begs the reader to bring it into full existence. In the same way, the story-
teller appeals to the listening world. Even in the act of telling, the reader is 
present, if only by implication. In reading, the storyteller is also present. At 
any rate, there is a meeting of two worlds, and the nature of this meeting is 
uncertain and fragile. One thing is certain, though: Dialogue exists between 
these two, however tenuous, and there is a meeting and melding of hori-
zons. Within the hermeneutic parameters of “I am because you are,” one is 
impelled to grant the other recognition by the grace of their shared human 
condition. In this regard, a moral framework or the common good is the 
space in which we acknowledge the fundamental importance of the other 
presented to us in a story and the necessity of our accommodating the other. 
To narrate oneself is to consider oneself seriously enough to be heard as 
much as it is to consider the other seriously enough to listen to oneself. Nar-
rative speaks to that common moral ecosystem shared by the narrator and 
the audience. We need morality to live, just as we need stories. We have to 
make sense of our lives. Ubuntu is storytelling insofar as the narrator cannot 
function and the narrated world cannot make sense without the listener/ 
reader. It is a process of making meaning together. 
Justice as an element of the common good 
My concern in the foregoing sections is to establish the framework within 
which the moral assumptions of human rights can best be approached and to 
argue that narrative can help us achieve it. In this section, I provide a more 
detailed discussion of human rights—an instantiation of justice—especially
in relation to Africa. I discuss universal human rights as an important as-
pect of the moral framework of any decent society. My proposition is simple: 
Whoever believes in decent societies and that ordinary virtues are nonne-
gotiable must believe in human rights. Human rights are merely ordinary 
virtues amplifed to the community level. 
Africa has seen a growing interest in human rights and more scholarly 
discussions of the topic. Most of them explore either its cultural or legal 
aspects. Sylvia Tamale’s (2008) “The Right to Culture and the Culture of 
Rights” and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im’s (1990) Human Rights in Africa: 
Cross-cultural Perspectives examine the cultural aspects of human rights in 
Africa. As I have already pointed out, Bonny Ibhawoh provides a rich his-
torical analysis of human rights thought and movements in African post-
colonial history. Rachel Murray’s (2004) Human Rights in Africa: From the 
OAU to the African Union examines how the Organization of African Unity 
has dealt with human rights since its inception. 
I take my understanding of human rights as those enshrined in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 by the United Nations. 
More fundamentally, they are those rights that humans have by the mere 
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It is comparable to the rights one enjoys in the family into which one is born. 
A member of a family automatically carries the family name and lives in the 
house that belongs to the family by merely being born into it. According to 
James Nickel (2017), 
Human rights are norms that help to protect all people everywhere from 
severe political, legal, and social abuses. Examples of human rights are 
the right to freedom of religion, the right to a fair trial when charged 
with a crime, the right not to be tortured, and the right to engage in po-
litical activity. These rights exist in morality and in law at the national 
and international levels. 
Important in this defnition is the notion that the norms and the rights they
protect exist in both morality and law. Whereas some laws could be arbi-
trary, morality, as is implied in the UDHR, is as timeless as humanity itself.
My interest lies in this latter aspect of human rights, and my discussion of
human rights here is based on Article 1 of the UDHR: “All human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”
(United Nations). The Declaration is undoubtedly a legal document. For
the purposes of my discussion, especially in light of the conception of the
common good as an ethical property, I restrict myself to the moral aspect of
human rights. To that effect, the concepts of dignity, conscience, and spirit of
brotherhood (and sisterhood) take a prominent place in my discussions of the
narratives or incidents that add to our appreciation of human rights. 
The preamble of the Declaration addresses human dignity in the very frst 
lines of the document: “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world” (United Nations). The Council 
of Europe’s manual for educating young people about human rights brings 
this idea home in its claim that “Human rights are moral entitlements that 
every individual in the world possesses simply by virtue of the fact that he 
or she is a human being” (Council of Europe). It is instructive that human 
rights is described as a “moral entitlement” and that we understand it as a 
claim that an individual can make upon others. Perhaps the reason it is a 
claim has to do with what we have already identifed as the common good. 
As with being born into a family, occupying the same moral framework as 
others—a quality that differentiates humans from brutes—is the justifca-
tion for demanding honor and respect. So, respect is not a privilege, but 
rather a thing every individual must claim in every decent society. 
The Council of Europe explains further that this moral claim is what in-
dividuals make on their government and on their fellow humans; they tell 
their governments “You cannot do that, because it is a violation of my moral 
sphere and my personal dignity. No one—no individual, no government— 
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moral sphere and personal dignity is related to another important concept in 
Article 1 of the Declaration: conscience. A moral sphere refers to the qual-
ity or condition in which a person is deemed capable of making decisions 
about his or her life. Being a member of the human race already qualifes 
one as possessing a moral sphere, regardless of the state the person is—that 
is, whether the person is a child, mentally challenged, in a coma, or an adult 
in full possession of his or her faculties. It means acting as a moral agent, 
which all humans are by the grace of being human. 
As sentient beings, only individuals know what they feel and are thus the 
only persons who can know what is good or bad for them; that is, they are 
the only ones to justify those feelings. If every individual has the right to 
decide what is good for him or her, it implies that his or her moral/individ-
ual space is inviolable. No one, no state, and no agency can take over the 
individual agency, except when the individual is incapacitated or is deemed 
dangerous to the state, in which case the law takes care of that person. The 
profound implication here is that the abuse of human rights begins on the 
microcosmic and most basic ethical level when people violate other people’s 
moral spheres and make decisions that adversely affect other people’s lives 
without consulting them. The spirit of brotherhood is the fundamental im-
perative that directs all humans to act in a way that upholds the framework 
outside of which one’s life has no meaning. Without this moral force, the 
UDHR’s claim to universality would be arbitrary. The spirit of brotherhood 
is the backdrop against which ordinary virtues make sense. 
It is customary to think of human rights abuses only when heinous crimes 
are committed against a person or a group of people. I think it is more 
fruitful to emphasize the microcosmic level of human rights abuse or its 
appreciation, the level that ultimately leads to the large-scale abuses that 
often attract the public’s attention. I do this in the belief that all the well-
known cases of abuse of human rights, all forms of atrocities in history, did 
not start with spontaneous, explosive outbreak of violence. They all started 
with some form of gradual disregard for the other, and this disregard is nur-
tured in narratives until it is baked into beliefs and ideology and become a 
widely accepted form of prejudice. 
Not all cultures or parts of the world accept the logic that human rights 
holds universally. This is due to some problems inherent in its conception 
and execution. As Lora Wildenthal (2012) has observed, human rights lan-
guage is abstract and ahistorical because of the original intention of the ad-
vocates of human rights to capture the universality of its underlining ideas. 
For her, the abstract universality of human rights discourse is a problem for 
historians, who seek to understand language in a particular time and place. 
The abstract nature of the language of human rights is a problem not only
for historians; it is much more so for cultures outside the logocentric West-
ern world—that is, one that is centered on the primacy of reason over all
human faculties. Indeed, the second sentence of the Declaration underlines
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and conscience.” It implicitly downplays any conception of the human that
would highlight feeling, since feeling was thought to belong to lower animals.
Elizabeth S. Anker traces the problems associated with this aspect of hu-
man rights’ origins in the European liberal tradition, which privileged logos
over the body. She argues that even though the notions of human dignity on
which the UDHR is based are useful, they are ultimately fctions because of
the “contradictory status of the body within” that liberal tradition, which 
posits a dangerously purifed subject, one purged of the body’s assum-
edly anarchic appetencies: its needs and desires, its vulnerabilities and 
decay. And when the body cannot be thus ignored, the liberal tradition 
generally treats it as an entity that must be repressed, quarantined, or 
otherwise mastered by reason. 
(Anker 2012:4) 
The notion of human rights resting on reason was therefore a product of an 
abstract conception of the human that is traceable to Plato’s ideal world via 
Christian theology via Descartes’s cogito, and this world notoriously con-
siders the body to be inferior to the mind. 
Highlighting some of the issues associated with the Western origins of 
human rights, Professor Lynn Hunt, one of the eminent historians of human 
rights, suggests that one of the origins of human rights as entrenched in the 
1948 Declaration can be traced back to the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Hunt points out the obvious contradiction in the idea of human 
rights and its implementation in practice. Those who claimed that rights 
were universal were not inclusive in their treatment of their fellow humans, 
as women and black people were not part of the equation in Europe and 
America at the time. Thomas Jefferson, one of the pioneers of this universal 
idea, was at the same time a slaveholder and a strong proponent of the no-
tion that black people were not equal to whites. 
Opponents of the UDHR seize upon some of these ideas to claim that the 
notion of human rights is a European cultural construct and cannot be ap-
plied to all cultures (Howard-Hassmann 1995). Some contend that the ideas 
behind the documents cannot be universal because they are deeply rooted 
in a Western liberal conception of the world, especially its prioritizing of 
the individual over the community (Ramcharan 1998; Tharoor 1999/2000). 
Some people even propose a postcolonial argument to the effect that human 
rights are parts of a Western ploy to impose itself on the rest of the world 
and therefore cannot be universal (O’Sullivan 2000). Some of these critics 
rely on cultural relativism to counter human rights’ claim to universalism 
(Donnelly 1984:400–419). 
Nigerian human rights lawyer Chidi Anselm Odinkalu (1999) has ob-
served that Africans “do not describe their problems in human rights terms. 
Many communities and groups involved in social justice movements and 
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language inspired by it, their mascot or medium.” As most African scholars 
of human rights argue, Africa is not averse to the spirit of the UDHR. They, 
however, point to African conceptions of human rights are codifed in the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also known as the 
Banjul Charter (African Commission). There are, however, disagreements 
as to the specifcities derived from its genealogy. 
It seems to me to amount to a purely academic exercise to debate the 
proper designation of the struggles for African people to attain dignity. It 
is not the goal of this book to judge the adequacy of terms. It is, however, 
fair to state that the Banjul Charter highlights some of the general criticisms 
leveled against UDHR but does not disagree with its moral assumptions. 
Both declarations have one thing in common: the quest for justice, pursuit 
of human dignity, and the common good. 
Making human rights palpable in Africa 
The abovementioned weaknesses of the conception of human rights not-
withstanding, an important strain in the evolution of human rights in the 
West stands out, and when examined closely, can enhance the appreciation 
of human rights in general. It is the role of fellow feeling. As Lynn Hunt 
(2007:29) argues, human rights becomes self-evident in the cultural practices 
that recognize that “others feel and think as we do, that our inner feelings 
are alike in some fundamental fashion.” Hunt argues further that “auton-
omy and empathy did not materialize out of thin air in the eighteenth cen-
tury; they had deep roots” in the maturation of European culture over time. 
Part of that maturation is what she calls “imagined empathy,” by which she 
means “the sense that empathy requires a leap of faith, of imagining that 
someone else is like you” (32). 
Against the backdrop of the abovementioned diffculties associated with
the universal notion of human rights, I return to a central aspect of this
book: How do we make the universality and abstractness of the notion of
justice or human rights as formulated in the UDHR palpable to Africa?
How can I get an African, who sees a person living with albinism as exotic
and therefore deserving of no empathy, to admit that the albino has inherent
dignity? How do I convince a traditional African man that his wife and his
daughters deserve the same dignity and right as he and his sons do? Can I
convince most Africans that persons with alternative sexualities have the ba-
sic right to be left alone to live their lives? How do we make respect for every
individual take a prominent place in our moral framework? In the introduc-
tory chapter, I stated that narratability is a litmus test of the universal nature
of concrete rights. The test is this: Can it be explained in a story format?
Stories widen our moral horizons by making space for others in our lives. 
We must keep telling stories; we must tell the story of how people with al-
binism feel when being bullied or even hunted down for their body parts. We 
must hear the words of a lonely elderly woman accused of witchcraft in an 
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African village. Whatever can get people to imagine the pain of these people 
is welcome. Stories cut across the chatter and abstractions of arguments; 
they present us humans as we are in our embodiedness and vulnerabilities 
and can help us imagine that these others are like us. Stories are vectors 
of values, and telling stories about other people imbues all concerned with 
dignity. 
The question of whether an issue can be put in story formats assumes a 
few things, one of which is that telling a story necessarily makes humans 
feel the humanity of others and thus respect their human rights. This is not 
always the case. It is worth noting that human rights are also hampered by 
stories, the negative stories we tell about others. The Nazis told stories about 
Jews, characterizing them as vermin. Indeed, stories have been misused in 
the history of humanity even before Hitler. Stories have always been vec-
tors of truth and untruth. However, some details make some fundamental 
differences between stories that make the abstract notion of human rights 
concrete and others that work against human rights. In other words, there 
are differences between stories that arise from the human condition and 
those designed to further an agenda. The former makes sure that humans 
are presented as living, breathing entities possessing the many dimensions 
of being human; the latter rests on generalizations and one-dimensional 
portraits of otherwise complex characters. Humans are neither angels nor 
demons; stories arising from this awareness do no more than further an un-
derstanding of the human. They do not promote specifc agendas. To that 
effect, I follow South African scholar Njabulo Ndebele’s conception of an 
ideal African literature, one capable of initiating appreciation of the other 
and convivial living. 
In “The Rediscovery of the Ordinary,” Ndebele (1986:144) critiques the 
apartheid-era South African writers who adopted protest literature as a way 
to confront apartheid. His concern was not with the goal of the writers, 
which was the liberation of the oppressed black population; rather, he was 
much more interested in their method as literary artists. He argues that their 
approach has two main faws: (1) It does not enhance the understanding of 
literature as a work of art, capable of highlighting the human condition, 
and (2) it does not contribute to the creation of moral frameworks. Protest 
writing was bound to fail because not only did it fail to change the system 
it was challenging, it also replicated in a less obvious manner the system’s 
spectacles, which notoriously objectivized humans. Ndebele calls the writ-
ers’ approach “spectacle” because they produced “spectacular representa-
tions of reality.” Like the spectacular, their writing preferred “the larger 
issues of society in our minds, obliterating the details.… It is the literature of 
the powerless identifying the key factor responsible for their powerlessness” 
(149–150). 
We note Ndebele’s observation about the powerless identifying the key 
factor responsible for their powerlessness. Important here is the object of 
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humans whose state of life includes being oppressed. Part of Ndebele’s con-
tention is that narratives that mimic an oppressive machinery ultimately fail 
to create a moral framework for a better society. 
A spectacle is whatever captures the immediate short-term imagination 
of the spectator, such as wrestling matches or the gladiator fghts in am-
phitheaters in ancient Rome. It is what is designed to please an immediate 
emotional need, a jolt of adrenalin; it does nothing for the spiritual side of 
the human, nothing that provokes introspection or leads to thoughts about 
the human condition. Ndebele states that some of the major characteristics 
of the spectacular are that “it provokes identifcation through recognition 
and feeling rather than through observation and analytical thought; it calls 
for emotion rather than conviction; it establishes a vast sense of presence 
without offering intimate knowledge” (49). Ndebele does not dismiss feeling 
or identifcation as a product of reading; what he is against is the condi-
tion in which a story is produced, and precisely for defned goals. He falls 
short of calling those stories propaganda. Any story’s frst goal should be 
to explore the human condition and present it to the other as an appeal. 
Anything that offers a vast sense of presence or knowledge without offering 
intimate knowledge is nothing short of ideology or propaganda. It is abstract 
and ultimately ignores the moral sphere or dignity of the individual. It fails 
our test of narratability. 
By narratability, therefore, I mean the ability of the storyteller/writer to 
use the ordinary details of a life to divest that life of all ideological abstrac-
tions and to present it to people, enjoining them with the strength of its 
narrative gestures to consider that life as if it were theirs. This hypothetical 
condition is truthful in a work of fction to the degree that it invites the use 
of the imagination. The leap of empathy is precisely what narratability seeks 
to achieve; it makes the life of the other relatable. In this way, narratability 
makes concrete the universal and universalizes the concrete. In sum, there-
fore, the conditions of narratability are (1) the story must arise from the 
human condition, (2) it must be relatable, and (3) it must be based on the 
practice of the ordinary. In light of the notion of narratability, I propose 
that all human rights discourses in Africa begin with the body—the body 
that feels pain and pleasure, the body that must not be violated, and the 
body that must be respected as if it were one’s own. 
One of the discourse modalities for engaging human rights at the grass-
roots level is to emphasize the condition of those who suffer pain due to no
fault of their own. What we owe others refects what they owe us, should we
fnd ourselves in their shoes. If the language of human rights is abstract and
if the practice of human rights is being imposed from above, only stories can
make their noble ideals and aspirations palpable to people. Narratives there-
fore make the abstract language of human rights concrete and provide us with
functional vocabularies to engage reality more fruitfully. The goal of human
rights advocacy in this regard is to make the issue primarily about people’s
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of caring for our common moral framework squarely in the laps of individu-
als. It is not the duty of the government to ensure that we love our neighbors
and respect one another as humans; it is the duty of the individual in the
community. This duty is just an integral part of our being human. 
I stated above that people are accustomed to read human rights violations 
only as egregious forms of violence such as torture, disappearance, and gen-
ocide; human rights violations can unfold in subtler, insidious ways over 
time. They also begin the very moment we consider another person dispos-
able and relate to them accordingly, either verbally or in our actions. These 
attitudes invariably begin with the stories we tell about them. Some of the 
incidents of human rights abuses in the selected texts and flms are rather 
obvious, while many others are less so. When I analyze texts in relation to 
human rights, I shall be looking for situations in which humans are consid-
ered inferior or undeserving of dignity, especially in the myths or seen as 
means to ends rather than as ends in themselves. I shall be asking, explicitly 
or implicitly, whether an individual’s or group’s dignity or moral sphere has 
been respected or violated, and whether people relate to one another “in the 
spirit of brotherhood.” Above all, my interest in the explication of the texts 
lies in their effectiveness in making palpable the otherwise abstract notion 
of justice. I shall be asking the questions implicit in the lives of the charac-
ters: Aren’t we, too, humans? 
Notes 
1 It is anyhow becoming increasingly diffcult to hold to such critiques even in the 
West, especially in the aftermath of poststructuralism and in times like ours in 
which people look for moral clarity in sociopolitical life. 
2 I grant that many people might disagree with the man. For now, though, we must 
accept his version of justice which seems to suggest his satisfaction at having 
been restored to the community by the mere act of being listened to. To be sure, 
the past cannot be undone, and neither can punishing those who inficted harm 
on him. 
3 To be sure, the human rights of a drowning person or a person experiencing un-
merited pain is not rooted in the perception of the person as a victim; the person 
has the right to be relieved of the unbearable condition and helped to reach a 
different condition in which he or she can exercise his or her autonomy. The goal 
therefore is creating a condition in which people can fourish by exercising their 
moral agency. 
4 The question, though, is who chooses to be part of that community? We know 
that the city-state Aristotle was addressing did not consider slaves worthy of the 
virtues accorded to others. Nor did the American Constitution consider women 
and slaves as equal members of the union. 
5 Of course, we know that the notion of community could become tyrannical. It 
could become so when it is used to suppress individual freedom and well-being. 
6 This, of course, does not do away with rationality or the need to aim for univer-
sality. It is also important to note that the body is not defned by specifc charac-
teristics such as white/black/brown, but rather as a human body that feels pain 
and pleasure. 
7 The need for laws that bind people to the agreed frameworks will surely arise 
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2 Ecological violence and the 
quest for justice 
The United Nations acknowledges the inexorable role that the care for the 
environment plays in human fourishing. It situates the environment as a 
necessary condition for human rights and thus imbues the struggle for the 
environment with a moral and existential character (UN Environment Pro-
gramme). It is fair to say that, because all lives take place in a given space at 
a given time, that is, to be alive is to do so in a given environment, life and 
environment are the two sides of the same coin of the human condition. He 
or she who threatens my environment threatens my moral and existential 
space; he or she threatens me. 
The main cause of the environmental degradation is the exploitation of
the land occupied by indigenous people, largely in developing nations such
as in Africa and Latin America, and in parts of the developed nations occu-
pied by minorities such as in the United States. The relationship between hu-
mans and the environment is therefore not a thing of transient value; it is an
issue of life and death consequence and, therefore, of urgent moral concern.
Barbara Johnston (2016) rightly ties environmentalism to social justice. 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, or 
Stockholm Declaration, acknowledged that “the protection and improve-
ment of the human environment is a major issue which affects the well-being 
of peoples and economic development throughout the world” (Stockholm 
1972). The conference sharpened the moral urgency of the relationship be-
tween humans and the environment in the frst principle of their resolution, 
which states that humans have the fundamental right to conditions that al-
low for a quality life. This implies living “in an environment of a quality 
that permits a life of dignity and well-being, [and humans bear] a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and fu-
ture generations” (Stockholm 1972). It is therefore the right to live, to live a 
decent life. 
The Roman Catholic Church is unquestionably one of the most impor-
tant international bodies that boast of the same moral authority the United 
Nations enjoys, if not more. In his encyclical, Laudato Si: On Care for Our 
Common Home, Pope Francis calls on all, especially his immediate audi-
ence, Catholics around the world, to evince a measure of responsibility in 
conserving the earth (Pope Francis 2015; Iheka 2017). To some degree, this is 
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a remarkable turn in the teachings of the Catholic Church, especially given 
that the Church is one of the most conservative institutions where, as many 
feminists would claim, patriarchy is preserved in its primordial form. From 
the African perspective, the Catholic Church is still a colonial institution, 
one that actually sanctifed the European conquest of the rest of the world. 
For example, the papal bull of 1452, Dum Diversas, authorized the kings of 
Spain and Portugal to invade and subjugate Saracens, pagans, and enemies 
of Christ and to “reduce their persons into perpetual slavery” (Hayes 2003). 
This is why the current pope’s anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist sentiments are 
positively surprising and very welcome. I am personally heartened by the 
fact that the pope casts environmental issues in moral idioms. He states that 
climate change is caused largely by human activities, such as deforestation 
and industrial pollution, and directly affects animals and humans, espe-
cially the poor. Pollution and changes in climate affect “the livelihood of the 
poor, who are then forced to leave their homes, with great uncertainty for 
their future and that of their children” (Pope Francis 2015:20–21). 
The pope seems to be echoing literary scholar and Princeton Professor 
Rob Nixon’s notion of slow violence, especially the displacement of the poor 
whose land has been poisoned by the exploiting institutions of the West. The 
pope states, 
as part of the universe, called into being by one Father, all of us are 
linked by unseen bonds and together form a kind of universal family, a 
sublime communion which flls us with a sacred, affectionate and hum-
ble respect. 
(65–66) 
The pope’s appeal, understandably framed in religious language, goes 
straight to the heart of the moral framework that we all, as humans, must 
be conscious of and maintain. Preserving others from harm and taking our 
environment and our common home seriously is a way of taking ourselves 
seriously. The pope’s position as the spiritual and moral leader of at least 1.2 
billion people lends him immense power in matters of the environment. He 
therefore becomes, ipso facto, a leader in this moral issue. 
In their introduction to a collection of essays on climate change and the 
moral challenges facing humans, Kathleen Dean Moore and Michael P. 
Nelson state that there is enormous scientifc information about the dangers 
of climate change brought about by humans, and humans know that we are 
approaching a tipping point where climate change will cause irreversible 
changes in the conditions under which we all live. In their judgment, there-
fore, “What is missing is the moral imperative, the conviction that assuring 
our own comfort at terrible cost to the future is not worthy of us as moral 
beings” (Moore and Nelson 2010:xvi). I share their premise about environ-
mentalism, which is that humans “have a moral obligation to avert harms to 
the future, so as to leave a world as rich in life and possibility as the world we 
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Carl Pope, the executive director of the Sierra Club, is also of the opinion
that the concern for the environment is now a moral imperative. He argues
that whoever takes the religious and ethical injunctions seriously must also
apply them to the environment. Even though the great ethical injunctions
were conceived and applied locally, now that we have a truly global challenge
in climate change, their values must be put to the test to determine their true
universal import. It helps in this regard to pose some questions: How does
environmentalism help us to fully live the moral principles of our religions
and cultures, which are essentially local and form the basis of our societies’
or groups’ moral frameworks? Should we care if our local habits and lifestyles
have consequences for lives thousands of miles and many decades removed
from us? For Carl Pope (2010:294), “[g]lobal warming means we must put our
ethics on steroids—and that makes them much more challenging, threaten-
ing, and, yes, subversive and newly controversial.” In other words, the nature
of the global challenges of environmentalism should make us aware of the
global consequences of our local ethics. We thus become aware of the conse-
quences of our lifestyles on others, far and wide. For example, the neighbor
in the injunction to “love thy neighbor” becomes any human being anywhere
who is threatened by the consequences of environmental pollution. This is
because we all live in the same village in matters of global climate change;
this realization is the consequence of local ethical injunction writ large. 
This chapter works from the premise that ecological violence is a mani-
festation of injustice and constitutes an abuse of human rights and human 
dignity. It conceives the environment as an integral part of the common 
good. To achieve this, I develop my argument thus: (a) I discuss the Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Wangari Maathai’s sociocultural and political philos-
ophy of the environment, specifcally the interconnection between moral 
responsibility for the environment and political consciousness; (b) I analyze 
the neocolonial/neoliberal mindset that governs the industrialized nations’ 
relations with developing nations regarding the environment; and (c) I dis-
cuss the writers’ response to ecological violence in the oil-producing Niger 
Delta, Nigeria, as a quest for justice. 
Wangari Maathai and the cultural philosophy 
of the environment 
Wangari Maathai, the Nobel Prize–winning environmental activist and 
founder of the Greenbelt Movement, believes that the question of ecolog-
ical violence is that of justice.1 In her Nobel Peace Prize address (Maathai 
2005:200), she states: 
In the course of history, there comes a time when humanity is called to 
shift to a new level of consciousness, to reach a higher moral ground. 
A time when we have to shed our fear and give hope to each other. This 
time is now … there can be no development without sustainable man-
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Maathai speaks specifcally of the moral responsibility of the present gen-
eration to leave a clean environment behind for the beneft of the coming 
generations. She speaks of streams that have dried up and that the challenge 
of the present generation, therefore, “is to restore the home of the tadpoles 
and give back to our children a world of beauty and wonder” (201). It is the 
question of the present generation treating the environment in such a way 
that the next generation would be left with a place to fourish. Doing the 
opposite would be unfair, an unjust act. 
I consider it important that Maathai frames her injunction about people’s 
relationship to the environment in the positive, that is, in terms of what 
ought to be done rather than what others have done wrong. She underscores 
the individual’s personal responsibility to the next generation, as if that gen-
eration were already here and now. In so doing, she treats the environment
as an extension of the other, implying that anything we do to the en-
vironment is done directly to this other. She then brings the care for the
environment closer to the notion of human rights and precisely because it 
is an issue of dignifed life. In many instances, it is even a life and death is-
sue. In her memoir, Unbowed (2007), she lays out the contexts and support 
for her world-famous movement, the Greenbelt Movement; it has attracted 
considerable scholarly attention (de Beer 2015). For this chapter, though, I 
focus on her book of essays, The Challenge for Africa, and more specifcally 
on Chapter 8, “Culture: The Missing Link?” 
I situate Maathai’s moral capital and importance in African cosmology in 
her agentic conception of culture. In her book of essays, The Challenge for 
Africa, she makes a strong case for the importance of cultural renaissance 
for Africa’s realignment with its environment. It is important to state from 
the outset that the phrase “cultural renaissance” has been abused in African 
discourse. It has been variously appropriated by politicians and ideologues 
to pursue their conservative political agenda. As Maathai (2009:164), ob-
serves, “In many communities in Africa and other regions, women are dis-
criminated against, exploited, and controlled through prevailing cultures, 
which demand that they act a certain way.” Such conception of culture is 
to be dismissed immediately. The rediscovery of Africa’s cultural values is 
far from this. Indeed, in Maathai’s uses, culture is a liberating force that 
empowers individuals to care about themselves, others, and the environ-
ment. The virtue of care forms the basis for my meditation on Maathai as 
an icon of moral responsibility toward the environment and as a promoter 
of enabling environment for justice and human rights. In The Challenge for 
Africa, Maathai states: 
Culture gives a people self-identity and character. It allows them to be 
in harmony with their physical and spiritual environment, to form the 
basis for their sense of self-fulfllment and personal peace. It enhances 
their ability to guide themselves, make their own decisions, and protect 
their interests … without culture, a community loses self-awareness and 
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guidance, and grows weak and vulnerable. It disintegrates from within 
as it suffers a lack of identity, dignity, self-respect, and a sense of destiny. 
(160–161) 
I interpret the operative words and phrases here, “harmony with the envi-
ronment” and “character,” in the tradition of virtue ethics as traits neces-
sary for a moral attitude toward the community. I reframe the tenor of her 
argument to imply that regaining pride in one’s culture forms the basis of 
the protection of one’s environment. Ideally, one protects what one appre-
ciates. Culture, which gives us the means to relate to our world, therefore, 
becomes a legitimating force for the imperative to protect and preserve— 
virtues that are essential for a proper conception of human rights. 
Character is very important in virtue ethics and in our understanding of 
ordinary virtues. In Maathai’s understanding, character is a constant atti-
tude of caring engendered by culture; it allows the individual to be in har-
mony with the environment. For her then, culture means being grounded, 
which in turn means establishing an affnity with the world that one inhab-
its. To be sure, her notion of culture differs from the nineteenth-century
conception infuenced by Gottfried Herder, one which saw a people’s cul-
ture as essentially defning that people as autochthonous in their space. The 
secret of Maathai’s notion of culture lies in the Latin root word cultura, 
meaning “to cultivate.” Above all, we cultivate character and our relation-
ship to the other, which the environment most symbolizes. 
Another operative word in Maathai’s notion of culture is “self-respect”; it 
is the basis for integrity and moral consciousness. It is, as Harry Frankfurt 
(2006) explained, taking oneself seriously, which is tantamount to taking 
others seriously, and taking others seriously inevitably leads to taking the 
environment seriously. The environment is the visible common framework, 
strictly speaking, the frst thing we have in common with others. We thus 
return to the argument, which is that concern for our environment leads to 
concern for our fellow humans and fnally to the well-being of all. 
Maathai grew up in a cashless economy, which prized the exchange of 
livestock as payment for services. She argues that the cash economy is the 
basis of ruthless profteering. Even at that, people never reach any level of 
satisfaction because the love of having increases by having. Unlike in the 
pre-industrial African culture in which Maathai grew up, which did not 
depend on having—even though the culture was not against it—value was 
not placed on things but on the relationship between people. Her search for 
that original African culture led her to consider what she has in common 
not only with other Africans alive today but also with the yet-to-be born, 
the future generation. In this search and the discovery, Maathai suggests 
that the present cannot be understood in isolation of the past and especially 
the future generation. To live is to do so in relation to others. We are all 
linked up by a common destiny whose survival depends on the degree of 
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be guided by a thinking that takes the presence of others as a given, if not 
as the starting point of our activities. This attitude which is fundamental to 
our understanding of human rights is, I think, borne of a thinking rooted in 
the ordinary virtues, of ubuntu, I am because you are. 
Informed by the relationship between culture and care, Maathai (2009:164– 
165) “began to listen to rural women speak of their diffculties in obtaining
frewood to cook nutritious food and providing clean drinking water and fod-
der for their animals.” Their interaction gave birth to the Green Belt Move-
ment. The contact with these local women showed her “the linkages between
poverty and environmental degradation and the loss of culture” (165), and she
understood that the recognition of culture was something political and social
and, ultimately, environmental. We understand politics, in both partisan uses
and in the form expounded by Hannah Arendt, as the exercise of speech in
the polis. If politics is the act of speech, which presupposes freedom and the
awareness of right, then reclaiming ownership of one’s culture, in Maathai’s
thinking, does no more than give the individual the courage to claim his or
her voice, to speak and to assert his or her right. The absence of that courage
has consequences for both humanity and the environment. For example, 
[w]hen communities were told that their culture was demonic and prim-
itive, they lost their sense of collective power and responsibility and suc-
cumbed, not to the god of love and compassion they knew, but to the 
gods of commercialism, materialism, and individualism. 
(165) 
Maathai was shocked to see the link between being culturally uprooted and
the destruction of the environment; people who were uprooted culturally be-
gan to uproot trees. The next natural step after uprooting trees would be to
uproot humans. This destructive attitude comes about because the person’s
sense of care has been destroyed. Thus, the destruction of the environment
brought about by being culturally uprooted ultimately leads her to wonder
why people were “disinheriting their own people and future generations” (166).
This is where I locate the core of Maathai’s cultural philosophy of the envi-
ronment and its implication for our conception of justice and human rights.
She turns the vicious circle of cultural rootlessness—lack of care for oneself
and the environment—into a virtuous circle of care for the same. She writes: 
Through the analysis of the intersections of culture, the degradation of 
the environment, and political corruption, I realized it was necessary to 
enlarge the Green Belt Movement’s conception of conservation to in-
clude a recognition of cultural heritage and the consequences of its loss. 
(167) 
Now, with the knowledge that there is a logical connection between being cul-





Ecological violence and quest for justice 43 
seminars that “allow individuals to deepen their sense of self-knowledge 
and realize that to care for the environment is to take care of themselves 
and their children—that in healing the earth they are healing themselves” 
(Maathai 2009:170). She introduced a concept, kwimenya, “which means be-
ing responsible oneself” (170). But responsibility for oneself must be coupled 
with the readiness to hold “leaders responsible as well—in other words, not 
only protecting the soil on your own land and conserving nearby forests, 
but also demanding that the government protect the country’s soil and for-
ests from degradation and exploitation” (170–171). In Maathai, therefore, 
meaning is like a circle that runs from culture to personal care, care for the 
other/society, and care for the next generation. I call it a hermeneutic circle 
of care that teaches us that responsibility for oneself must be tied to the 
environment and our fellow humans in order for it to be truly meaningful. 
The reverse is obviously the case. These three—the self, the other/society, 
and the environment—are all tied together in what I identify as Maathai’s 
environmental political philosophy. Maathai’s notion of care helps us to 
interpret her reading of justice and human rights. Human rights is better 
protected when we encourage people’s dignity by proactively caring about 
and for them. Humans hardly abuse what they care about. In Maathai, the 
ordinary virtues, especially care for others, blossom into a thick conception 
of rights of (wo) man, and fnally into a political act, a quest for justice. 
It is beftting to conclude this meditation with the words and ideas of the 
Dalai Lama and Desmond Tutu; I do so in the belief that their ideas, es-
pecially about the environment, form a persuasive moral argument for en-
vironmental protection and human rights. For the Dalai Lama (2010:16), 
humans have strayed and have failed to see the essential common relation-
ship of all things. For this, the earth is showing us indications that we have 
erred. To counter the practices that constituted the error, therefore: 
[W]e can teach ourselves to be more aware of our own mutual depend-
ence. Every sentient being wants happiness instead of pain. So we share a
common basic feeling. We can develop right action to help the Earth and
teach others based on a better motivation. Therefore, I always speak of
the importance of developing a genuine sense of universal responsibility. 
I equate the Dalai Lama’s notion of universal responsibility with Maathai’s 
hermeneutic circle of care. Like Maathai, the Dalai Lama emphasizes the 
moral obligation of the present generation to relate to the next generation as 
if it were already present. He states: 
Furthermore, as people alive today, we must consider future genera-
tions: a clean environment is a human right like any other. It is therefore 
part of our responsibility toward others to ensure that the world we pass 
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In the same line of thinking, Desmond Tutu (2010:xiv) states that “[i]n mat-
ters of climate change, as in all aspects of our lives, our obligation is clear: 
we must do unto others as we would wish them to do unto us.” It is instruc-
tive that Tutu locates care for the environment at the center of what has 
been universally accepted as the standard of all morality: the Golden Rule, 
versions of which are found in all cultures. 
Maathai, the Dalai Lama, and Tutu, three of the better-known moral
icons of our times, present us with a planetary moral consciousness, the cen-
tral idea of which is also traceable to the UDHR; they make us aware of the
global nature of our local ethics. This enhances the argument that environ-
mentalism is a moral issue that sits at the core of humanity’s moral frame-
work. To care for the environment is a universal act that is, at the same time,
patently individualistic. It is the best example of a fundamental moral act
because it is intrinsically good, universal, and particular at the same time. 
The environmentalism of the colonized 
My interest in the environment as a human right issue centers on Rob Nix-
on’s apt formulation of the relationship between industrialized nations and 
less developed nations in regard to the environment. Nixon calls the impact 
of the industrialized world’s reckless exploitation of the less developed na-
tions “slow violence” because the pollution that arises therefrom subjects 
the people in the less developed nations to a form of death that is barely 
noticed because it lacks spectacle. But the reckless exploitation reveals more 
than mere greed; it exposes a gross abuse of human rights that borders on 
mass murder. I consider two fairly well-known cases. 
First, in 1991, the chief economist of the World Bank, Lawrence Summers,
issued a memo in which he proposed that the industrialized nations should
send their dirty industries to the less developed nations. He produced justif-
cations based on pure reason, or the so-called rational choice argument. For
him, the industrialized nations had too much pollution, whereas the less devel-
oped nations had too little of it; the West has a high life expectancy, whereas
the less developed nations had low life expectancy. Given that the Third World
has low life expectancy, sending them dirty industries would not make much
(economic) difference, but it would cost much to care for lives in the West
given their high life expectancy. He states: “Dirty” Industries: Just between
you and me, shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging MORE migration of
the dirty industries to the LDCs [Less Developed Countries]?” (The Whirled
Bank Group 1991). Being the effcient economics professor he is known to be,
he dismisses the anticipated, largely moral argument against his proposal thus: 
The problem with the arguments against all of these proposals for more
pollution in LDCs (intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral reasons, social
concerns, lack of adequate markets, etc.) could be turned around and used
more or less effectively against every Bank proposal for liberalization. 
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It is remarkable that Summers, ostensibly a liberal thinker, who served in 
both the Clinton and Obama administrations, dismissed what many con-
sider to be some of the registers of humanity’s moral frameworks such as 
intrinsic rights to certain goods, social rights, and moral reasons. But per-
haps when it comes to the relationship between the West and the rest of us, 
the difference between conservatives and liberals in the West diminishes to 
a minimal level. Summers’ memo is one case of the West having little regard 
for the well-being and human rights of the people in developing countries, 
their erstwhile colonies. 
The second case is even more sinister. In 2006, a multinational company, 
Trafgura, dumped highly toxic waste in eleven unsecured sites in Abidjan 
City, Ivory Coast. In the following days and weeks, thousands of people 
exhibited signs of poisoning. According to Amnesty International, about 
100,000 people were exposed to varying degrees of health hazards (Amnesty 
International). It is tragic enough that toxic waste is dumped anywhere in 
the world; it is more so when the waste in question had been rejected by 
Europe and any other part of the world the company had wanted to use to 
properly dispose of it (Lewis 2012). Why then did it have to be dumped in 
Africa, without taking care to protect the population? What does that say 
about how others see African humanity and how Africans, who accepted 
the waste, view their own lives? 
The Brazilian minister of the environment, José Lutzenberger, highlights 
the problem in Lawrence Summers’ thinking thus: 
Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally insane…. Your thoughts
[provide] a concrete example of the unbelievable alienation, reduc-
tionist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of
many conventional “economists” concerning the nature of the world
we live in. 
(The Whirled Bank Group) 
I am drawn to two important issues in Lutzenberger’s critique. One is that 
Summers’ thinking is perfectly logical; the other is that it is reductionist and 
socially ruthless and indicates arrogance toward the nature of the world we 
live in—both of which are intertwined. By the phrase, “the nature of the 
world we live in,” Lutzenberger is reasoning from the standpoint that we as 
humans cannot function without some kind of moral framework. We are 
essentially rational beings, and morality is part of our nature as rational 
beings. Of course, it is one thing not to have compassion for others; it is quite 
another to propose an action that would actively lead to their death. I think 
that Summers’ thinking goes far beyond a simple lack of compassion for a 
people he did not know. 
Judging from Summers’ revelation of the knowledge of the consequences 
of his proposal, it is safe to say that any harmful consequence resulting from 
the decisions to send toxic waste or dirty industries to a defenseless group 
of people is premeditated. It is therefore a direct assault on not only the 
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people’s human rights but also their ultimate right to exist. To appreciate 
the moral magnitude of this situation, we consider the concept of “slow vio-
lence” a bit more closely. By slow violence, Nixon (2011:2) means: 
a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed 
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional vi-
olence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is cus-
tomarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, 
explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensa-
tional visibility. 
Violence does not have to be physical; it can also be psychological or verbal. 
In this regard, anything that intentionally hampers the normal course of a 
life is violent. We must recognize the importance of Nixon’s admission that 
environmental pollution—especially that resulting from the thinking and 
vision of the powerful, such as that of Summers—is violence, albeit one that 
unfolds over time and is far removed from people’s immediate attention. But 
the result is nonetheless the same. People experience gratuitous pain, and, 
in many cases, many people’s lives are permanently disfgured. People die, 
through no fault of their own. People are displaced. Indeed, the more egre-
gious aspect of that violence is in the thinking that considers some lives less 
valuable than others and therefore disposable. And this thinking is rational, 
which, of course, does not mean that it is moral. 
Nixon’s notion of slow violence allows us to see no difference between 
killing a people in an explosive, spectacular format and doing so in a subtle, 
sneaky way that unfolds over time. What counts is the premeditation, that 
is, the knowledge that one’s action or decision will lead to the death of some 
people somewhere. He also speaks of displacement brought about by envi-
ronmental pollution. But this displacement, in keeping with its nature as 
slow violence, is also not spectacular. This sort of displacement, 
instead of referring solely to the movement of people from their places 
of belonging, refers rather to the loss of the land and resources beneath 
them, a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the 
very characteristics that made it inhabitable. 
(19) 
Essentially, then, the local poor are dispossessed of their lands and are sub-
jected to death by attrition. As I hope to make clear in the next section, this 
is precisely one of the situations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, a place 
in which all forms of violence converged to make the people the perfect ex-
ample of the “wretched of the earth” (Fanon 1967). 
The person, who is aware that sending dirty industries or toxic waste to 
the less developed nations, specifcally to Africa, will diminish the people’s 
lives even if it does not lead to death does not consider African lives to be 
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valuable, to have dignity. This person considers such lives disposable. Nei-
ther does the African who receives such waste consider African life worthy 
of preservation. He or she lacks self-esteem, a requisite condition for dignity. 
The core of the moral issue with programmed environmental pollution is 
also the troubling colonial shadow of the thought process. The issue is that 
persons “A” do not consider persons “B” worthy of suffcient respect as to 
have a common moral framework with them. Neither do persons “B” con-
ceive of their world in the same moral framework. Perhaps the true source 
of the violence is in the fact that Summers failed to acknowledge the dignity 
of those to whom he wants to send dirty industries. 
Summers’ colonialist mindset is dangerous not only because it might pro-
duce death somewhere, but precisely because it is designed to do so and, 
therefore, goes to the heart of humanity’s moral framework. It is unjust and 
immoral because it considers people in the Third World the way Nazi Ger-
many considered Jews in the early part of the twentieth century: disposable. 
It is inevitable that this mindset be exposed and contested, for in it lies the 
origin of all forms of injustice in the world and abuses of humanity and 
others. 
The Niger Delta: writers and justice 
Environmental criticism has evolved from its initial focus on nature writing 
to questions of urgent existential import, questions that touch on whether 
a people survive or whether they are wiped out by another people’s will-
ful pollution of their living spaces. This shift in focus is generally under-
stood as the second wave of environmental criticism in literature, and it 
preoccupies itself with ecological justice, bringing elements of postcolonial 
theory and race studies to bear on its self-understanding (Buell 2005). Lit-
erary discourse in Africa is gradually catching up with global development 
in this regard. Ogaga Okuyade’s (2013) edited volume, Eco-critical Litera-
ture: Regreening African Landscapes, is a trailblazer, engaging critical per-
spectives on the importance of sustaining a symbiotic relationship between 
humans and their environment. Other works include Farieda Khan (2002) 
and Chinyere Nwahunanya (2011). Byron Caminero-Santangelo’s Different 
Shades of Green: African Literature, Environmental Justice, and Political 
Ecology discusses social confict, environmental change, and imperialism in 
Africa (Caminero-Santangelo 2014). As I have already pointed out, Cajetan 
Iheka’s (2018) Naturalizing Africa: Ecological Violence, Agency, and Postco-
lonial Resistance in African Literature provides an enhanced discussion in 
this feld, emphasizing the relationship between humans and the nonhuman 
world. 
In discussing the selected works of African writers on environmentalism, 
I focus especially on the writers’ perception of Africans as deserving of de-
cent environment in which human fourishing is possible. It is therefore the 
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those spaces. Rob Nixon (2011, 14) believes that literature has a role to play 
in the condition of moral consciousness in regard to the environmental vio-
lence directed at the poor. He shares Aldo Leopold’s belief that “we can be 
ethical only toward what we can see.” 
Nixon’s ideas are in line with our interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of
tragedy (Chapter 1) as evincing pity and fear, that is, the capacity to extend
our empathy to people in adverse situations they did not cause. “In a world
permeated by insidious, yet unseen or imperceptible violence,” Nixon ar-
gues, “imaginative writing can help make the unapparent appear, making
it accessible and tangible by humanizing drawn-out threats inaccessible
to the immediate senses” (15). Nixon argues that writers who witness the
manifestations of slow violence have a moral obligation to bear testimony;
they must uncover the degree of violence that the modern economy in its
insidious ways has chosen to cover. As I sought to make clear in Chapter 1,
narratives bring others closer to us and urge us to respond to the people’s
condition. In regard to those affected by ecological violence, it places them
within the sphere of our empathy so that they are no longer an undiffer-
entiated, amorphous group; rather, they become those who feel pain and
pleasure just as we do. This special function of presenting the otherwise
distant others to us is precisely where Njabulo Ndebele’s notion of the ordi-
nary plays a vital role. In order for any writing to imitate the kind of moral
consciousness of which we speak and provoke a demand for justice, the
writer must focus on the ordinary, that is, the practice of everyday life. Any
attempt at polemic or protest writing surely fails to expose the ordinary life
of people and with it the effects of other people’s decisions on their fellow
humans. 
In Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, Giorgio Agam-
ben (1999:156) argues that it is a moral obligation for those who have a voice 
to speak for the voiceless. Describing the bodies of the Jews in Auschwitz 
who were so debilitated by hunger and sickness that they resembled the 
living dead, “the overcomatose person and the neomort attached to life-
support systems today,” Agamben notes that they could not bear witness 
to the horrors that were visited on them. Most of them ended in the gas 
chamber, anyway. Even though they were the perfect witnesses of the evils 
of the Holocaust, the only way they can speak is through the survivor, whose 
authority “consists in his capacity to speak solely in the name of an incapac-
ity to speak—that is, in his or her being a subject” (156). Bearing witness is 
a moral obligation because it restores dignity to those who have been denied 
such. Agamben argues that 
it is because there is testimony only where there is an impossibility of 
speaking, because there is a witness only where there has been desub-
jectifcation, that the Muselmann is the complete witness and that the 
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In regard to the victims of violence such as in the Niger Delta, those who 
perished speak through those who write about them. Those who write about 
them, on the other hand, do so because of their belief in our common hu-
manity. They write to call the attention of all to the moral frameworks that 
make us what we are: rational, vulnerable beings; they write not only to 
expose the horror of the violence slowly unfolding in their world but also to 
restore the dignity of the dead and the dying. 
Nigeria is one of the ten largest producers of crude oil in the world and 
surely the largest in Africa. It is estimated that up to 70% of the crude oil 
produced by Nigeria comes from the Niger Delta, which is also one of the 
most environmentally degraded areas in the world. Crude oil was discov-
ered in 1956 in Oloibiri, and with its production came the inevitable negative 
effects on the environment: pollution. Given the small mass area and the 
closeness of villages to oil deposits, most oil wells are located close to com-
munities, and gas faring and dredged spoils are close to people’s homes. Oil 
spills are also common. 
Ken Saro-Wiwa is one of the most renowned names in the Niger Delta 
people’s struggle for survival, and he is one of the frst people to speak out 
against such pollution. In the early 1990s, he became one of the founding 
members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), 
which advocated for the basic human rights of the Ogoni people. Not long 
after that, in 1994, he was arrested, imprisoned, and put to death by the 
then military Head of State, Sani Abacha. His book (Saro-Wiwa 1996), A 
Month and a Day: A Detention Diary, documents his activism and occupies 
an important place in the literature on the ecological violence in the Niger 
Delta. Numerous works have been devoted to Ken Saro-Wiwa, including 
Rob Nixon’s groundbreaking book and others (Campbell 2002). There are a 
handful of novels of varying degrees of literary strength by writers from the 
Niger Delta devoted to exploring the ravages of oil exploration in the Niger 
Delta. These include Tanure Ojaide’s The Activist (2006), Isidore Okpewho’s 
Tides (1993), and Kaine Agary’s Yellow-Yellow (2006). These narratives have 
received some scholarly attention. I am, however, going to discuss the po-
etry of some of these writers, especially given the paltry attention they have 
received so far. They include Gabriel Okara, Tanure Ojaide, Ogaga Ifow-
odo, and Nnimmo Bassey. My approach is to show the original condition 
and beauty of the environment, its devastation, and the poets’ reaction to it. 
I conclude with a discussion of Helon Habila’s novel, Oil on Water. 
Gabriel Okara was born on April 21, 1921, in Bumodi (Ijaw ethnicity), in 
present-day Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Okara’s poem, “The 
Call of the River Nun,” was published in 1953, three years before oil was dis-
covered in the Niger Delta.3 The frst stanza, comprising three lines, holds 
the key to a magical longing that the poem orchestrates: “I hear your call! / I 
hear it far away; / I hear it break the circle of these crouching hills” (Wonyogi 
Blog 2009). The speaker obviously has a special bond with the river, so much 
so that he or she hears the river’s voice break through the bending hills. We 
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assume that the river is serene and must have provided the speaker immense 
pleasure. The speaker’s joy and admiration seem to have gained another di-
mension because of the river’s location between the hills. We have a picture 
of an awe-inspiring part of the beauty of that world, a world whose dignity is 
intact. The last line of the second stanza adds a new dimension to nature: “I 
hear it coming through; invoking the ghost of a child listening, where river 
birds hail your / silver-surfaced fow.” Thus, we now know that the speaker 
had been a child who had had a close affnity with the river. 
The last stanza connects the river’s call with the call of the seabird. In 
what seems to be an exclamation of the speaker’s smallness in the face of 
nature, the speaker declares, as if overwhelmed by the experience of the sub-
lime, “O incomprehensible God!” Thus far, the poem presents nature as a 
living organism; it is to be assumed that there is a symbiotic relationship be-
tween it and the speaker, who is in awe of its magnifcence, nature. We have, 
therefore, a river, hills, a child, and birds, all together in a relationship that 
evokes the legendary Garden of Eden, a place untouched by sin and greed. 
Okara shares a common attitude with the nineteenth-century European 
Romantic poets: awe and respect for nature. Like Wordsworth, he sings in 
praise of nature that restores his imagination and provides him tranquil-
ity. Indeed, as Emmanuel Egya Sule (2016:4) observes, “The connection of 
childhood to the river, very primal, organic and spiritual, is symbolic of the 
connection between humans and their environments, between culture and 
nature, between present and future.” 
Okara’s poem gives us an idea of what will soon be lost in the Niger Delta 
when the harmonious relationship that exists between the individual and 
nature is disturbed by “man’s dominion,” to quote another Romantic poet, 
Robert Burns. In an interview granted to Sumaila Isah Umaisha, Okara 
stated that “[his recent poem] River Nun (III) is all about the rivers, but 
there are some changes to refect the present realities” (Umaisha). By pres-
ent realities, Okara means, among other things, the fact that Shell is dredg-
ing the river for oil. To fully understand the details of the present realities, 
we shall turn to another poet from that region: Tanure Ojaide. 
Ojaide was born in 1948 to Urhobo parents in Agbon Kingdom of Delta 
State. He has won several national and international poetry awards, includ-
ing the Commonwealth Poetry Prize for the Africa region in 1987. As if 
providing an adequate response to Okara’s poem, he paints the new, present-
day picture of the otherwise serene and awe-inspiring river of Okara’s child-
hood, several decades after the publication of “The Call of the River Nun.” 
The title of the poem, “Can I Still Call from the River Nun?” signals the 
acerbic mood of the speaker (Ojaide 2015:114).4 The rhetorical question is 
sarcastic and raises doubts about the condition of the river. Whereas the 
river is the protagonist in the original Okara poem, one that beckons to 
the child that used to play or work in it, in “Can I Still Call from the River 
Nun?” the protagonist is disillusioned by dramatic changes in the river. The 
frst couplet, “Can I still call from the River Nun to the sea maids / lounging 
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in the Atlantic to come to me for a party” establishes a link between the 
river—contained within a locality in the frst poem—and the sea/the Atlan-
tic Ocean, signifying the larger world. The speaker’s reference to the ocean 
evokes the role of global trade, including that of humans. The speaker is 
duly aware that his or her world is no longer that pristine environment re-
served for the indigenous people there. Globalization has affected it, and 
negatively too. 
The doubt, or better, the sarcasm introduced in the title permeates the 
rest of the poem. The dubious persona extends the same question to the 
birds that sang in “The Call of the River Nun”: “Can the river bird be heard 
and summoned / to perch and dance on the reed in the tide.” The question 
extends to humans, fora, and fauna surrounding the River Nun. These in-
clude the fsherman who goes to work with songs, the iroko, mahogany, the 
warthog, the porcupine, “the fsh population fondly called children of the 
gods.” The speaker knows that the symbiotic relationship that used to exist 
between these things is gone. We are given clues as to what has unbalanced 
their ecosystem and has disturbed their agency. It is “the vagabond fares of 
raging gas” and “the black clouds of fumes blanketing the sky.” These, of 
course, refer to the oil drilling taking place in and around the River Nun. 
Human rights instantiates itself in the full exercise of agency; it is the rec-
ognition and appreciation of a person’s moral sphere. In Okara’s poem we 
saw nature as a living organism with agency, to the degree that it is in a sym-
biotic relationship with humans. In presenting the break in the harmonious 
relationship between man and nature, Ojaide suggests the abuse of dignity 
and moral sphere of the region; he therefore establishes a condition for our 
understanding of the abuse of human rights in the region. The penultimate 
stanza rounds off with a long question that evokes the one introduced in 
the title of the poem: “can the remnant population of the abused land still / 
live meaningful lives after the death of companions?” The question is not 
answered, which allows the reader to provide an answer. But it is important 
to note the words and phrases that seem to highlight the writer’s concerns: 
“abused,” “meaningful lives,” and “death of companions.” This is one of 
the ethical moments in the poem, the moment in which, as Sartre says in 
regard to the responsibility of the reader, the reader is asked to animate the 
injustices presented to him or her with indignation. Although it is never sure 
how readers will answer, the tenor suggests that the question will activate 
the readers’ responsibility. Although the last stanza addresses the defenders 
of their homeland, the long question, however, is for the world invoked by 
the reference to the Atlantic. He raises questions about what the world has 
done to the inhabitants or why the world has turned a deaf ear to the people 
there. Can the whole world look on while humans, fora, and fauna sur-
rounding the beautiful River Nun perish at the hands of oil explorers? The 
poet challenges the conscience of the world. He turns “The Call of the River 
Nun” into a clarion call for the River Nun and therefore bears testimony to 
the dying world. 
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In another poem, “In the Omoja River,” (Ojaide 2015:117) Ojaide com-
pletes the circle of dialogue he began with his response to Okara’s “The Call 
of the River Nun.” In this poem, the speaker reminds the reader of what had 
been before the oil exploration began in the region and what has been lost 
to pollution. The frst two stanzas paint the same natural scene as Okara’s 
poem. In the river, they washed their bodies and tools. In the river, they 
“listened to murmuring water / before taking tracks into the forest to pick 
fruits.” The next fve stanzas, all couplets, are a list of accusations against 
those who destroyed the environment—those who “pissed and pissed bar-
rels of arsenic into the current” and those who “stripped and stripped the 
forest naked.” The repetition of the verbs “piss” and “strip” underscores the 
premeditated violence unleashed on the virgin land. In the combination of 
these verbs, the poet alludes to the rape of his land, the abuse of the rights of 
the environment and of the people. 
The last stanza captures the intensity of the anger that has fueled the 
whole poem. Sadly, this anger threatens to block the emergence of the read-
er’s moral affnity. The anger draws attention to itself rather than the con-
dition that caused it. Perhaps the poem could have gained more if it had 
concentrated on the details of what was lost rather than cursing those re-
sponsible. It would be the moral obligation of the reader to do or not do the 
cursing. Rather than be moved to seek to protect the vulnerable, the reader 
already feels that the forceful language of the poem does that. But this does 
not detract from the force of testimony that this preeminent poet of the 
Niger Delta bears on behalf of his silent and slowly dying world. 
The next important poet of the Niger Delta, Ogaga Ifowodo, was born 
in 1966 in Oleh. Before becoming a poet, he had worked for eight years as 
a lawyer with the Civil Liberties Organization, Nigeria’s premier human 
rights group. He was held under preventive detention for close to a year 
by the then military regime of General Sani Abacha because of his human 
rights activism. 
The cover art of Ifowodo’s poetry collection, Oil on Lamp, is eloquent 
in regard to the environmental pollution in the Niger Delta. In the back-
ground is a row of four pipelines, at the end of which a huge ball of yellow 
fre dances into the atmosphere. On the pipelines are clumps of white sub-
stances, obviously tapioca or other local foodstuff, spread in wide baskets. 
By the left-hand side of the pipelines are three women, two of whom are 
stooped toward the tapioca, seemingly turning it so it can dry. The picture 
is blood-curdling for several reasons, one of which is the gas fare that sends 
out poisonous gases into the air, close to the people’s villages. The other 
is that the village women spread their foodstuff to be dried by the heat of 
the gas fare. The third is, of course, the many pipelines that crisscross the 
people’s farms. All of these paint a picture of desolation and deprivation, a 
picture that leaves no doubt as to the status of the humans living there as 
dispensable. One is left to imagine the effects of the fumes that the women 
are breathing right there beside the glaring toxic fre. And of course, the soot 
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from that fre will eventually settle on the foodstuff they are spreading out to 
dry. When one imagines the lifespan of these women one cannot but think 
of Rob Nixon’s notion of slow violence, or of Lawrence Summers’ implicit 
disregard for the people. The picture, therefore, elicits questions that should 
constitute the core of any civil society’s moral framework: How can humans 
force other humans to live in such despicable conditions? What do we owe 
this people, as fellow humans who possess the same rights and dignities as 
we do? What is the worth of the lives of those who live in that region? The 
last question seems to be the core issue that the poetry collection engages. 
The Niger Delta has experienced not only slow violence; it has faced con-
ditions similar to and frequently worse than war. For example, as a result of 
the confict in the Niger Delta over indigenous rights to oil resources and en-
vironmental protection, during which twelve Nigerian soldiers were killed 
by suspected militants from the Niger Delta, the then-president of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo ordered the Nigerian military to quell the militant re-
sistance. A military attack was carried out on November 20, 1999, in the 
Odi community of Bayelsa State. “The military invaded the community and 
indiscriminately attacked the unarmed civilian population, which, accord-
ing to human rights organizations left not fewer than 2,500 people dead.” 
(Igbonwelundu 2013). They were pacifed. Another incident: On October 19, 
1998, an oil pipeline exploded in the town of Jese, about 180 miles southeast 
of Lagos. It was said to have been caused by people siphoning oil from the 
pipeline. The inferno that ensued cost between 250 and 700 lives (Associated 
Press 1998). These two are but some of the subjects of the poems in The Oil 
Lamp (Ifowodo 2005). My discussion is rooted in the poem about the second 
incident. 
The poem “Jese” provides, in fne-grained detail, an account of the Jese 
fre incident, in a manner that conforms with Njabulo Ndebele’s notion of 
the ordinary. The frst line, “It was the fourteenth month of the fuel crunch” 
(3), paints the usual political-economic situation in Nigeria. Most Nigerians 
have become used to the fact that Nigeria, the eleventh largest producer of 
crude oil in the world, is not able to assure a constant supply of fuel to its 
citizens. The situation seems even worse in the Niger Delta, the source of 
Nigeria’s oil wealth. Their condition is compounded by the fact that thou-
sands of pipelines crisscross their lands; in some cases, these pipelines, often 
several decades old and rusting, run across the villages. The speaker draws 
our attention to this fact, to how the lives in that space were considered 
disposable: 
With old pipes corroded and cracked 
By the heat of their burden— 
With these pipelines in every corner of the people’s environment, their fate 
seems to have been sealed, or in Rob Nixon’s terms, the violence that would 
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The speaker presents us with four boys who might have made the dis-
covery that sealed the fate of the town. They are “[f]our boys chasing ro-
dents for the day’s meal—” We are not left with just this information. The
speaker makes sure to include a comparison to the boys’ “mates in cities
where the pipes end” and who, instead of hunting for rodents, are in classes
learning letters in song and rhyme (5). Ifowodo inserted this comparison
to elicit questions about justice and therefore challenge the moral compass
of his compatriots from other parts of Nigeria, far removed from the Niger 
Delta. Whereas children from other parts of Nigeria are busy learning for
their future, the four boys who hunt rodents for a meal are the ones to
discover what will eventually lead to their town’s doom. Their hunt takes
them to a broken pipe from which oil fows out, and “they hurried home
to fetch pails and keg, // cups and funnels. It was the fourteenth month / of
the fuel crunch” (6). Their discovery was a boon to the town, for soon there
was light and “stoves and lamps burned again” (7). The repetition of the
time period, the “fourteenth month of the fuel crunch,” reminds the reader
how the impoverished and misruled Nigerians measure time. Major events
mark time in the people’s consciousness: the time before the fuel crunch
and the time after. 
No one knows precisely what sparked the fre. As Giorgio Agamben 
states, the perfect witnesses of the horrors of Auschwitz were those who 
went through the gas chamber, those who took their truth to the grave and 
so could not bear testimony to the horror; they cannot speak. It is therefore 
the moral obligation of the survivors to bear testimony so that the experi-
ence of the dead will not be lost. Perhaps those who know the truth of the 
fre incident were incinerated. But Ifowodo has undertaken to speak on their 
behalf, and he touches the most sensitive part of the poem: the programmed 
violence in the Niger Delta. The speaker provides the details required to 
drive home the slow violence. The speaker describes the reactions of the 
victims of the fre incident, focusing on that of a child who sees her mother 
burn. The child is traumatized by her mother’s hair, which glowed “like fla-
ments of gold / Led by the venomous scene of charring bone, // the dripping 
and drying fat of breasts and buttocks” (11). 
It is the function of the storyteller to provide details of a narrative; it is 
that of the reader to respond. In tune with Nixon’s argument, regarding the 
role of writers in bringing the violence of environmental degradation to the 
consciousness of others, Ifowodo makes sure to dramatize the experience 
of victims’ slow death and erasure in such a way that readers can no longer 
claim ignorance of the situation. The readers are then challenged relative 
to their appreciation of the common humanity they have with the victims 
of abuse. Ifowodo does it by focusing on the ordinary lives of the people in 
the Niger Delta. Sadly, what is ordinary in their lives is the violence visited 
upon them. To further drive home the moral impact of the narrative, the 
speaker relates the cries of the bereaved. A woman wails about the loss of 
 
 
Ecological violence and quest for justice 55 
her husband, who is “[a]t the bottom of the sea, the bottom of the sea.” There 
are no fsh for her soup. The fsh are “[d]ead in the creeks, dead in the lakes.”
She blames oil for all that. “Oil is my curse, oil is our doom” (17). 
The woman’s wail is a cry sent out to the world. Will the world hear? The 
lack of assurance that the world will hear her is a testament to her vulnera-
bility. The more vulnerable people are, the more acute is the appeal to others 
to respond and to be moved to help. We are moved to help because of our 
investment in the moral framework which our being as humans assumes. 
In this manner, Ifowodo displays his moral and human rights conviction 
grounded in his eight years’ experience as a human rights lawyer. This poem 
is, of course, a different appeal to the moral sensibility of people than is in 
legal format. 
In the concluding part of this section, I discuss a novel by a more accom-
plished Nigerian writer, Helon Habila, who is not from the Niger Delta, and 
whose testimony is no less compelling. Habila’s novel, Oil on Water, artic-
ulates the moral case proposed by the above poems in an equally visceral 
form. Habila was born in November 1967 in Kaltungo, Gombe State, Ni-
geria, several hundreds of miles removed from the Niger Delta. Unlike the 
poets we have considered thus far, he is not ethnically associated with the 
Niger Delta. This, I think, adds an extra dimension to our moral inquiry, 
which is the necessity to bear testimony to denial of justice and the abuse of 
human rights in the Niger Delta, regardless of ethnic affnity. 
In Oil on Water, Isabel Floode, the wife of a British oil executive, is kid-
napped in the Niger Delta. Two journalists, Rufus and Zaq, set out to fnd 
her. They embark on a very dangerous journey that mirrors the lives of the 
residents of the oil-rich region, and they come face to face with the daily 
struggles of the people of the Niger Delta: the polluted environment, the bru-
tality of the government soldiers, and the militants fghting to preserve their 
homeland. Although Habila belongs to the group of more accomplished 
contemporary African writers, his works have not received commensurate 
scholarly attention. Thanks to the growing interest in environmentalism in 
African literature, Oil on Water is now being discussed at conferences and 
symposia. 
Nigerian literary scholar Emmanuel Egya Sule (2018: 98) argues that 
[w]ith the structure of a coming-of-age narrative, wrapped in the dom-
inant trope of journey—something of a movement from the known to 
the unknown—Oil on Water is better perceived as a militant statement, 
indeed action, on the environmental and human waste going on in the 
Niger Delta. 
I read the narrative a bit less as a militant statement, or even much less as a 
coming-of-age story, than as an exposition of the senseless violence visited 
upon the people of the Niger Delta simply because they happen to live in a 
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place rich in a mineral deposit on which the neocolonialist machinery has 
cast its eye. For that, therefore, they are considered expendable, as did Law-
rence Summers the lives of the citizens of developing nations. My analysis of 
the novel focuses on the most important encounters that expose the brutal 
environmental realities of the region. I do so especially in view of examining 
the contours of slow violence and instances in which the dignity of individ-
uals is trampled upon or ignored due to lack of ordinary virtues of care and 
respect for their moral space. 
In the early pages of the novel, Zaq and Rufus are aware that even though 
their goal is to fnd the kidnapped wife of a British oil executive, their mis-
sion has a meaning that goes beyond fnding the white woman; it has “a 
greater meaning” (Habila 2010:5). In another instance, the militant leader 
Henshaw confronts Zaq, who had told him that they are in search of a white 
woman kidnapped in the region. He asks, 
Is that all you want from me, to tell you whether some foreign hostage 
is alive or not? Who is she in the context of the war that’s going on out 
there, the hopes and ambitions being created and destroyed? Can’t you 
see the larger picture? 
(153–154) 
Now we see two instances that capture the nature of the testimony that 
Habila is bearing about the people of the Niger Delta: “greater meaning” 
and “larger picture.” 
What, then, is that “greater meaning”? What is the “larger picture”? I 
argue that the phrases are Habila’s way of drawing attention to the injustice 
that inheres in the people’s condition. The greater meaning and the larger 
picture gesture toward justice. In the encounter between Zaq and Henshaw, 
part of the larger picture is that the colonialist mindset suggest that the life 
of a white woman is more important than the lives of the people of the Niger 
Delta and that of their environment. The colonialist mentality is that part 
of the husband’s injunction to Rufus and Zaq to fnd Isabel and that nothing 
should happen to her because she is “a British citizen” (32). The husband, 
James, does not grasp the full picture of what is happening in the Niger 
Delta. He does not seem to be in a position to grasp it because he is, well, a 
white man, who, as representative of the British colonial power, has never 
been in the position to appreciate the humanity of the colonized Africans. 
He implies then that Isabel’s human dignity is more important than that of 
the people of the Niger Delta. 
What greater meaning could there be than to respond to common hu-
manity by narrating human rights abuses? It is perhaps not by accident that 
Zaq, the person who divined the deeper meaning of the journalists’ journey 
into the depths of the Niger Delta, is described as one who philosophizes 
“over almost anything” (6). We take it that he is not one to be easily satisfed 
with a shallow perception of reality. He is therefore the one most suited to 
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lead the reader to think about the context of life in the Niger Delta. True to 
Zaq’s philosophical judgment, no sooner did they travel to the inner part of 
the troubled region in search of the kidnapped white woman than they en-
countered the devastations visited on the people by oil exploration in their 
homeland. They come across a deserted village, which is one of the most 
visible indications of such violence. Rufus says, “Behind one of the houses 
we found a chicken pen with about ten chickens inside, all dead and decom-
posing, the maggots traffcking beneath the feathers. We covered our noses 
and moved on to the next compound, but it wasn’t much different” (9). 
Rob Nixon speaks of the displacement of the poor natives in their land, 
due to pollution or the direct intervention of the government, as aspects of 
slow violence. Part of the contours of these forms of violence and human 
rights abuses is that people become refugees in their own land. Rufus and 
Zak take us to villages whose residents have either been terrorized into de-
serting their homes or have been killed. This is beyond slow violence; it is a 
lopsided war on the people. (Saro-Wiwa 1992). Less than halfway into the 
story we get a good picture of the world the two reporters are entering. It is 
a dying world, one in which the rivers no longer produce fsh because they 
are toxic with oil spills. It is a world in which grasses no longer grow because 
oil spills have rendered the soil acidic. Rufus tells of what he had seen about 
the ecosystems: 
We followed a bend in the river and in front of us we see dead birds 
draped over tree branches, their outstretched wings black and slick with 
pile; dead fsh bobbed white-bellied between tree roots…. The patch of 
grass growing by the water was suffocated by a flm of oil, each blade 
covered with blotches like the liver spots on a smoker’s hands. 
(Habila 2010:9–10) 
Ultimately, the challenges the narrative places before our moral eyes are the 
cost of the environmental degradation on humans, both directly and indi-
rectly. Indirectly, when the environment is polluted beyond repair, people 
are forced to relocate. Directly, though, people catch various diseases or 
they die from the effects of toxic waste. Ironically, Zaq falls ill the moment 
he arrives in the region. His health deteriorates gradually; he is suffering 
from a kind of “hemorrhagic fever” that is nameless, but which he must have 
picked up “somewhere in these godforsaken waters.” The doctor lets Rufus 
know that picking up a virus for such a hemorrhagic fever is easy (130). The 
mention of a kind of hemorrhagic fever does not go unnoticed by Rufus’ 
hyperconscious mind. 
Hemorrhagic fever is a metaphor of the people and their culture bleeding 
to death, a metaphor of slow death. He is dying slowly. His condition thus 
best dramatizes Rob Nixon’s notion of slow violence. The doctor who diag-
noses Zaq goes on to note what is responsible for the disease. He had been in 
those waters fve years now, and he knows that it is “a dead place, a place for 
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dying.” To highlight what he meant by that, he points at the faraway orange 
sky and says, “Those damned fares” (131). The phrases “dead place” and 
“a place for dying” evoke the speaker in T.S. Eliot’s “The Wasteland.” Both 
Zaq and the speaker in “The Wasteland,” speak of a place where nothing 
grows. And just as Eliot speaks to the moral post–World War I world, so 
does Habila seek to awaken awareness of human rights in his world. 
It is ironic that Zaq, who goes to the Niger Delta to fnd greater, deeper 
meaning, loses his life there (234). He goes to die in the Niger Delta, to sac-
rifce his life so that the cry of the people there can be heard. Given that 
he is qualifed as the thinker, one who searches for the deeper meaning of 
things, it seems apt to suggest that the region is where meaning goes to die. 
It is possibly where the moral awareness of his people might be born. In this 
regard, his death becomes highly symbolic; he becomes a sacrifcial lamb, 
giving his life so that the world can see what is done to the people of the 
Niger Delta. This, I think, might sound too religious for some readers. I in-
terpret it, though, in moral terms. Zaq considered the lives of the people of 
the Niger Delta worthy enough to invest his own life in a moral imperative, 
perhaps because he had imagined himself in their position. In his death, he 
demonstrated the ultimate form of solidarity. To him, no life is inferior to 
others. In his death and, of course the actions that led to it, he fulflled the 
spirit of the frst article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 
Zaq’s life and death, the reader comes in close proximity with the people of 
the Niger Delta whose dignity had been denied them. 
Those who kidnapped Isabel Floode did so in order to fnance their resist-
ance to oil exploration in their region and the pollution it brings about. The 
mastermind of the militant resistance tells Rufus to write “about the fares 
you see at night, and the oil on the water” (232). In other words, he entrusts 
the journalist with the task of revealing the concealed violence in the Niger 
Delta. In his thinking, the writer must bear testimony, in the manner Gior-
gio Agamben has mapped out, even while he engages in the gritty form of 
resistance; the writer must bring the people outside the Niger Delta in close 
proximity with the abuse of human rights taking place there. Eventually, 
Rufus fnds Isabel Floode and discovers that she and James, her husband, 
have a complicated relationship. But that is secondary to the story. At that 
point in the story, Zaq’s “greater meaning” has already been achieved. The 
reader has already been compelled to raise questions about the worth of 
human life in the Niger Delta. 
The degree of violence unleashed in the Niger Delta has already been 
touched upon in my discussion of the poems. The implication of these forms 
of violence appears too obvious to be repeated in detail here, though it can-
not be totally avoided. Of equal, if not deeper, relevance is the mindset that 
accompanies or even necessitates the violence. For instance, the doctor who 
is attached to the military camp reports on the impacts of toxins that the oil 
releases on the people. The Italian manager of the oil frm is friendly to him 
and informs him right away that he is now on their payroll and gives him the 
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impression that his research will be of use. But when they do not take it se-
riously, he reports: “I thought they’d do something with my results, but they 
didn’t. So, when people started dying I took blood samples and recorded 
the toxins in them, and this time I sent my results to the government” (145). 
It is disturbing enough that the Italian manager would disregard the dan-
ger posed to the lives of the people of the Niger Delta; what is even worse is 
the utter disregard that the government has for the same lives. This recalls 
the story of the dumping of waste in Ivory Coast by Trafgura. What is the 
image and worth of the human persons living in that space in the minds of 
others? This question is as valid for the white man as it is for the black man 
in charge of lives there. There is, therefore, an open disdain for people’s 
lives. It is not only the lack of ordinary virtues, but a manifestation of ha-
tred, a belief in the disposability of human lives that are not ours. 
Habila does not simply give us instances of the destruction of agency and 
moral space as reasons that force us our attention to injustice; he also di-
rects our attention to how human rights could be restored and justice given 
to the victims. It is by nurturing a positive, caring attitude to humans, one 
that establishes them as possessing dignity, or as having agency in the frst 
place. To restore people’s human rights, we must see them through the prism 
of ordinary virtues of care, respect, compassion, and so on. For instance, 
Tamuno, who goes by the name Papa Michael, wants Zaq and Rufus to take 
his son, Michael, with them to the city because otherwise Michael has no 
future in that place. In a gesture of co-feeling, Zaq and Rufus discuss the op-
tion but discover it is a task they are ill-equipped to carry out (40–41). In this 
encounter, Zaq and Rufus demonstrate the alternative to the way in which 
the rest of the world regards the people of the Niger Delta. Zaq and Rufus 
encounter them as humans with dignity, who should be treated as such. This 
demonstrates their regard for the people’s humanity; they are humans with 
agency, but who could not exercise it because of the condition of slow vio-
lence to which they had been subjected. Their relation to the people of the 
Niger Delta places premium on the positive, rather than the negative con-
ception of morality and freedom; they demonstrate what ought to be done 
rather than what was not done or what evil had been done to the people. 
Nnimmo Bassey titled the preface to his collection of poems, I Will Not 
Dance to Your Beat, “Reclaiming our humanity, our memory.” This title is 
a ftting conclusion to our meditation on this section on bearing testimony. 
Bassey is one of Africa’s leading advocates and campaigners for the envi-
ronment and human rights. He “has stood up against the practices of mul-
tinational corporations in his country and the environmental devastation 
they leave behind destroying the lives and ignoring the rights of the local 
population” (African Success n.d.). In the preface, he reminds readers that 
“[e]verywhere we look we see pain, degradation and acts of man’s inhuman-
ity to man” (Bassey 2011:8). His words read as if he were interpreting Article 
1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His collection of poems, 
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The frst fve lines of his poem, “I will not dance to your beat,” under-
line his unbending resolve to engage those who abuse other people’s human 
rights and subject others to violence and death. 
I will not dance to your beat 
If you call plantations forests 
I will not sing with you 
If you privatize my water 
I will confront you with my fsts. 
(8) 
Bassey urges us in both his life and his poetry to fght environmental pol-
lution because it is about our survival as people who share the same moral 
framework. He occupies a prominent position in the African imagination 
about environmentalism and human rights and bears testimony to the vic-
tims of slow, silent violence. It is, though, a different question whether one 
may be able to excite people’s moral response with balled fsts. If his poems 
do not rise to the level of aesthetic elegance that can be seen in those of 
Ogaga Ifowodo, they nonetheless convey a sense of urgency that equals his 
activism. 
In conclusion, I return to the hypothetical situations I sketched in the pro-
logue. It is fair to claim that these writers challenge us to imagine ourselves 
in the positions of the residents of the Niger Delta and to state how we would 
want the world to respond to our situation. 
Notes 
1 Some parts of this section appeared elsewhere (Eze 2019) in a different format. 
2 Muselmann, Muslim in German is a term used by inmates of Auschwitz to des-
ignate those so debilitated by hunger and sickness that they resembled the living 
dead more than human beings. 
3 The River Nun is a tributary of River Niger. It is when the Niger River splits in 
two, forming the Nun and Forcados rivers. 
4 All further quotations from this poem refer to this page. 
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3 Mythic consciousness, 
witchcraft, and human  
rights abuses 
In May 2016, the Benue State Police (Nigeria) interrogated a seventeen-
year-old Nigerian man named Agayo Iorzenda for killing his mother. In his 
defense, the young man stated: 
I went to consult the oracle over my impotence and I was told that my 
mother used my manhood for witchcraft and rendered me impotent. 
She did not want me to be a man. So my friend advised me to kill her so 
as to use her blood to acquire spiritual powers that will help me become 
rich and do many other things. That was why I shot and killed her. 
(Eboiyehi 2017:253) 
Although most Africans would express shock at the fact of a young man 
killing his own mother, not many would doubt the witchcraft aspect of the 
story. Belief in the power of the occult is rife in Africa; it cuts across reli-
gious, ethnic, class, and educational groups. What strikes one is that most 
people, including practitioners of Christianity and Islam, believe in witch-
craft but proceed to offer their Gods as an antidote to the power of the men-
acing witches. They therefore set out to liberate the individual by subjecting 
his or her body to some form of exorcism. Of importance to my discussion 
here is the human rights implications of such efforts to liberate the “infected 
bodies” from evil forces. The issue, therefore, is the different visions of the 
world, all rooted in competing mythologies and which have varying degrees 
of human rights implications, depending on the interpretation of the myth. 
We have on the one hand the belief in witchcraft, rooted in African tradi-
tion; on the other hand, there is also the belief in, for example, the mystical 
power of Jesus Christ. What both of them have in common besides their 
root in mythology is the subsuming of the individual into some kind of be-
lief system with its attendant ideology, which notoriously makes it diffcult 
to consider individuals for who they are: bodies that feel pain. In this chap-
ter, I seek to establish mythic consciousness as an enabling environment for 
witchcraft which I discuss as a dominant form of the abuse of human rights. 
Witchcraft is not a uniquely African phenomenon. It has been practiced 
in Europe since as far back as recorded memory; its devastating effects, 
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however, took offcial form in 1487 with the publication of a book called 
Malleus Malefcarum (The Hammer of Witches), by Heinrich Kramer 
(Mackay 2009). The book elevated sorcery and witchcraft to the status of 
heresy to be subjected to inquisition. The hunting down of so-called witches 
fourished during the Inquisition in Europe and the English colonies in the 
New World, up until the period of Enlightenment when science and reason 
began to shape offcial policies. In 1597, King James VI King of Scotland 
(later King James I of England) published a book on witchcraft called Dae-
monologie (Tyson 2011). When he became the king of England in 1603 he 
initiated a sweeping campaign to rid England of witches, thus creating one 
of the many instances of massive human rights abuses in European history. 
I feel compelled to provide this short bibliographical reference to under-
score my intense desire to examine witchcraft as an aspect of humanity’s 
imperfect effort to understand the mysteries of existence and to explain its 
devastating effect on human rights. Second, a casual glance at the studies of 
witchcraft in Africa conducted by mostly European anthropologists leaves 
the sour and wrongheaded impression that it is essentially African and that 
nothing could be done to extirpate that from the African nature. 
The OED defnes witchcraft as “The exercise of supernatural power sup-
posed to be possessed by persons in league with the devil or evil spirits” 
(Simpson and Weiner 1989:439). This defnition is obviously incomplete, 
but of signifcance to our discussion are two things: (1) a person exercising 
or affecting actions, and (2) recourse to supernatural powers. John Mbiti 
(1970:264), one of Africa’s pioneer scholars of African religions, agrees with 
the defnition, stating that 
Witchcraft is a term used more popularly and broadly, to describe 
all sorts of evil employment of mystical power, generally in a secret 
fashion.… In popular usage the term “witchcraft” is employed to des-
ignate the harmful employment of mystical power in all its different 
manifestations. 
Essentially, witchcraft is the belief that humans can exert agency and ma-
nipulate nature, but this agency is not direct; rather, it is already mediated 
by, well, another agent: the spirit. It is a received agency. It is different from 
spirit possession to the degree that the witch is believed to take the initiative 
to acquire spiritual or supernatural power in order to infict harm. How-
ever, in some instances, it is believed that witchcraft can be inherited. So, 
the question is: who or what is really responsible for the exercise of certain 
actions or activities that are believed to manifest themselves in witchcraft? 
E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1976), one of the earliest Western scholars on 
witchcraft in Africa, sees witchcraft as the belief in a mystical power in-
nate in certain individuals and exercised by them to harm others. Dutch 
anthropologist Peter Geschiere (1997:12) contests the moral distinction 
most anthropologists have made in regard to the discourse of existence of 
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witchcraft. For him, they reduce the distinction “to an unequivocal oppo-
sition between good and evil, even when the local terminology hardly lends 
itself to this.” For him, “these terms are highly unfortunate and even mis-
leading translations of African notions that often have a much wider range 
of meaning.” Providing numerous examples given by his native informants 
in Cameroon, where he conducted his feld research, he argues that witch-
craft includes forces (evil or good) that humans appropriate in order to af-
fect reality (10–11). 
Mythic consciousness and moral order 
Max Gluckman (1963:141), famous founder of the Manchester School of An-
thropology, made a keen observation about the relationship between Africa 
and the West in the mid-twentieth century when he said in 1954 that “Africa 
has now been swept into the western world.” This observation is even truer 
today. This is hardly new to any clear-eyed student of African history. For 
better or worse, Africa is now part of Western modernity. But Africa has yet 
to come to terms with this fact in that it is no longer in control of the world 
it used to know, and it is not fully at home in the strange new world. Africa 
is neither fully Western nor truly African in their traditional, purist senses. 
Analyzing African people’s response to modernity and its threat to their 
lives, Gluckman states that: 
Africans turned in several directions for supernatural aid. One trend 
was increasing reliance on another set of their beliefs—those in magic, 
in oracles, and in witchcraft.… They also believed that individual mis-
fortunes were due to the evil nature of fellow-men, witches and sorcer-
ers, and they sought to combat these by magic. 
(141) 
Two things are at stake in this observation: one is ontological—the African 
people’s place in the world, and their relation to God and the afterlife. The 
other is moral—the African person’s relation to self and others. Essentially, 
these two—ontological and moral—aspects of being African are inter-
twined and largely explained through the modality of magic or witchcraft.1 
Unlike the West, Africa has no recorded scientifc explanation of the 
world. Much of their cosmology, as in the prescientifc, pre-Enlightenment 
societies of the West, is embedded in their religions, which have no system-
atized theologies, unlike the more established religions such as Judaism, 
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, and others.2 Africans ex-
plained misfortunes in moral terms and with recourse to supernatural forces 
and magic. Accidents or illnesses are never pure accidents or illnesses; they 
must be a result of evil machinations. According to Gluckman, the belief 
in the intercession of the supernatural world and its resultant will to con-
trol the world manifested itself acutely in the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion. 
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As the warriors of the Kenyan war of independence, the Mau Mau engaged 
in some form of rituals; they took oaths that bound them to the spilling of 
blood, engaging in taboo sex acts, and acts of bestiality and the threat to 
murder near kin. He sees these as the nihilistic “courage to revolt” (145). For 
Gluckman: 
A cycle is set up as the oath-takers break taboos on sex, and menstrual 
blood, and so forth, and gain fresh energy. They are bound together, in 
shame and guilt, through the ranks of a disunited, shifting people. Mau 
Mau is dominantly a movement of despair, and uses a magic of despair. 
(145) 
Confronting the powerful British army, the Mau Mau resorted to those rit-
uals as a last effort to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, or perhaps 
simply to survive. These acts released the people from all inhibitions in or-
der for them to devote themselves to the one goal of fghting the white man, 
who has proven to be far superior militarily. Their magic of despair is their 
total submission to, or indeed a result of, mythic consciousness. To be sure, 
what is interpreted as nihilistic might just be an instance of the limitations 
of one’s skills and the helplessness that arises therefrom, intermixed with a 
stubborn will not to succumb to a condition considered intolerable. But it is 
also surely a manifestation of desperation, a desperate search for an expla-
nation of the world that they no longer understood. 
The Mau Mau’s rituals are desperate perhaps because of their belief that 
those drastic measures would force the spirit world to intervene in the work-
ings of the material world on their behalf. It is a form of self-fagellation 
the likes of which was practiced in the Catholic Church during the Middle 
Ages and which still exists in some forms of rituals of guilt today. Also, 
the European Middle Ages confronted through magic the phenomena that 
exceeded their epistemic horizon and threatened their existence. They sub-
jected themselves to severe corporal punishments like fasting, bodily morti-
fcations, and fogging. These fagellants, also explaining the world in moral 
terms, believed they could repel recurring plagues such as the Black Death 
by punishing themselves and others. But these explanations are prescien-
tifc, based on mythological thinking—that is, a specifc kind of thought 
or explanation of the world rooted in stories or make-believe or in outright 
belief in witchcraft. 
Cameroonian scholar of religion David T. Ngong recalls one of his en-
counters with witchcraft in Africa. When he was growing up in his village in 
Cameroon in the early 1980s, a friend of his died at about the age of ten. But 
this friend was not the only person to die in that family. Many other young 
people died successively. The oldest of them was barely twenty. Only one 
person would not die: the paterfamilias. It was rumored that he sacrifced 
the souls of his children so that he would become rich; the dead children 
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reaped proft from their slave labor. The man, therefore, must have belonged 
to a secret cult called nyongo and must be practicing witchcraft. He must 
be a witch (warlock). Ngong observed that it did not make any difference 
that the man was not getting rich; at least, he was not any better off than 
all his poor neighbors. He still lived in a hut with plank walls. Yet, once the 
myth of his soul-devouring spiritual capability was planted in people’s con-
sciousness, they began to see him as a man in cahoots with the dark forces 
of witchcraft. When he eventually saved enough money and began to erect a 
small house with brick walls, that confrmed the village people’s suspicion; 
his house was “burnt down by angry villagers,” and he was consequently 
“exiled from the village” (Ngong 2012:145). 
At least two things stand out in Professor Ngong’s story. The frst is the 
communal search for the explanation of the many deaths in the family; the 
second thing is the village people’s easy recourse to stories or anecdotes for 
the explanation of phenomena that are obviously beyond their epistemic 
scope. They merely identifed patterns and archetypes in their cultural mem-
ory. They relied on a mythic apprehension and interpretation of the world. 
The deaths could not just have happened by accident; there must be a cause, 
and that cause must be within the immediate world of the events and must 
be an evil force. Since an evil force cannot operate independently of persons, 
it must reside in a person who has welcomed it, a person who did not become 
prey to the force. It is easy to dismiss this thinking as a vestige of primitive 
societies, but a close look at its structure reveals that it is also how religious 
thinking works, and it is present in every culture of the world today. 
To be sure, mythic consciousness is a particular form of reading of the 
world that relies on generous use of the imagination rather than on facts, 
and it expresses itself in many forms of mythopoeia such as anecdotes, 
legends, poetry, and literary works of fction. The outstanding features of 
mythic conception of reality, as can be gleaned from the two stories above, 
are the absence of rigorous critical inquiry and the simplistic acceptance 
of the implied truth of anecdotes. As Kenneth Burke (1996:11) observes, 
“though mythos originally meant but ‘word’ (being the Homeric equivalent 
for logos), the important consideration for present purposes is that it came 
to mean a tale, story, fable, a narrative form.” Myths are ahistorical, for they 
have no certain author; they explain matters by means of stories that explain 
things beyond the immediate scientifc, factual horizon of the people. 
The fact that mythic consciousness relies on fction does not make its in-
terpretation of reality false, but neither does it make it true. Like a work of 
fction, its truth is different, requiring mediation. It can still make claims 
about the human condition, even if its details are not factual. Ernst Cassirer 
provides some characteristics of mythic apprehension of reality as follows: 
(1) a feeling of sympathetic response to the world, dominating logical re-
sponses and perception of empirical cause-and-effect relationships; (2) a 
sense of the unbroken continuity and interconnectedness of everything 
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in the world; (3) metamorphosis; (4) an experience of time into which 
linear progression does not enter, and the separate segments of time— 
past, present, and future—fuse into each other simultaneously. 
(Jones 1975:6–7) 
Understood in a simpler form, Cassirer is saying that mythic apprehen-
sion exhibits affective reception of the world that defes the logic of cause 
of effect; secondly, there is an amorphous interrelatedness of everything, 
and then a cyclical rather than linear interpretation of time. Of relevance 
to my inquiry is the notion of generous interpretation of the world that goes 
against the senses or factual cause and effect. In most cases, there is an 
overreliance on extrasensory perception or even on the supernatural world 
for interpretation of material reality. In some cases, there is a blunt refusal 
to see factual evidence, perhaps because of pure ignorance or the emotional 
need for confrmation bias. For example, when the male members of a par-
ticular family lose their lives before they reach the age of thirty, the family 
may fnd it diffcult to accept that there is, for example, a congenital disease 
that runs through the family DNA and is passed on from father to sons. 
A suggestion that the cause might lie in their neighbor’s evil intentions or 
their ancestors’ anger might be more appealing to their religious, cultural, 
or ritual disposition. It is precisely prescientifc because the people have no 
idea of the complex biochemical process in the human body called DNA. 
The dangerous aspect of mythology as a means of explaining immediate 
reality of moral consequence is that it cannot be challenged because it is not 
rooted in something logically provable or challengeable, just as it is diffcult 
if not impossible to challenge the existence or nonexistence of God. 
According to Joseph Campbell, myths serve four functions: metaphys-
ical, sociological, cosmological, and moral (pedagogical). Myths provide 
cultural frameworks for people to educate their young; they are generally 
guidelines for coping with the passage from one stage of life to another. I am 
particularly interested here in the sociological function, which according to 
Campbell (2001:31) is for: 
supporting and validating a certain social order. And here’s where the 
myths vary enormously from place to place. You can have a whole my-
thology for polygamy, a whole mythology for monogamy. Either’s okay. 
It depends on where you are. It is this sociological function of myth that 
has taken over in our world. 
Mythology preserves the conventional knowledge and order of the world 
because its origin is unknown. It is therefore no surprise that those who 
beneft from the status quo in any society are usually vehemently against 
new knowledge, either from science or a counternarrative. It is in this way 
that original mythology functions as a technology of power—a way of pre-
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case when that myth is put into the canon of knowledge or transmitted as 
dogma. Thus, in most cases, myths can be used to explain the world accord-
ing to one’s ideological bias. What is gained from this type of interpretation 
cannot be called knowledge in the strict use of the term, but this is beside the 
point. The point is that it becomes people’s lifeworld and assumes a perma-
nent place in the community’s cosmology.3 
As a form of entertainment, myths are purely harmless, and mythic con-
sciousness often helps to expand the imagination. In some cases, however,
people take myths as literal truth, and these myths thus control people’s ethi-
cal disposition. A famous and undying example is the myth of the Fall of Man
in the book of Genesis. Adam and Eve, purely fctional characters, morphed
in the Judeo-Christian and Islamic imagination into real humans through
whom sin came into the world. That helped shape most men’s perception of
and relation to women as a sure source and vector of evil in the world. 
Famous professor of religious studies Jan Bremmer (1983:301) writes 
about the scapegoat rituals in ancient Greece, which involved the ritual of 
sacrifcing something such as a goat, a person, a slave, or somebody deemed 
guilty in order to save the rest. He states that in Athens, 
in exceptional times, such as a drought or a famine, certain ugly people 
were selected and sacrifced … at the Thargelia, a festival for Apollo, a 
man with white fgs around his neck was expelled from the city as a pu-
rifcation for the men, and another man with black fgs for the women. 
This ritual is not restricted to the ancient Greeks. In the Old Testament 
there are several references to the scapegoat sacrifce, Leviticus 16: 10: “But 
the goat chosen by lot as the scapegoat shall be presented alive before the 
LORD to be used for making atonement by sending it into the wilderness 
as a scapegoat.” 
According to René Girard (1989:25), “all myths have their roots in real 
acts of violence against real victims.” At frst, this claim seems untenable, 
especially given that there are also other myths that have nothing to do with 
violence. In terms of the primitive search for moral order, however, it ap-
pears that there will always be some form of victim. Girard underscores 
the consciousness behind the act of scapegoating someone or something in 
society. The need to justify that act “is that which produces myths” (50). 
In ancient societies the threat of permanent violence is often averted when 
communities fnd a single victim upon whom they can purge their collective 
anger. Such violence is usually created by “ferce rivalries and sets mem-
bers of the same family or social group at one another’s throats” (Girard 
1977:49). This defnition is of critical importance in our understanding of 
witchcraft as a phenomenon that obtains among close relatives and neigh-
bors. A society or community immersed in violence or crisis and could thus 
be facing its own demise seeks “to defect upon a relatively indifferent vic-
















70 Mythic consciousness and witchcraft 
its members, the people it most desires to protect” (4). The exercise might 
appear irrational, but it has its own logic. To quell the collective conscience 
of society, therefore, it has to produce some metaphysical explanation in the 
form of narrative. In this case then, myth functions to proactively justify the 
expurgation of an otherwise innocent human. Once the myth takes root in 
the people’s culture it becomes a self-justifying act. Nowhere is this as true 
as with the phenomenon of witchcraft. 
According to Monica Wilson (1951:313), “witch beliefs are general in small-
scale societies with inadequate control of their environment and dominated
by personal relationships, societies in which people think in personal terms
and seek personal causes for their misfortune.” Peter Geschiere (1997:11) ech-
oes Wilson’s observations, stating that even in modern African cities with
electricity and clean water and access to information, “witchcraft is sup-
posed to arise, frst of all, from the intimacy of the family and the home.”
If the world’s evil can be explained in moral terms, that evil can only be de-
feated through moral means. Correspondingly, Gluckman argues (1963:143), 
both in South and in Central Africa there have emerged men who moved 
through the country with new medicines to cleanse the people of their 
witchcraft: many people, aware of their vicious feelings, admitted these 
and asked to be cleansed. 
As in Professor Ngong’s story, society or the group usually rallies together 
to identify and uproot the cause, the sacrifceable person. 
Witchcraft and modern Africa 
To capture the depth and breadth of mythic consciousness as it relates to
witchcraft and its implications in the conception and practice of human rights
in Africa today, I shall relate some more incidents from anthropologists and
other scholars working on the topic. The frst incident: In their popular essay
on occultism and modern Africa, “Occult economies and the violence of
abstraction: Notes from the South African postcolony,” Jean Comaroff and 
John L. Comaroff (1999) relate a list of incomprehensible and inexplicable
phenomena that took place in post-apartheid South Africa. These include:
(a) the sale of human parts on the streets or open markets, (b) ritual murder
and the alleged production of zombies, and (c) pyramid schemes. For the
Comaroffs, these are manifestations of an occult economy, that is: 
the deployment of magical means for material ends or, more expansively, 
the conjuring of wealth by resort to inherently mysterious techniques, 
techniques whose principles of operation are neither transparent nor 
explicable in conventional terms. These techniques, moreover, often in-
volve the destruction of others and their capacity to create value. 
(279) 
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They argue that the occult economy draws on cultural elements of indige-
nous histories to assert itself as a part of millennial capitalism; it is an “odd 
fusion of the modern and the postmodern, of hope and hopelessness, of 
utility and futility, of promise and its perversions” (283). The Comaroffs un-
derline the fact that the roots of this strange phenomena “do not lie simply in 
poverty or material deprivation, however cruel and unrelenting it may be.” 
Rather, they are to be found in what Max Gluckman has characterized as 
“the Magic of Despair” (283). In their understanding, this despair is brought 
about by modernity, the people’s inability to fnd their way in a neocapitalist 
economy. As I have pointed out earlier, Gluckman’s notion of the magic of 
despair is helpful because it allows us to grasp Africans’ sincere but blind ef-
fort to grapple with the overpowering presence of modernity and the global 
economy. 
It is intriguing that the Comaroffs believe that South Africans’ resorting 
to the sale of human parts for occult purposes is out of desperation to which 
the modern capitalist economy has subjected them. This claim deserves a 
closer analysis that ought to go beyond the implicit and deserved critique 
of the neoliberal world order that has surely unhinged the African world. 
So, the larger question is: why exactly do Africans believe that human body 
parts could under any circumstances yield money to any person who con-
sumes it or uses it in any other form? 
Second incident: In his book The Modernity of Witchcraft in Africa, Peter 
Geschiere relates stories of incidents of witchcraft. In one of his feld studies 
in Cameroon, a woman who identifed herself as a (benevolent) witch stated: 
I have been driving all night. I drive a plane. We use the plane to trans-
port food, rain and such from places of plenty to the Buea area. Very 
recently, white people have been attempting to take the plane from us. 
If I hadn’t been so skillful, having piloted the plane for 30 years, they 
would have long gone with it. 
(Geschiere 1997:3) 
The story is interesting for a number of reasons, one of which is that an 
African witch would use a metaphor taken from Western science to explain 
a supposedly scientifc feat of African witchery. Perhaps Geschiere chose 
to ignore the contradiction, or even to suspect that the informer might be 
saying what she believed the white man wanted to hear. He seems rather too 
eager to highlight potential registers of modernity in that aspect of African 
cosmology. He thus states that, rather than seeing witchcraft and sorcery as 
belonging to ancient traditions that people had believed will disappear with 
modernization, people should rather see them as part and parcel of mod-
ernization in Africa. He writes, “Throughout the continent, discourses on 
sorcery or witchcraft are intertwined, often in quite surprising ways, with 
modern changes. Nowadays, modern techniques and commodities, often 
of Western provenance, are central in rumors on the occult” (2). What is 
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more surprising, according to Geschiere, is how witchcraft has been grafted 
onto politics and has been deployed as an apparatus “in the accumulation 
of wealth and power” (5). He echoes Max Gluckman’s observation that the 
belief and practice of witchcraft in Africa “does not contradict science: in-
deed, it embraces science. For witches do their ill-deeds by using elephants 
to crush, snakes to poison, overturned canoes to drown, disease to kill their 
victims” (Gluckman 1963:142). There is nothing surprising in the fact that 
Africans practice witchcraft at the same time that they make use of the 
fruits of European modernity, whose workings they might not have stud-
ied or understood. It is more plausible, I think, to suggest that mythic con-
sciousness simply deploys any available idioms, however contradictory, to 
craft its narrative. 
Third incident: Like the Comaroffs and Geschiere, Julien Bonhomme 
(2012:207) lists incidents that are incomprehensible to the modern mind 
but seemingly normal in modern Africa. These include stories of penis-
snatching, in which “strangers are accused of stealing (or sometimes only 
shrinking) the genitals of other people during public encounter, often by 
just a simple handshake”; killer mobile phone numbers, which states “that 
receiving calls from certain phone numbers could instantly kill those who 
took the call, with blood pouring out of the mouth, nose, and ears” (208), 
and of deadly alms, meaning that person “A” could cast spell on person “B” 
by gifting person “B” with alms laced with a magical potion. 
Like Geschiere, Bonhomme (210) suggests that 
witchcraft, magic, and the occult are no longer regarded solely as a tra-
ditional heritage, but rather as inherently modern phenomena, which 
must be set back in the context of global fows of symbols and images— 
what Appadurai aptly calls “mediascapes.” 
To be sure, Bonhomme (225) interprets the three cases above in line with 
Gluckman’s magic of despair as manifestations of societies dealing with 
the anxieties and encounters associated with the anonymity of modernity. 
There is, therefore, a common theme of encounters with a strange world or 
modernity either in its violent form, as with the Mau Mau, or in the form 
of capitalism, as in the Comaroffs’ example, or in technology and the un-
certain contours of society as a result of globalization and migration, as in 
Geschiere and Bonhomme. 
The fourth incident: The Nigerian social anthropologist Friday Eboiyehi 
(2017:253) interviewed an elderly woman who had been ostracized by her 
community because she was suspected of having caused the death of her 
son, who had died in a car accident several miles away. She narrates: 
I had only three children that God gave me. We were all living happily 
together until early last year when the youngest of them died in a ghastly 
motor accident on his way to Benin. When they brought his corpse, the 
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elders in my village insisted that they must fnd out who was responsible 
for his untimely death. They called a witch doctor who accused me of 
using witchcraft to kill my own son because he has not been sending 
money to me. The whole village has since isolated me. My children too 
have abandoned me because they see me as the one bewitching them. 
I am not interested in providing an overarching ethnological or anthropo-
logical interpretation of these events, as are the Comaroffs, Geschiere, and 
others, however much they seem to be peculiar to sub-Saharan Africa. I 
do not question the quality or content of any person’s belief. Indeed, these 
instances might not be qualitatively better than the beliefs and practices 
of certain cults or sects in Christianity in America. It is not entirely out 
of place to suggest that mythic consciousness as exhibited in the instances 
listed above issues from the same part of the psyche that has birthed reli-
gious rituals: humanity’s quest for meaning. It is one thing to have a magical 
attitude toward reality; it is another thing to have that relation negatively 
impact one’s relationship with fellow human beings, as happens in some of 
the stories above. Indeed, my ultimate concern in this book is about this 
second aspect: the degree to which abstractions create environments that 
enable the abuse of human rights by frst impeding access to reality and 
destroying interpersonal relationships.4 
The reliance on abstraction or naked ignorance of the workings of the 
human body has immense human rights implications. It creates a situation 
similar to what Jean-Paul Sartre (1989) describes in his play No Exit, a situ-
ation in which people see one another as embodiments of evil.5 In African 
contexts, the resort to abstraction in dealing with one’s body and in relating 
to other humans easily turns their space into hell. For one, it effectively 
blocks people’s portals of empathy so that it becomes nearly impossible to 
imagine the pain of others, even that of close family members such as one’s 
child. 
Nollywood, evangelical Christianity, and witchcraft 
An average African scholar familiar with Western colonialists’ outright dis-
missal of African culture and even African humanity would heave a sigh 
of relief at reading contemporary Western anthropologists’ nonjudgmen-
tal analysis of the phenomenon of witchcraft in Africa. Yet their hesitancy 
gives the probably misleading impression of acceptance. For example, in 
Geschiere’s efforts not to dismiss African reality out of hand, he searches 
for ftting comparisons in the West with some manifestations of the occult or 
witchcraft in Africa. In Cameroon, the nganga, or who is often pejoratively 
called the witch doctor, is a person who is believed to have access to the 
spiritual realm and knows its secrets. This profession has different names 
among various African ethnicities: babalawo in Yoruba, dibia in Igbo. They 
too can be witches, but they are believed to be able to effectively arm other 
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people with special powers to harm enemies or protect oneself against them. 
Referring to these people, Geschiere (1997:9) writes: 
When I listened to my friends’ speculations about the hidden role of 
the nganga (healers) and their arsenal of occult tools, which supposedly 
were decisive factors in regional and even national politics, I was often 
struck by the parallel with the role attributed to public relations experts 
in American politics (and increasingly in Europe as well). 
Geschiere’s suggestion about the parallel between both instances of political 
consultancy is not accurate. As David Ngong (2012:160) argues, “comparing 
the political role of the nganga to public relations experts in the West con-
fuses planes of discourse in one important way: it confuses metaphysical 
and non-metaphysical planes of discourse.” I strongly agree with Ngong’s 
perceptive observation here. Indeed, the proper comparison would be the 
nganga/witch doctor and evangelical Christianity and their prayer ministry 
(Wilonsky 2015).6 The Holy Spirit is to American evangelicals what the un-
named spirit or power is to the world of African witchcraft. 
I understand that it is not the job of Western anthropologists working 
on Africa to provide a robust critique of African reality; this is the obliga-
tion of African intellectuals. It is in this light that I am grateful to scholars 
such as David T. Ngong and Elias Bongmba (2001). I appreciate especially 
Ngong’s notion of the two planes of discourse that Western anthropologists 
confate in their assessment of the African condition: physical and meta-
physical planes—a mistake they might never make in any judgment of West-
ern societies. The issue with the African notion of witchcraft, the one that as 
Ngong states “stifes African imagination,” is the simplistic recourse to the 
supernatural to explain sometimes easily observable natural phenomena. It 
is therefore a legitimating of arbitrary judgment and abstractions in relation 
to others. The easy recourse to abstraction has far-reaching consequences 
for the conception and exercise of human rights in Africa. Abstractions 
obliterate the details of everyday life (Ndebele 1986:149–150). I have argued 
elsewhere that abstractions are some of the easiest ways to avoid personal 
responsibility because they notoriously ignore the demands of the other’s 
body (Eze 2016). Abstractions as essential elements of mythic consciousness 
manifest themselves in language, heritage, culture, tradition, religion, and 
human rights abuses. Because of its reliance on archetypes, mythic con-
sciousness sees humans not as individuals but as representative of some-
thing else: their groups, evil forces. 
It turns out therefore that mythic consciousness, which sustains the belief 
in the existence of evil forces and the ability to cleanse people of them, consti-
tutes an enabling environment for abuse of human rights in Africa. African 
Christianity has not helped to break the cycle of magical thinking in Africa. 
Indeed, the opposite is the case; rather, it merely has given a “civilized” le-
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has replaced African witchcraft with spirit possession, and the witch with 
the evangelist/exorcist. Christianity promises an antidote to the powers
of Satan: the fre of the Holy Ghost. It does not seek to explain the world in 
common-sense terms because that would go against childlike faith in and a 
magical relationship to God, which are the basis of their profession. 
In his study of the impact of belief in witchcraft in post-apartheid South 
African politics, Adam Ashforth states that given the ubiquity of the be-
lief in witchcraft and the notion that it is always about an evil person out 
to get another person, there are thousands of healers who propose various 
therapies, both spiritual and temporal. Healing from the attack of witches 
is a booming business in South Africa. According to Ashforth (2005:8), a 
rough estimate of the practitioners of this kind of healing is about half-a-
million. The anti-witch shrines and many Pentecostal healing ministries are 
both technologies of social and cultural power. Their priests seek to exert 
control over society through a calculated manipulation of the minds of so-
ciety’s most vulnerable members. This power struggle has devastating con-
sequences for the rights and dignities of people, especially those of women, 
children, and individuals of alternative sexualities and genders who are seen 
as abodes of evil. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I shall examine 
the appropriation of mythic consciousness in Nigerian popular flms and its 
human rights implications. 
In the twenty-frst-century Africa, no other form of narrative better sym-
bolizes mythic consciousness than the cheap video-to-flm movies mas-
sively produced, especially in Nigeria, popularly known as Nollywood and 
which began in the 1990s. Uchenna Onuzulike argues that the whole Nol-
lywood phenomena began with the movie Living in Bondage, produced by 
Ken Nnebue in 1992. For him, “the flm set the pace for the emergence of 
Nollywood. Videoflm has become an important mode of apprehending re-
ality and illusion in contemporary Africa. Nollywood is a vehicle through 
which Nigerian cultural heritage is represented” (2009:178). In the flm, a 
young couple, Andy and Merit Okeke, are facing challenges in life, includ-
ing sudden poverty. Andy is desperate to become rich by all means; he joins 
a satanic cult, in which members have to sacrifce the person they love most 
in a ritual. For that they become immensely rich. Andy sacrifces Merit, 
who dies in hospital shortly after the ritual. Before her death, though, she 
places a curse on her husband for his betrayal. Though he is rich, he lives 
in bondage with the devil, and Merit’s ghost haunts him. He wants to be 
released from his allegiance and seeks out a chief priest, who prescribes 
self-castration and blinding. Andy does not want to go along. He becomes 
deranged and lives as a vagrant under a bridge in Lagos. Tina, a former 
prostitute he had presented to the cult as a decoy, discovers him under the 
bridge and takes him to her church, where the evangelical priest delivers 
him from his bondage in the name of Jesus Christ. 
The video, having tapped into the archetypes prevalent in the mythic 
consciousness of the culture, opened the foodgates to the production of 
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hundreds of such flms each month (Adesokan 2011; Jonathan Haynes 2016). 
As Nigerian scholar of literature and popular culture Paul Ugor (2016:3) has 
observed, Nollywood began 
as young people’s own attempt to interpret and gain control over an 
emerging chaotic postcolonial reality…. Nollywood thus emerged as 
a modest cultural platform that offered young but economically and 
socially disenfranchised youth the opportunity to formulate both per-
sonal and collective myths that not only captured their quotidian strug-
gles in both rural and urban spaces, but also their desires and hopes for 
a good life. 
From its humble beginnings, Nollywood has assumed a global dimension, 
and its flms “are now being featured in international flm festivals in Berlin, 
Montreal, Paris, New York, London, South Africa, and even the bi-annual 
African flm festival (FESPACO), which is held in Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso” (4). 
Ugor pays special attention to the flm industry’s “young creators and 
the lives of other young people in the stifing environment that gave birth to 
it” (6). It is noteworthy that Ugor has offered a sympathetic reading of the 
efforts of these video-flm makers; they were forced to eke out means of sus-
tenance in the chaotic, postcolonial, and neoliberal reality. This assessment 
does not imply that he is oblivious to the negative sides of the undertaking, 
but exploring the moral implications of the genre has not been within his 
purview. Indeed, much has been written about Nollywood’s humble be-
ginnings and its global reach, but not much has been done on how it has 
reshaped African religious and moral landscapes. As Uchenna Onuzulike 
(2009:181) has observed: 
Nollywood videoflms demonstrate how Africans have incorporated 
Christianity into their culture. On the other hand, there are some con-
ficts as a result of the hybridization of African traditional religions and 
Christianity. Nigerian videoflms have confrmed those issues that res-
onate in African society such as spiritual warfare and conficting reli-
gious philosophies. 
Without a doubt, the opportunistic blending of elements of African tradi-
tional religions and Christianity manifested itself starkly in the absorption 
of their various mythologies about the nature of evil in the world. The var-
ious elements in these two religions merely reinforced in the African mind 
the dominance of mythic consciousness, as the practitioners of both reli-
gions have borrowed copiously from one another to craft a simplistic, bi-
nary moral world. 
Although Nollywood might have begun as an effort by Nigerian youths to 
eke out a means of survival in the postcolonial modernity, it has become an 
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easy road to wealth for many of its producers. It cares less for the aesthetic 
claims of the genre or the ethical and social implications of their art. Of 
course, the producers would argue that their concern had never been about 
the art itself but rather about pure economic motivation. This, to be sure, is 
no different from most Hollywood flm productions. The difference between 
the consumers of Nollywood and Hollywood flms is, however, immense. 
Most consumers in the West have appreciable aesthetic awareness to differ-
entiate between art and life and to delineate the mediated truth of art. The 
same cannot be said about most African consumers of these myths. 
According to Samuel Waje Kunhiyop, Nollywood videos have played a 
signifcant role in the spread of belief in witchcraft: 
Though they are usually cheap and of poor quality, these movie videos 
are one of the most powerful promoters of belief and practice of occult-
ism, witchcraft belief and practice, Spiritism and ancestral veneration. 
Movie directors and producers deliberately and intentionally portray 
and re-enact these beliefs in such a manner that they reconnect with 
African worldview on witchcraft. 
(Kunhiyop 2016) 
Many such videos litter the web. Some of them include “My Daughter Is 
a Witch,” “The Little Witch and the Wicked School Teacher,” and so on 
(Nwaonu n.d.). What they all have in common is the binary distinction be-
tween good and evil and a naïve judgment of the world that is characteris-
tic of societies whose epistemic registers are still immersed in mythologies, 
whose judgment of the world is largely controlled by paradigms derived 
from religion (Onyinah 2009) To say this is surely not to fall into the trap 
of hasty and undifferentiated judgments made by Western ethnologists and 
colonialist explorers, who branded Africans as pre-logical and primitive. 
Regardless of the above colonialist observations, one fairly accurate state-
ment about Africa stands: A large proportion of the African population is 
still illiterate, both functionally and literally. The tradition of writing and 
documentation and critical interrogation of knowledge has not yet taken 
root in most parts of Africa. The other side of this truth is that much of the 
information guiding African lives is still largely oral, and even in institu-
tions such as schools, churches, and governments, where offcial policies are 
written down, they are usually ignored by many, including the policymak-
ers. There is no controlling authority from which offcial readings of myths 
or other forms of knowledge fow. In other words, there is no offcial canon 
out of which some form of rational discourse can issue. All this makes room 
for chaotic readings of reality and the reign of a mythic apprehension of 
reality in which Nollywood fourishes. 
When myths are not subjected to informed interpretation, such as the 
biblical exegetes have done for the myths in the Bible, the result is usually 
an undifferentiated consumption of the narrative and a confation of art 
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with life. There is, therefore, especially regarding African interpretation of 
myths surrounding witchcraft, a naive judgment of the world that thrives on 
a simplistic binary perception of reality, especially the moral world. There 
is also a related belief in the triumph of good over evil, and this triumph is 
usually associated with Christianity, as if to cap off the hegemonic colonial 
conquest of Africa. 
The naïve reading of myths, the resultant binary moral judgment of the 
world, and the apocalyptic belief in the triumph of good over evil are a lethal 
mix in the African world. Children have been buried alive, scarred by acid, 
and poisoned because their parents or benefactors believed the children 
were instruments of evil forces, that they were witches. To infict pain on 
the bodies of these children therefore is tantamount to destroying whatever 
forces resided in them. For example: Mary Sudnad is one of the many chil-
dren accused of being witches. When she lost her youngest brother, a pastor 
told her mother it was because Mary was a witch. The mother invited three 
men to her house; they beat up Mary while Mary’s father watched. After the 
beating, the men took Mary to a church for a deliverance. A day later, they 
took Mary to a bush with Mary’s mother. 
They picked poisonous “asiri” berries that were made into a draught 
and forced down Mary’s throat. If that didn’t kill her, her mother 
warned her, then it would be a barbed-wire hanging. Finally her mother 
threw boiling water and caustic soda over her head and body, and her 
father dumped his screaming daughter in a feld. Drifting in and out of 
consciousness, she stayed near the house for a long time before fnally 
slinking off into the bush. Mary was seven. She says she still doesn’t feel 
safe. 
(McVeigh 2007) 
As Marc Ellison and Samuel Iwunze demonstrate in their insightful slide 
and video presentation on the consequences of witchcraft accusations, 
many of the pastors and prophets “have commoditized witchcraft—a prod-
uct on the market whose power is reduced through costly exorcisms. They 
point to the scriptures to validate their prophecies—a verse from the bible 
that tell readers to “suffer not a witch to live” (Ellison and Iwunze 1018). 
As I have already noted in the introductory chapter, in 2015, Anja Ring-
gren Lovén, a Danish aid worker, saved a two-year-old Nigerian boy whose 
mother had left him on the street to die “because his family thought he 
was a witch” (Osborne 2016). This is not an isolated incident. African aid 
workers regularly encounter similar human rights abuses. Women who fall 
out of favor with their husbands, or who assert their rights in their marital 
homes, are often suspected of possessing the powers of witchcraft. There 
are thousands of lesser-known cases. Further down, I discuss one such case 
in which modern mythmaking blends with moneymaking evangelicalism; I 
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I examine the structure of one of her flms with the knowledge that whatever 
human rights judgments we are able to make from them applies, without 
much qualifcation, to 90% of all the other flms. I conclude the section with 
a discussion of a much more aesthetically pleasing flm, I Am Not a Witch, 
which is also about witchcraft, but which provides a counternarrative to 
dominant Nollywood flms. 
Born in 1969, Helen Ukpabio is credited with popularizing the belief that 
children could be agents of the devil and could practice witchcraft. Her 
fame, or more accurately, notoriety rests on the fact that she deftly combines 
being an actress with being a prophetess. She is an evangelical Christian 
pastor, the founder and head of the African Evangelical franchise, Liberty 
Foundation Gospel Ministries, based in Calabar, Cross River State, Nige-
ria. She established her own flm production industry to propagate her ver-
sion of the evangelical mission. There is no fne line between art and life, 
between acting and being, and herein lies the beginning of confusion in the 
minds of naïve consumers of her flms. 
In “End of the Wicked: A Witchcraft Movie,” a number of mostly preteen
children are believed to have exited their bodies while asleep; their spirits
assemble in a witches’ coven where they are initiated into the secret world of
witchcraft. They imbibe resistant and destructive character traits (Onigbog-
bogbo 2013a). The scene changes to a modern nuclear middle-class family
living in a posh modern house. After initiation into the cult of witches, their
boy Dave returns home and declares to his mother: “Mommy, I am a wiz-
ard.” The mother does not believe it. She hushes him and sends him to his
bedroom. The boy’s father tells of his bad dream. We are shown a scene of
child members of the secret occult. Their Lord, a preteen boy, instructs them
to steal their parents’ property and bring the stolen items to their witches’
den. With the stolen things as a link to the families, the occult members
can then directly torment the family. They, the children, are therefore the
witches, who, possessing supernatural powers, can now effect evil in the real
world. Dave, who had told his mother that he was a wizard, is singled out
and admonished for having revealed his secret identity. He gets a new name:
Jeneji. All the kids get “evil” character traits inculcated into them: the spirit
of stubbornness, stealing, waywardness, lack of interest in school, unsteadi-
ness, bad company. They have the power to break glasses and to cause fever
to all members of their family. Soon enough, the families of these children
begin to experience a series of misfortunes. Job termination, divorce, Dave’s
father loses his sight, Dave’s mother abandons the family, and so on. The
source of the scourge, the viewers know, are the children who possessed evil
magic powers. Ukpabio, the evangelical preacher, of course, sets the stage for
the intervention of the superior power of Christ. In Part II of the flm, Uk-
pabio herself plays the pastor, who purges these children of their evil through
the power of the Holy Ghost and Jesus the healer (Onigbogbogbo 2013b). 
The plot is predictably simple and overly didactic, leaving nothing to the 
imagination. Rather, it is all calculated to instill horror, touching nearly 
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all registers of mythic consciousness such as those mapped out by Ernst 
Cassirer above, especially the affective, rather than logical, reading of 
cause and effect. Ukpabio exploits the mythic apprehension of reality and 
superstitious beliefs, particularly those related to demonic possession and 
witchcraft. The beginning of the flm is a display of amateurism in cine-
matography and reveals right away the producer’s didactic intent: to dram-
atize the existence of the power of evil. We are presented with a panoply of 
badly stitched grotesque features intended to present a gothic narrative. The 
characters are seen only as symbolic of something larger. They are therefore 
not explored from multiple dimensions as humans are supposed to be. In 
Ndebele’s famous formulation, they offer “a vast sense of presence without 
offering intimate knowledge” (Ndebele 1986:49). 
Ukpabio’s goal is to explain the source of evil, the manifestation of which 
haunts modern families. But what is troubling to a modern mind is that 
obvious cases of disability or illness are easily attributed to evil forces. 
Children’s stubbornness, dyslexia, or obvious lack of interest in school are 
not seen as parts of any human character development; rather, their causes 
are rooted elsewhere. Ukpabio’s mythic consciousness, which enables her 
to invent an explanation for diffcult behavior patterns, seeks their solu-
tion in another myth, the myth of Jesus as the savior. Only Jesus Christ can 
deliver the possessed children from the stranglehold of the powers of the 
underworld.
Ukpabio’s case demonstrates the triumph of Western myth over that ar-
ticulated in Africa. What both of them have in common is the evasion of 
forensically demonstrable reality. Perhaps due to African people’s limited 
knowledge world, simple cases of intransigence or a faw in a child’s develop-
ment of character is interpreted as a handiwork of the devil. In some cases, 
precociousness in children is interpreted as a sign of evil and often beaten 
out of them. It goes without saying that Ukpabio and her ilk are emblematic 
of widespread human rights abuses that are often accommodated if not pro-
moted in the name of Christianity. They make human rights abuses appear 
as if they are treating a sick person in the hospital. 
Narrative and the quest for justice 
I return to the “fve-oranges” hypothetical situation I sketched in the pref-
ace and specifcally to the scenario in which the boys deny the girls oranges 
with the explanation that the girls (Eve) were responsible for the fall of man. 
There are many ways the girls can respond to the myth that made boys deny 
them their oranges: They can keep on appealing to the boys’ empathy. Or 
they can also remind them that another woman brought salvation to the 
world by giving birth to Jesus Christ. In this case, the girls cleverly use a 
myth to vanquish another myth and they get their oranges. As much as we 
might chuckle at the humor of the situation, that is, intriguingly enough, 
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to challenge another is precisely what Rungano Nyoni does with her well-
regarded flm, I Am Not a Witch. 
Whereas Nollywood flm production stands for the wild exercise of 
mythic consciousness and abuse of mythopoeic tradition in Africa, I Am 
Not a Witch demonstrates some understanding of the art of narrative. I Am 
Not a Witch is a satiric narration of the fate of those accused of witchcraft 
in Zambia. Shula, a preteen orphan girl, is accused of being a witch because 
she happens to be standing nearby when a woman who has just fetched wa-
ter from the village well trips and falls. The woman blames Shula for her 
fate and reports the girl to the police. People no longer fetch water from the 
well for fear of being bewitched. Once this one particular probable cause of 
people’s misfortunes has been identifed, many village people come forward 
to accuse Shula of their own hard luck. For the safety of the community, 
she is taken to a witch camp, which consists of mostly elderly women, and 
which is cordoned off with a white ribbon. Shula is told that should she cut 
the ribbon and attempt to escape, she will be cursed and transformed into 
a goat. After Shula is taken to a real witch doctor, who tests whether she is 
a witch, with a predictable result, she accepts her fate as a witch perhaps 
because her survival instinct makes her grasp that resistance would only 
confrm people’s suspicions. It would make her appear even more strange, 
which would have effectively removed her from the reach of human empathy 
(Nyoni 2018). 
Of importance in our understanding of the environment of human rights 
is what Shula reveals about the humans she encounters. She is like a mirror 
that refects the character of those she encounters back to them. Perhaps this 
is one of the greatest revelations in the narration. For example, she is de-
clared government property and put under the guardianship of Mr. Banda, 
who works for the Ministry of Tourism and Traditional Beliefs. He seeks to 
exploit her for his own ends. On a television talk show, she is displayed in 
public and asked to demonstrate her gift, but she doesn’t speak. The talk 
show host is dubious about the whole game. He poses an insightful question: 
“What if she’s actually but just a child?” At that pronouncement, the cam-
era pans to Shula; she is in tears, probably moved by the combined effects 
of her being put on display and what the talk show host has said. Indeed, 
the talk show host seems to make the judgment the viewers would have ar-
rived at. No one speaks—not Mr. Banda or the talk show host or Shula. We 
are allowed to digest the import of that pronouncement. The same question 
could be extended to the other women accused of witchcraft. What if they’re 
but just poor elderly women? What if their crime was that they were the 
wretched of the earth? What is perhaps even more shocking to the viewer 
is that even after this pronouncement, Shula is still taken back to the camp 
where tourists pay her visits and take pictures with her. 
In Shula, we judge the character of those she meets. Their reactions re-
veal the far-reaching toxicity of the environment sustained by mythic con-
sciousness. It is part of the success of the flm as a good work of art that the 
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question is no longer whether Shula is a witch; rather, we judge the reactions 
of people who engage with Shula on daily basis. In judging their reactions, 
we judge ours. We are enjoined to examine how we would have acted in such 
situations. The flm fulflls what we might call Ndebele’s aesthetic test of 
African narrative, one of which is whether the narrative provides us with 
intimate knowledge of its characters. When we see Shula in her natural en-
vironment, when we encounter her as a child, which she is, we feel we know 
her, and we relate to her. This is because we see her just as a child, and not as 
representative of anything. The flm does not present a “vast sense of pres-
ence”; rather, it takes Shula’s life as just another ordinary life. 
As Katie Rife (2018) rightly observes, “I Am Not a Witch fts right into the 
cringe-comedy tradition, albeit on the more formally rigorous end.” Indeed, 
the flm is squarely a satire, an effort to mock in a lighthearted manner 
the absurdity of witchcraft beliefs. Nyoni tactfully interrogates the belief 
and practice of witchcraft in Africa, and she does so in a way that does not 
sound preachy. She declared in an interview: “‘I wanted to show Zambian 
humour and how we deal with tragic events” (Webb 2017). As she reveals, 
the witch camp that provided the background for the story “is based on real 
places Nyoni visited in Ghana and Zambia” (Rife 2018). Some of the items 
she used such as the spools of ribbon were taken from real life. She states, 
“There are places in Ghana where they paint a line and tell you that you 
can’t go around it or else you’ll die” (Webb 2017). 
Nyoni provides a counternarrative and lays the palimpsest for how to en-
gage the debilitations of mythical consciousness. She succeeds best when 
she gives a glimpse into Shula’s pain. This comes best in the television show 
where Mr. Banda and the talk show host talk about Shula while she says 
nothing. The single teardrop from Shula’s right eye speaks directly to the 
viewer. It shows Shula as a regular human being. That tear drop encapsu-
lates the question: Am I not a human? In it Nyoni directs our attention to 
the simple basic human dignity. 
Besides directing us to the basic issue of human dignity, Nyoni success-
fully renders into humor that aspect of African tragedy by bringing us to 
laughter at some point in the flm. One of the ways she does so is by producing 
a jarring contrast between tradition and modernity. In the background are 
Vivaldi and Schubert, symbolic of European modernity, which play against 
a pre-modern, medieval background. A further clash with modernity arises 
when the government wants to use the services of Shula to determine the 
person who had stolen a man’s dowry money. The suspects are lined up and 
Shula should point out the culprit. As a witch, she should have the power to 
do so. But she calls her grandmother for help: “They’ve lined up the suspect, 
but I don’t know who it is.” The grandmother answers: “The one who looks 
scared.” She explains further. “It is the one who looks down at the ground.” 
At this point there is no doubt in the viewer’s mind that Shula is just but a 
little girl. All these present Shula as a regular human who demands that we 
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Witchcraft and the common good 
In his discussion of justice and otherness in Africa, Nigerian philosopher
Uchenna Okeja ( ‎2019:10) argues that the primary condition for justice
in society is the unconditional acceptance of the humanity of the other.
Justice is based on deliberation, which in itself is “contingent upon the
intersubjective affrmation of a basic principle, namely, the principle of
humanity.” What then are the principles of humanity or perhaps the im-
pediments to their fullest realization? The standard for recognizing the
humanity of others is simple and straightforward, as laid out in Article I of
the UNDHR: that the other is as fully endowed with dignity as I am and
therefore deserving of the same respect and treatment as I am. This is the
point at which a diffculty arises, for, in Okeja’s thinking, justice is denied
precisely at the point we see the other as inferior or not fully human. I con-
tend that witchcraft accusations achieve a specifc goal in this regard: They
objectify the other by robbing him or her of their humanity. The other is
seen as less human because he or she is thought to be at the service of a
force that is essentially against humanity. Witchcraft denies the accused
the opportunity to be part of the deliberative process. This is precisely
because the accusation summarily turns the accused into a stranger and a
danger. Okeja argues: 
Constructions of otherness which make the recognition of the human-
ity of a people or an individual who should be part of the deliberative 
process, present a fundamental challenge to the deliberative model of 
justice for two reasons. The frst is that the absence of cognitive equality 
nullifes the motive for deliberation. It transforms the process into a 
monologue of the powerful, making it essentially a performance that 
makes the powerless victims … [the second is] the anti-communitarian 
nature of constructions of otherness. 
(17) 
Analyzing David T. Ngong’s already cited story, Okeja argues that it would 
be impossible for the accused man, who was eventually banished from the 
village, to receive justice because he had already been branded as less than 
human. What is said of this man also goes for children accused of witch-
craft. It is heartrending to read about a mother who abandoned her children 
because she believed them to be witches. But the truth is that no cruelty 
is unimaginable in human community under enabling conditions, one of 
which is what Okeja has referred to as the absence of cognitive equality. I 
understand Okeja as suggesting that justice is possible only where the ordi-
nary virtues of co-feeling, care, tolerance, and so on are present. Without 
these virtues, no community would be able to function. 
The examples of witchcraft accusations we have seen this far reveal a so-
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and justice have been blunted by the ideology inherent in their mythic 
conception of reality. People’s portals of empathy and fairness have been 
effectively blocked by the overpowering effects of simplistic myth and ab-
stractions. Elsewhere, I discussed the role of empathy in society and how it 
could be blocked (Eze 2016). Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa, and 
the Jim Crow American South are the most obvious examples. Frans de 
Waal (2009:214) argues that 
We sometimes deliberately shut the portal, such as when we suppress 
identifcation with a declared enemy group. We do so by removing their 
individuality, defning them as an anonymous mass of unpleasant, infe-
rior specimens of a different taxonomic group. 
Mythic consciousness blocks or at least blurs people’s portals of empathy, 
precisely because of the absolutist binary modality of the narrative. And be-
cause it creates conditions that present humans in an abstracted condition, 
people are no longer seen as individuals with distinct feelings but rather as 
puppets. Presenting humans as mere symbols effectively puts the accused 
outside the range of people’s empathy. Where empathy is not blocked by in-
doctrination or myths, it brings people back to the most basic form of bod-
ily identifcation with others, regardless of race, sex, age, religious beliefs, 
and other forms of group identifcation. 
Belief in witchcraft erodes trust and good will among people and ul-
timately destroys feelings for the common good. Many keen observers
of witchcraft accusations in Africa have noted that they are manifesta-
tions of everyday strife within close-knit communities. As Monica Wilson
(1951:312) has observed, “In Nyakyusa society friction is most likely be-
tween neighbors who live close together, and it is between them that ac-
cusations of witchcraft are most frequent. Both societies are polygynous,
and, in both, accusations are fairly frequent between co-wives.” Given
the persistence of mutual suspicion among neighbors, there is hardly any
ground for mutual deliberation on any issue and therefore no condition
for justice in society. That further creates conditions for some kind of
authoritarian assertion of personal opinion either from the eldest man or
from a band of men. This situation arises largely due to the fact that the
parties regard each other as inherently dangerous enemies. The condition
described in the already cited Sartre’s play, No Exit, takes place: Humans
become hell to humans. 
The obsession with purity and the urge to rid society of its bad apples give 
rise to conditions in which people project their own failures and weaknesses 
on others, partly in the belief that the accuser is considered better than 
the accused. People therefore produce what Girard calls a “‘sacrifceable’ 
victim” (Girard 1977:4). Wilson draws an important comparison between 
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alleged communists in the United States carried out under Senator Joseph 
McCarthy between 1950 and 1954. She raises important questions: 
Are the witches but the primitive form of the scapegoat who is always 
with us? Are men with pythons in their bellies and those who ride ba-
boons by night indeed a true parallel to the red agents of McCarthy’s 
fevered dreams? 
(Wilson 1951:313) 
Economic professor Boris Gershman (2016:184–185) argues that belief in 
witchcraft also hampers society’s economic growth primarily because it 
hinders 
interpersonal trust, cooperation, and social relations more generally. 
An overview of ethnographic case studies suggest that there are two 
main reasons for being suspicious, distrustful, and non-cooperative in a 
society with widespread witchcraft beliefs: the fear of bewitchment and 
the fear of witchcraft accusations. 
This observation becomes all the more apparent in preliterate societies, 
where contracts are not written down and cannot be backed by the force of 
law. People depend much on the goodwill of their neighbors and that of the 
community. In situations where one party accuses the other party of witch-
craft in order to get out of a mutual business contract, that destroys not only 
human interaction but also the possibility of both parties profting from 
current or future business deals. It turns out therefore that given the above 
conditions, in societies in which belief in witchcraft fourishes and in which 
people mutually accuse one another, it becomes impossible to get people to 
think of or act toward the common good, or even to think of the common 
virtues of empathy and care. One hardly empathizes with the other whom 
he or she considers an actual or potential enemy. 
The above considerations constitute not only the ethical consequence of 
widespread belief in witchcraft; they also gesture toward political implica-
tions, the most fundamental of which is the ability to conduct deliberation 
and to exercise justice. 
Notes 
1 We must guard against making any hasty general judgments about the so-called 
nature of Africans. We might ask ourselves why there has been an increase in re-
ligious fundamentalism and denial of obvious facts of science such as evolution 
and the spherical nature of the globe in America? Why has the fat earth society 
fourished? 
2 With this I am passing no value judgment. As a person who grew up practic-
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Catholic theology, I know the difference between these religions in terms of 
theology. 
3 Until the phenomenon of sickle cell anemia became widely known in Africa (at 
least the part of Africa I come from) successive childhood deaths in families 
were attributed to supernatural forces primarily because the people had a lim-
ited knowledge about it. Presently potential couples test for their blood type for 
the probability of their offspring inheriting sickle cell. 
4 Of course, it does not help that different churches now offer Christian solutions 
to the alleged occult attacks rather than explain what might be going on in peo-
ple’s lives. 
5 In the play, three souls, Joseph Garcin, Inès Serrano, and Estelle Rigault, are 
condemned to hell because of their sins on earth. They are locked up in a myste-
rious valet, and they are at frst surprised to learn that their hell is not a burning 
cauldron. But after staying with one another in the closed room for a long time 
they fnd one another unbearable and discover that hell is other people. 
6 When I saw a host of Evangelical pastors laying their hands over Trump in 2015 
to protect him from his liberal enemies, I saw in my mind’s eyes African poli-
ticians seeking out ngangas, babalawos, or dibias for protection against the evil 
forces of their enemies. 
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4 Barriers to being 
Albinism, disability, and 
recognition 
As I hope to have made clear in Chapter 3, mythic apprehension of reality 
constitutes a major hindrance in interpersonal relationships because peo-
ple interpret reality through the prism of magic and abstract beliefs rather 
than through the practice of the ordinary. In most cases, myths create and 
sustain a toxic environment that enables the abuse of human rights. Mythic 
apprehension of reality, which is often preserved in religious and cultural 
rituals, effectively shapes people’s moral attitudes. For instance, many peo-
ple of Abrahamic faiths relate to women based on the moral principles de-
rived from the myth of the Fall of Man whereby women (Eve) brought about 
the fall of men (Adam) by luring them into sin. Women are always at fault. 
In such cases, in order to break the thrall of mythology, an appeal to the 
basic principles of common humanity becomes unavoidable. By this appeal 
to the common humanity, I mean that individuals need to be reminded that 
others have dignity and therefore must be treated the way we all would de-
sire to be treated. But simple appeals are often not enough to maintain a 
world in which people’s human rights are consistently respected. A vigor-
ous campaign must be conducted to drive home the absolute necessity of 
maintaining the inviolability of the dignity of individuals, whether they are 
strangers, look strange, or are otherwise unknown to us. Thankfully, people 
are doing just that. I have also related Vicki Ntetema’s undercover investiga-
tion of killings of people living with albinism in Tanzania, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda. 
In this chapter, I discuss the condition of people living with albinism in 
Africa. I identify albinism as a disability that, like all disabilities, ought 
to elicit every decent person’s compassionate attention. In my discussion, 
I translate this compassionate attention into the broader philosophically 
tinged notion of recognition and moral responsibility. The issue of disability 
as a subject of inquiry has not yet received the much-deserved attention by 
scholars of the African world. As I have already mentioned in the introduc-
tory chapter, Ato Quayson’s Aesthetic Nervousness is to my knowledge the 
only work that engages it. Quayson examines disability in literature as an 
ethical issue. Disability fundamentally affects intersubjective relationships 
and forces readers to take an ethical position. Following in his footstep, 
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I argue that disability calls on us to examine our notion of (social) justice, 
whether we accord vulnerable members of society the same dignity we claim 
for ourselves. 
Black people in white skin 
In one of the most poignant chapters of Black Skin, White Masks, titled 
“The Lived Experience of the Black Man,” Frantz Fanon (2008:91) recounts 
the minor details of black people’s encounter in Europe that negate their 
existence as humans. Such details include the simple gesture of a white child 
pointing at him, a black man, and declaring, “Maman, look, a Negro; I’m 
scared!” Fanon states that, like every other human, he came into this world 
eager to be, to live his life, and to “uncover the meaning of things,” but at the 
moment of that encounter he became “an object among other objects” (89). 
The reason does not lie in his nature—that is, he is not predetermined by 
nature to be diminished or be frightened in the presence of others, as a prey 
would at the sight of a predator. Rather, his feeling of becoming an object 
is in the nature of the encounter between black and white in a racist envi-
ronment. The black man has already been defned over the centuries with 
thousands of “anecdotes, and stories” (91) woven around him by the white 
man whose child pointed at him, stories that fxed him in an inferior cate-
gory of being. The black skin is therefore not just a different shade of skin; 
it is a signifer, and the signifed is embedded in the myths and anecdotes of 
which the child is fully aware. In pointing at the black man, the child pins 
him down with all the weight of history. The black man cannot fght back 
because the issue is not with the child; it is what the pointing fnger stands 
for. Indeed, the battle, issuing from Hegel’s master/slave dialectic (Hegel 
1971:170–175), had already been won even before the black man encountered 
the child, and because of the lost battle, the black man has “diffculties in 
elaborating his body schema” in the white world. The image of his body 
“is solely negating…. All around the body reigns an atmosphere of certain 
uncertainty” (Fanon 2008:90). 
Fanon echoes W.E.B. DuBois’ notion of double consciousness—that is, 
according to DuBois (1996:5), a veil, “this sense of always looking at one’s 
self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world 
that looks on in amused contempt and pity.” DuBois describes a condition 
in which the black person is split between two worlds: one in the presence 
of white people, the other when he is among black people. In each world, 
the black man never achieves full consciousness. For DuBois and Fanon, 
the white gaze erases the black body thanks to a racist system composed of 
narratives or, to stick with the idiom we established in Chapter 3, a mythic 
perception of reality. It is mythic to the degree that racism was constructed 
from what Abdul JanMohamed (1986) calls Manichean allegories. This rac-
ism constitutes a barrier to the being of the black body and black people’s 
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to which it is put. In the above case, it had been weaponized by white racist 
societies with the help of legends and myths created to deny the black people 
recognition on the one hand and to maintain the illusion of superiority on 
the other. 
Besides Vicky Ntetema’s undercover report on albinism in Africa, albi-
nism has attracted some scholarly interest, especially in the felds of cul-
tural anthropology, genetics, and disability and human rights studies with 
leading fgures such as Patricia Lund (People with Albinism n.d.), Jennifer 
Kromberg (2018), and others. On its campaign website against the abuse 
of people living with albinism, the Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations states, “Albinism is a rare, non-contagious, genetically inherited 
condition which occurs worldwide regardless of ethnicity or gender. It most 
commonly results in the lack of melanin pigment in the hair, skin, and eyes 
(oculocutaneous albinism), causing vulnerability to sun exposure.” (United 
Nations). 
Oculocutaneous albinism is not a disease; it occurs merely due to some 
form of genetic mutation. In Western societies, people with albinism often 
go unrecognized, at least not immediately. Indeed, as Charlotte Baker et al.
(2010:169) state, “very early Western anthropology assumed that people 
with albinism were found only in non-European populations, but now it is 
recognized that albinism is present in all ethnic and racial groups, although 
prevalence rates vary considerably throughout the world.” Ironically, albi-
nism seems to be more prevalent in Africa, and especially in Nigeria, Tan-
zania, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. In Tanzania alone, albinism occurs at 
“a rate of more than 14 times that of North America & Europe” (Under the 
Same Sun; The Albino Foundation). 
Esther S. Hong et al. (2006:212) have declared albinism to be a public 
health issue. Living with albinism is a challenge; it has health issues such as 
poor eyesight, involuntary eye movements, skin cancer, and photophobia. 
Living with albinism in Africa poses several problems, the least of which is 
dealing with the harsh sun and the practical problems of health care. Living 
in a continent of people with dark skin color, people with albinism represent 
easily visible signs of difference. They are therefore treated as the other, ex-
otic. As Giorgio Brocco (2016: 230) observes: 
The majority of people with albinism in Tanzania live in marginalized 
social conditions and a state of economic vulnerability because, apart 
from having a different physical appearance and suffering from visual 
impairments, they cannot actively take part in agrarian work due to 
their sensitivity to the sun, and this effectively excludes them from en-
gaging in the major productive activity in most rural areas. 
German cultural anthropologist Brocco lists epithets that allude to the pre-
carious condition of people living with albinism. He states that “In Tan-
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(which literally means ‘deal’, and refers to the trade of the body parts of
people with albinism on the black market).” Brocco examines the stigma-
tization of people with albinism as a form of denigration, and this is com-
parable to epithets hurled at black people in Western countries. He stresses
that just as the self-perception of black people is adversely affected by the
experience of racism, “the subjectivity and life experiences of people with
albinism are strongly shaped by their different physical appearance and
attributes” (232). 
Anita Franklin et al. (2018:2) argue that albinism is a form of disability 
not only because of the physical challenges such as photophobia. Indeed, 
they extend their application of disability to encompass areas in which the 
condition of albinism disables albinos or renders them incapable of living 
fully. First, they conceive of disability as an “umbrella term for impairments, 
activity limitations and participation restrictions, referring to the negative 
aspects of the interaction between an individual (with a health condition) 
and that individual’s contextual factors (environmental and personal fac-
tors).” So disability can be understood socially, psychologically, and physio-
logically. The social way of understanding disability differentiates between 
“impairment, the loss or limited functioning experienced by an individual, 
and disability, the barriers that people with impairments face because of the 
way societies are structured” (2). This social form refers to the day-to-day 
effect of living with particular conditions of impairments; this can prevent 
one from doing something. Another form is when it affects people’s psych-
oemotional well-being. In the former, they experience barriers to doing; in 
the latter, it is a barrier to being. Barriers to being are imposed by others in 
society. 
Albinism constitutes barriers to doing and to being. Franklin et al. 
(2018:3) argue that “social processes and practices severely affect children 
with albinism and as such, they face signifcant ‘barriers to being’, most se-
riously, their right to life and protection and the right to freedom from dis-
crimination.” To fully appreciate this form of disability or barriers to being, 
we recall Fanon’s description of the emotional condition of the black man 
the moment a white child pointed at him and says, “Mama, look, a Negro.” 
Perhaps it helps in this regard to pose a rhetorical question: Is blackness a 
disability in a white racist country? Indeed, this question has been asked 
by many African American scholars (Paul-Emile 2018). I approach it not 
in the conventional context of American identity politics, but rather from a 
Fanonian phenomenological analysis of the infuence of rabid racism on the 
black body, as shown in the (Fanon) examples above. 
The altered subjectivities of those living with albinism is a signifcant psy-
chological aspect of their lives, and it is thus a major hindrance to being 
largely owing to low or lack of self-esteem arising from being bullied and 
epithets being hurled at them. The Human Rights Council of the United 
Nations states that “The physical appearance of persons with albinism is 
often the object of erroneous beliefs and myths infuenced by superstition, 
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which foster their marginalization and social exclusion” (United Nations 
n.d.). The existence of these myths has direct life-and-death consequences 
for people living with albinism. 
Confrming the effects of the mythic apprehension of reality, Maureen 
Mswela (Mswela 2017:15) reports that on September 25, 2015, two nineteen-
year-old men pleaded guilty in a South African court to the murder of 
Thandazile Mpunzi, a twenty-year-old woman with albinism. The woman 
was said to have been deceived by her boyfriend, who had been told by a 
witch doctor or traditional healer that a charm prepared with the body parts 
of a person with albinism would make him rich. On that basis, the accused 
made plans to kill his girlfriend and extracted her body parts for the ritual. 
Mswela states that 
the body parts of persons with albinism are believed to sell for enor-
mous sums of money, and the fact that trading in albino body parts 
constitutes such a lucrative enterprise and a way to make quick money 
is an incentive for inhuman acts such as these. 
(116) 
Commenting on the effects of mythology on people’s psyches, Charlotte 
Baker et al. (2010:170) state that “throughout the world, myths function 
to account for phenomena which are out of the ordinary or which cannot 
be explained in other terms, fulfilling a fundamental human need to make 
sense of the world.” In their study, they found out that “one of the great-
est impediments to a person with albinism taking part in society is that of 
myths and beliefs that continue to be attached to albinism” (170). Endorsing 
their explanation, I will later argue that the myths associated with albinism 
in Africa constitute its greatest impediment to being. First, I examine some 
of the ways in which mythical explanations of reality shape the reality of 
people living with albinism. One such explanation is given by a woman with 
albinism whose mother explained to her the reason for her being born that 
way thus: 
The mother attended a party while pregnant and saw a mother with a 
baby precariously strapped to her back in a blanket. Fearing the baby 
was about to fall she went forward to help tighten the blanket. She then 
saw to her fright that the baby had albinism. She believed that, as a di-
rect result of this encounter, she had given birth to a child affected with 
the same condition. 
(172) 
Myths are based on often simplistic, abstract, and omni-historical expla-
nations of reality, and they are diffcult to disprove for that reason. I also 
discussed Rene Girard’s concept of the scapegoat and the archaic desire in 
ancient societies to sacrifce one of their own to avert perceived impending 
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doom. Usually, the victim is somebody who looks different or one consid-
ered dispensable to retain society’s moral equilibrium. In ancient Greece, 
it was always an ugly person, usually from a poor background. The phe-
nomenon of scapegoat, to be sure, is not restricted to ancient societies. Or 
perhaps it is one of the enduring residues of primitivism found to varying 
degrees in every society. In times of economic, social, or political crisis, 
times in which people abandon rational discourse and fall back on myths, 
strangers and vulnerable members of societies are usually the easy targets 
of frustration and attack, deemed sacrifceable because of their difference. 
I argue that the stigmatization of people with albinism is a remnant of the 
ritual of scapegoating. 
The issue therefore is difference and the uses to which it is put. Mary 
Douglas (1966:4) states that 
ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing trans-
gressions have as their main function to impose a system on an in-
herently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference 
between within and without, above and below, male and female, with 
and against, that a semblance of order is created. 
In the spirit of Fanon’s analysis above, we can add the category of black and 
white to Douglas’s binaries. Difference heightens the perception of purity, 
especially if the thing that differs from the norm is at the same time seen 
as embodying evil. Indeed, it has to embody all negativity to justify the de-
fner’s refusal to identify with it or extend empathy to it. Just as myths help 
humans to make sense of their lives, they also help to burn prejudices into 
the psyche and make it extremely diffcult to change social behaviors. This, 
as I indicated above, constitutes the most dangerous condition for people 
living with albinism in Africa. 
On February 19, 2015, the International Business Times ran a seemingly 
sensational headline titled, “It’s Fatal to Be an Albino In Tanzania Due to 
Cannibalism.” The author, Vittorio Hernandez (2015), writes: 
On Feb 14, one-year-old albino boy Yohana Bahati was added to the 
growing list of Tanzanians abducted and brutally killed due to many 
Africans still practicing cannibalism and black magic and believe that 
albinos have power which would be transferred to them if they ate the 
fesh of one. 
It seems sensational for its attention to cannibalism in Africa, indirectly 
drawing attention to the European modernist framing of Africa as prim-
itive. Pakistani reporter Khurram Shahzad (2016) frames the same issue a 
bit differently: “Cannibalism or spirituality? Albino children being killed in 
Malawi for use in ceremonies.” A BBC report on the same issue chooses to 
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people have been killed for their body parts in rituals within a year. In one 
particular case, a seven-month-old baby “was mutilated on the orders of 
a witchdoctor peddling the belief that potions made from an albino’s legs, 
hair, hands, and blood can make a person rich” (BBC 2008). 
Whether we call it cannibalism or spiritual renewal, the fact is that hu-
mans are killed for their body parts, which are used to prepare potions to be 
consumed. In other words, people consume whatever is prepared with these 
human body parts. What is cannibalism, if not the practice of consuming 
the fesh of one’s species, whether for food or spiritual beneft? Cannibalism 
is a crime against humanity, for it goes to the heart of humanity’s moral 
framework and reduces humans to beasts. Cannibalism also goes against 
the assumptions of human civilization because it undercuts the essential 
trust and belief in the common good. 
Narrating being, narrating difference 
Characters with albinism are rare in African literature, and whenever they 
appear, they are seen as tropes rather than as individuals in their own right. 
As Charlotte Baker and Patricia Lund (2017:1) state, its representation 
“tends to be highly stereotypical, and the qualities of albinism are typically 
exaggerated to identify characters with albinism as deviant and strange.” In 
Wole Soyinka’s The Interpreters (1970), Lazarus the albino is seen as a twi-
light creature, one that belongs neither here nor there. In Buchi Emecheta’s 
young adult novel, The Moonlight Bride (1983), the bride is albino, and she is 
very welcome in the village of Odanta; the albino is thus a trope for hospi-
tality. In José Eduardo Agualusa’s The Book of Chameleons (2008), the pro-
tagonist, Félix Ventura, an albino, sells people their pasts. Nnedi Okorafor’s 
Akata Witch (2011) is a fantasy novel that tells the story of an albino, twelve-
year-old Sunny Nwazue, gifted with magical powers. Soon she is part of a 
group of magic students trying to capture a notorious criminal who also 
has magical powers. Although the story is about fnding one’s place in the 
world, the presentation of the protagonist as a person with magical powers, 
perhaps because of her difference, makes it more diffcult to see her as the 
regular human being she is supposed to be. 
There are equally paltry scholarly works on narratives about albinism. 
Most works on albinism focus on teaching materials for secondary schools. 
I feel especially drawn to Charlotte Baker and Patricia Lund’s essay for its 
focus on the possibility of using fction to teach about human rights in Af-
rica. Following in their footsteps, I discuss three novels: Jenny Robson’s Be-
cause Pula Means Rain (2000), Tara Sullivan’s Golden Boy (2013), and Petina
Gappah’s The Book of Memory (2015). 
Jenny Robson’s Because Pula Means Rain is a young adult novel and is 
one of the few novels devoted to exploring characters with albinism.1 It oc-
cupies a very important space in the literature of albinism, not only for the 
subtle ways it exposes the human rights conditions of people with albinism 
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but also because it is among the pioneer narratives on the issue. Robson al-
lows us to see people with albinism from inside out, as humans who have the 
same wishes as others do. Emmanuel’s mother abandons him because he is 
albino, and he lives in Kedia Heights, Botswana, with his grandmother, who 
is to him the opposite of what his mother had been. The novel is about his 
journey to self-discovery. My interest in the novel rests primarily in the psy-
chological struggle that the character goes through as his encounters with 
others remind him of his difference to the rest of his world, and I compare 
that with the already mentioned condition of the Negro in Fanon’s Black 
Skin, White Masks. I shall, therefore, restrict my analysis to what Emma-
nuel considers as barriers to his being. 
What strikes the reader from the frst page is that Emmanuel identifes 
himself as an alien being. He is alien in a double sense; his mother had aban-
doned him, and he now lives with his grandmother in a different village. 
So, he is alien to that village. The people have stories about his origin. His 
mother had “been with a white man. A bad white man. That is why Gladys 
Lesenyamotse has birthed this deformed child” (Robson 2000:22). Emma-
nuel states that the stories were too hard for his mother to bear, and so she 
left him with his grandmother. 
But Emmanuel is also alien to the village people in the sense of his color, 
and this is the ultimate source of his psychological pain. As the black man 
in Fanon’s analysis, Emmanuel is painfully conscious of his difference, and 
this weighs on him like a heavy burden and a hindrance to being. When a 
friend, Sindiso, offers to take him to Gaborone, the capital city, he is excited 
and cannot hide his joy. He remarks that it is a “city full of thousands and 
thousands of people who would be too busy to take any notice of me!” (3). If 
the smallness of the village setting had constituted a hindrance to his being, 
he hopes that the anonymity and perhaps the cosmopolitanism that cities 
usually offer will lift that hindrance. Like the black man in Fanon’s postco-
lonial analysis, Emmanuel reads everything through the prism of his differ-
ence. When his grandmother urges him to dress well for the city, he reads 
much into her otherwise innocent admonition. He observes rather sharply: 
“She pretends that if I dress smartly, everything will look fne. If my shirt 
is clean and mended, then people won’t notice the strangeness of the face 
above the collar” (6). He suffers anxiety from being constantly under the 
gaze of others, and with this comes self-deprecation, a major hindrance to 
human fourishing. 
Jean-Paul Sartre writes in his preface to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth
that “the status of ‘native’ is a nervous condition introduced and maintained 
by the settler among colonized people with their consent. Laying claim to 
and denying the human condition at the same time: the contradiction is 
explosive” (Fanon 1967:17). The situation of the native or the colonized is 
that they are denied their humanity, even though the colonizers accepted, 
however grudgingly, that they are humans; this condition subjects the colo-
nized to a permanent state of anger and in most cases also doubts about his 
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humanity. He demands justice in the form of recognition. Emmanuel also 
experiences a nervous condition because he does not feel that others have 
respect for his person. Just as the native is blamed for his skin color and 
is therefore responsible for the rejection of his being, Emmanuel thinks of 
self-mutilation. He says: “I longed to pick up a shard of glass and stab it into 
my fesh because my fesh was wrong” (Robson 2000:8). But this self-hatred 
is a refection of how society reacts to his difference, especially with anec-
dotes about how his mother conceived him. Expressed in Fanon’s language, 
society has woven Emmanuel out of thousands of anecdotes that are devoid 
of dignity. That is why he hates mirrors; he hates to see his refection. He has 
introjected others’ perceptions of him and calls his skin “pig-pink skin” (10). 
Emmanuel tells of a particular incident in which he experienced the 
Negro moment: 
A young girl was tugging at her mother’s skirt just beside the petrol 
station. “Mama, look! It’s a pink man! Why is he pink, Mama? He looks 
funny. Is he a ghost?” The mother slapped the girl’s pointing fnger. I 
heard her answer above the chatting of so many waiting passengers. 
‘Don’t you look at him, you hear me! And don’t you laugh at him. Oth-
erwise when you are big you will have a baby just like that! Do you want 
to have a baby just like him?’ 
(21) 
The more painful part of the experience is not that the child points at Em-
manuel; it is the mother’s reaction that further turns Emmanuel into an 
abhorrent object. This supports Emmanuel’s earlier dubiousness about his 
society. “What is the point of turning away from refecting windows when 
my ugliness and my abnormality show in the eyes of everyone who turns 
my way?” (16). This observation seems to have an accusatory tone, perhaps 
designed to be not downright accusatory, but rather Robson’s gentle way 
of reminding society of its encroachment on the dignity and moral space of 
this particular vulnerable member. 
Emmanuel realizes that he is not safe, even in the city. He enters a book-
store and tries to communicate with a white boy. He might feel some instinc-
tive identifcation with the white boy, believing that his own skin color will 
not scare the boy. He’s disappointed that even the boy fnds him strange. 
Emmanuel says: “I saw his eyes grow wide. And then he screamed: ‘Mo-am! 
Mommy! It’s the boogie-man! He’s trying to get me! The boogie man, 
Mommy!’” (38). Here, again, is a Fanon-moment, a threat to Emmanuel’s 
existence as a human who, in Fanon’s words, “came into this world anxious 
to uncover the meaning of things, [his] soul desirous to be at the origin of the 
world” (Fanon 2008:89). But the world around him will not allow Emmanuel 
to be; it objectifes him. Yet Emmanuel wants to belong; he is determined 
to be part of the community he was born into. He refects: “Why couldn’t 
I just be a person like everyone else?” (Robson 2000:75). In this moment 
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of self-doubt, we are drawn closer to his humanity; the self-doubt reveals 
his vulnerability and asks: Am I not a human being? He demands justice 
by challenging the reader to respond to it and to consider why his society 
subjects him to gratuitous pain. If this is the case, then it is incumbent on 
society to stop it. This is the human rights challenge of the novel. Emmanuel 
narrates human rights. We feel his wish that others put themselves in his 
position and realize that his wishes are like those of other humans. 
Emmanuel wants to be recognized as a regular human being, and, for 
that, he undertakes a perilous journey into places that many people from 
that cultural background would go if they have his or similar problems. 
He goes to magical and spiritual healers to have his skin restored to that of 
humans; he went to Mama Jay from South Africa who practices witchcraft; 
to Brother John, a Christian miraculous healer; and to Ngaka, a herbal-
ist (84–114). After going through the magical healing processes, he realizes 
that his physical condition cannot be changed. “Forever and forever I would 
stay an albino. The freak of the village” (115). His self-fagellation makes us 
cringe, but at the same time realize that we, the society, are responsible for 
that. Society pushes Emmanuel to hate himself. 
Robson achieves an important feat in providing Emmanuel with agency. 
In Emmanuel, we do not see somebody who complains and succumbs to his 
fate; rather, we see a human being doing everything possible to overcome 
his fate and to remind his society of the justice he deserves. He realizes that 
the frst thing to do is to accept himself, and he does so by understanding 
his past. He learns that his ancestor was an albino who had been accused of 
betrayal by his people. Unable to deal with the village’s rejection of him, the 
ancestor had walked away and had never been heard of again, “still search-
ing for a place he could call home” (118). Emmanuel does not want to end 
that way. Unlike his ancestor, he decides to stay in the village. “My village. 
Yes, my village. Home of my people” (133). 
Two things are at stake here, both of which are integral parts of Emma-
nuel’s identity: history and the body. Emmanuel cannot change either of 
them. He must accept them, and he wants to make his society do the same. 
Charlotte Baker and Patricia Lund (2017) identifed that this young adult 
novel is excellent for educating people about albinism and human rights. 
For one, Emmanuel’s acceptance of his condition urges readers who do not 
yet know about albinism to follow in his footsteps. Above all, though, the 
narrative shows Emmanuel as a human with subjectivity. This, I think, is 
the enormous advantage of the novel’s frst-person point of view. He tells, 
and readers listen; in so doing, he invites people into his interior life. He is 
not a beast. If society’s gaze has turned Emmanuel into a beast, attention to 
his interiority achieves the opposite; it seems to remind society of his subjec-
tivity as a being deserving of moral attention. Alone in this, Robson might 
have approached one of the goals of her didactic narrative: sensitize her 
young readers to the pain of others, and challenge older adults to become 
aware of the moral obligation to protect the human rights of others. 
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Tara Sullivan’s Golden Boy is also a young adult novel. It is set in Tanzania 
and tells the story of Habo, a boy living with albinism. His condition does 
not sit well with the members of his family, who are obviously of a different 
skin hue. His father abandons the family because of him, and his mother 
does not give him much-needed attention and love. Only his sister, Asu, 
loves him the way he is. The family is forced to leave their village because of 
his difference. They fnd refuge in Mwanza, a town close to Lake Victoria. 
But even there, he does not fnd acceptance; indeed, his life is in even greater 
danger, for people with albinism are hunted for their body parts in that re-
gion of the country. He must fnd a way to survive. Like in Jenny Robson’s 
Because Pula Means Rain, my discussion of Golden Boy centers in particular 
on the structure of Habo’s encounter with people, how others perceive him, 
how he perceives himself, and what all this says about human rights and 
dignity in that space. 
These two young adult novels have many things in common in addition 
to their obvious narrative about albinism. Habo’s and Emmanuel’s mothers 
are both abandoned by their husbands. This is in line with the folk belief 
that the mothers of children with albinism are to blame because they might 
have done something wrong. As Charlotte Baker et al. (2010:172) state, “Be-
cause of the stigma associated with the condition, many children with albi-
nism are brought up by single mothers because the father often leaves when 
the woman gives birth to such a child.” Whereas Emmanuel’s mother drops 
him off in her own mother’s house to live with her, Habo’s mother does not 
get rid of him, but she does not shower him with love either. Indeed, Habo’s 
mother becomes a source of torment when she reminds him not only of his 
uselessness but also of the fact that he is a stigma to the whole family (Sulli-
van 2013:13). Perhaps her failure to fully accept Habo indirectly encourages 
Habo’s two brothers to consider him as not fully human; they think of him 
as a ghost, suggesting his insubstantiality in their eyes (4). Habo tells his 
story in a sympathy-evoking voice: “I distinctly heard Chiu’s voice whisper-
ing ‘mtoto-pepo—ghost boy’. Burning with shame, I stood there alone and 
listened as the plague of whispers ate my hopes” (39). The reader’s attention 
is arrested by Habo’s reference to hope. We assume it is his hope to be ac-
cepted as fully human. The story the author touches on is that of what all 
humans have in common: the desire and hope to be treated fairly. Habo’s 
worthlessness in his people’s eyes is not restricted to their verbal abuse; they 
physically abuse him as well (4). 
As I have already discussed above, Brocco has observed that people liv-
ing with albinism are humiliated with epithets such as zeruzeru (ghost) or 
mzungu (white person) and that these names affect their self-esteem. Habo 
understands that zeruzeru means “zero-zero,” or “nothing.” He tells that 
“A zeruzeru is an unnatural thing, like a zombie. It’s like calling me an an-
imal” (Sullivan 35). Of course, such labels make a great impact on Habo’s 
self-esteem and behavior. Born a stranger, he feels less worthy as a human. 
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not ftting into my own village, my own family, since the day I was born” 
(232). Faced with a world that despises him, Habo makes a devastating judg-
ment about himself—“I’m hardly a person” (9). Habo’s experience under-
lines what Fanon means when he says that “the image of one’s body is solely 
negating. It’s an image in the third person” (Fanon 2008: 90). Thus, the
Negro-moment turns out to be an albino-moment, a moment of self-
perception as a person without dignity. 
In her already cited article, Maureen Mswela (2017:116) states that “the 
body parts of persons with albinism are believed to sell for enormous sums 
of money,” and that is an incentive to hunt for people with albinism. Having 
been made aware that he is not as worthy as others with brown skin, Habo 
also hears that “He’s really an animal” (Sullivan 2013:21). In a heartrending 
cry for help, he comments that people “are throwing rocks on me for fun, 
like I’m a street dog” (23). He is stunned to hear his own brother, Chui, make 
a reference to his being an animal that can be killed for its worth in money: 
“I am okay with killing one animal. To not be poor” (55). Habo is devastated 
to hear this from his own brother, and this is an instance of microcosmic 
infringement on human rights. Right there in the verbal exchange between 
Habo and Chui, we see the core registers of human rights violated. In an 
uncanny foreshadowing of the rest of Habo’s problems, on the family’s way 
to Mwanza they meet Alasiri, a rich man who makes money from poaching 
ivory. Alasiri kills elephants but “leaves the meat alone. He harvests the 
teeth and tails and toenails” (45). 
Sullivan’s careful paralleling of Habo and the elephant enhances our un-
derstanding of Habo’s precarious condition; he is despised as a human be-
ing but appreciated for his utilitarian value as an animal. In an ominous 
foreshadowing of his likely fate, he notices Alasiri’s “delight over the kill” 
and feels with the poor animal (45). His co-feeling with the poached animals 
excites ours too and prepares us to understand his agony, especially when 
he learns that Alasiri and other poachers are looking for albino body parts. 
In the Mwanza-Lake Victoria region, people believe that albinos bring good 
luck. He is devastated to hear: 
Your hands and hair alone are worth more than a year’s salary. Your 
skin is enough to buy a car, your legs are worth a great deal more than 
all the rest of you put together. Because it’s your legs, Habo, Habo that 
will win Msebo this next election. 
(97–98) 
The body parts of people living with albinism are sold to the witch doctors,
who prepare good luck charms to be consumed by their clients. “Bones are
ground down and buried in the earth by miners, who believe they will be
transformed into diamonds. The genitals are made into treatments to bol-
ster sexual potency” (Malone 2009). The melding of primitive belief sys-
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ill-placed narrative technique to mock the abuse of the human rights of
people living with albinism if Vicky Ntetema had not already exposed the
practice as widespread in Tanzania and the surrounding countries. The
above rituals are in line with a belief and cultural system steeped in mythic
consciousness. 
Although we already see Habo’s subjectivity in his feelings of shame and 
disappointment at how his brothers and other children treat him, Sullivan 
gradually brings us closer to Habo’s pained interiority when he learns that 
he is now in a region in which nearly everyone believes albinos are subhu-
man. He hears about the killing of people with albinism because their body 
parts are used in potions sold by witch doctors (Sullivan 2013:67). We feel his 
vulnerability most when he says that he wants to disappear: 
I put my cup of tea on the foor, no longer able to drink it. I hug my 
knees to my chest and put my head down onto them so I don’t have to 
see anyone looking at me anymore. 
(95) 
His world no longer provides an environment suitable for his fourishing as a 
human being. It is therefore not surprising that he decides to run for his life. 
He leaves for Dar es Salaam, the capital city of Tanzania, where he hopes to 
escape the bigotry and the grip of primitive traditions and beliefs. 
Like Emmanuel, Habo is lucky to have a few people who keep in his life 
the sure knowledge that he is as fully human as they are. Not all people are 
shocked by his difference at birth. His sister, Asu, lets him know that when 
he was born, while others were shocked by his whiteness, she reached out 
to him: “I picked you up” (29). The reader feels his pride in his narration of 
how Asu has kept reaching out to him: “Asu scoops me up into a hug and 
kisses my head before setting me in her lap” (70). To touch is to affrm, to 
recognize the other body as present and, phenomenologically speaking, as 
an extended part of oneself. It is therefore a gesture of justice. Touch is one 
of the most fundamental forms of recognition. 
Jean-Luc Nancy (2018) argues that the body is only the viewpoint from 
which this perceiving, which is also an action, can be organized. Like all 
points, the viewpoint is without dimensions. In Asu, Sullivan urges the 
reader to see albinos as humans who desire touch as much as the rest of 
us. Habo is lucky to land in the house of Kweli, a blind sculptor who hires 
him as his apprentice. True to his condition as a blind person, Kweli does 
not judge him based on his skin color; he is able to see Habo or, rather, not 
see his exteriority or epidermal difference; he perceives Habo by touching 
him. It is instructive concerning the importance of the body as a theatre 
of existence that Kweli engages with the world through his sense of touch. 
So when he comes in contact with Habo, he is able to come in contact with 
what others (except his sister) are not able to do. He accepts Habo (Sullivan 
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There is a subtle allusion to Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s (1971:73) The Lit-
tle Prince, who famously declares that “only with the heart that one can
see rightly; What is essential is invisible to the eye.” In Kweli, Habo feels
recognized for who he is: “Today, I was normal.” And he says of Kweli: “He
treats me like a normal person” (Sullivan 2013:205). As if to enhance the Ex-
upérian notion of deeper meaning, Kweli invites Habo into his philosophy
of carving and life. “A sculptor,” says Kweli, “does not carve a thing, but a
meaning” (218). Kweli suggests that meaning in life does not lie elsewhere
but in the life of the person when he tells Habo that “The way we give shape
to an idea, boy, is to show its shape in our life” (219). Habo confrms Kweli’s
wisdom when he says to himself: “Yes, I will ft there. Yes, I could carve here.
Yes, I can do this” (221). His discovery of the true meaning of life with Kweli
contrasts with his former sense of self among his own people, especially his
brothers—those who never really touched him. Kweli brings to full circle the
recognition Habo’s sister had begun. Habo begins to touch things and feel
the world because he has been touched; his body has been affrmed. 
I tell this story to demand justice 
In an interview granted to NPR’s Renee Montagne, Petina Gappah stated
that in writing The Book of Memory, she wanted to say something about
race without being racialist. “In Zimbabwe somebody [with albinism] looks
white but doesn’t have the privilege that whiteness brings with it. And at
the same time, that person is supposed to be black but doesn’t actually look
black” (NPR 2016). But does how one say something about race without
being racialist? This can be done by inventing an allegory or by turning the
conventional understanding of race and racism on its head so that those who
had been at the receiving end of racism become the ones to hold the power to
name or frame reality. The Book of Memory achieves precisely that. It tells
the story of Memory, an albino girl in Zimbabwe. Neither black nor white,
she is the object of ridiculing gazes because of the color of her skin in a land
of black people. Ironically, she is adopted by Lloyd, a white man, who sees
his fate as a white man in Zimbabwe refected in Memory’s condition. Mem-
bers of a nationalist band kill Lloyd and frame Memory as the culprit. She is
condemned to jail, where she tells her story. It is obvious that the reference
to memory is against the backdrop of Zimbabwe’s history of colonialism
better articulated by Gappah’s famous compatriot, Tsitsi Dangarembga in
Nervous Condition. In contrast to Lloyd, a stand-in for the British presence
in Zimbabwe, Memory has only a vague, inchoate recollection of her past;
indeed, her past is not recorded. In her review, Becca Rothfeld (2016) states
that the story “is an attempt to reclaim, by way of reconstruction, a gene-
alogy both personal and cultural, an exercise in self-searching that upends
many of Memory’s most deeply entrenched conceptions about herself and
her origins.” Color plays an important role in the lives of the people, and this
is no doubt traceable to the horrors of their past as colonized people. 
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Zimbabwe’s history goes beyond color or race relations. There are also 
many ugly chapters in its history that beg to be remembered: Robert Mug-
abe’s genocide in Matabeleland and which goes by the name Gukurahundi. 
Yvonne Vera’s The Stone Virgins also documents another aspect of Zimba-
bwe’s history that ought not to escape the collective memory: the horrors 
of the Independence war. Anita Sethi (2015) states that “Gappah grapples 
with the grand themes of fate and free will, love and loss, the collision of 
tradition and modernity, the impact of politics on the personal.” In a blog 
post, Shingi Mavima (2018) made an incisive observation about the novel. 
Gappah, he argues, humanizes “historically marginalized characters.” I en-
dorse Mavima’s take on the novel, and rather than read it through the obvi-
ous postcolonial lense of race, I engage the fate of marginalized characters, 
especially Memory. 
Like Emmanuel in Because Pula Means Rain, Memory feels objectifed by 
her society. Indeed, she begins her story by announcing the condition that 
makes her a stranger and an object of ridicule in her society. She is “murungu-
dunhu, … a black woman who is imbued not with the whiteness of murungu, 
of privilege, but of dunhu, or ridicule and fakery, a ghastly whiteness” (Gap-
pah 2015:2). She is “black but not black, white but not white” (7). She is in a 
dangerously liminal space or in the twilight of being. For a world that is still 
governed by the Manichean binary vision of truth, not being either white or 
black is a curse. Her being is on the fringe. In her understanding, her body 
is not deserving of admiration because it is an object of pity. She sees her 
ugliness refected in another albino, “Lameck, who had a squashed face and 
red, blotchy skin that broke over his arms and face” (54). It is interesting that 
in comparison to Emmanuel, who sees his ugliness refected back at him in 
the mirror and in other people’s gazing at him, Memory arrives at the ugli-
ness of her own condition by looking at other albinos. Every time she passes 
Lameck, she sees “the fies that settled on his mouth” (55). She is afraid of 
Lameck and so does not wonder that people are afraid of her. This condition 
makes her arrive at a devastating self-judgment: “I see now, of course, that 
he was just as much a misft as I was” (55). The fact that Memory identifes 
another person who occupies the same position as she does underscores the 
precarious condition of such people as the new wretched of the earth, those 
who are considered expendable. Memory and Emmanuel’s stories are rich 
for the very reason that they expose the inner world of the characters; they 
let us know how they feel and their dreams and aspirations. We are aware of 
how precarious they perceive their lives to be, and this is a preliminary and, 
indeed, essential step in their quest for recognition of justice. 
Not much happens in Memory’s narrative, but every incident is loaded 
with meaning. Her painful honesty about herself might appear somewhat 
self-deprecatory, but it achieves the frst goal of narratives in the realist tra-
dition, which is to bring the human condition to the fore, to foreground life 
as it is. The truth is that albinos have experiences such as those described 
by Memory, and when she becomes honest about herself, it is to draw her 
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listener’s attention to the condition of her body as a fellow human occupying 
the same space, a body that desires a basic human touch. It is, at the same 
time, a body that has been objectifed by society’s oppressive gaze. 
Gappah, not interested in spectacle, keeps the narrative focused on the 
ordinary life of Memory. She is interested in our ethical response to differ-
ence, understood not only in racial terms. Memory’s difference from the 
norm raises a profound ethical challenge to her society. The question is: how 
do people relate to her? Even though Memory speaks of her condition in 
deprecatory terms, there is a substantial difference between her emotional 
attitude to her world and that of Emmanuel. Whereas Emmanuel appears 
to be eager to attract pity, which casts him as a victim, Memory is not ready 
to succumb to her condition; she is not prepared to be a victim. To be sure, 
both of them seek some connection to their audience, but their approaches 
are qualitatively different. The Book of Memory is a frst-rate literary fction 
that deploys many registers of literality such as intertextuality, an allusion 
to the classics, irony, and others to achieve its sophistication. Memory wants 
to be seen as an individual who is not lost in abstraction. 
Hannah Arendt (1958:9–27) differentiates between human condition and 
human nature. The human condition surrounds the lives of individuals as 
part of a community, while human nature seeks to capture the general, ab-
stract thing that is thought to be common among individuals; it seeks to 
establish the norm. Those who aim to defne human nature seek to establish 
the essence or an absolute condition of things and often resort to ideology, 
which notoriously seeks to explain humans in broad strokes. Ideologies 
function under the premise of human nature. Racism, sexism, tribalism, 
and bigotry are all results of obsession with human nature. We relate to our 
fellow humans based on the parameters given by the fact of our natality, not 
by human nature. Seeing individuals through the prism of human nature 
denies them their individuality and makes them invisible. This is largely 
because the belief in human nature posits only a certain type of human, 
usually without blemishes, but the reality is usually different. The human 
condition foresees the fact of vulnerability; it acknowledges difference with-
out weaponizing it. 
Memory regrets that other people’s perception of her is conditioned by 
abstraction—that is, by their notion of human nature. People do not see her 
as an embodied being; they hardly imagine the pain she experiences. Her 
mother sees Memory’s condition as a curse that can be taken care of only 
with the help of the spirit world. She allows her relationship to her daughter 
and to the world to be dictated by diviners and prophets. As Memory ex-
plains, “My mother believed in the spirits and the mediums through which 
they spoke. She believed in healers and diviners” (Gappah 2015:118). From 
Memory’s perspective, religion stands in the way of her mother taking her 
(Memory’s) body seriously. Indeed, religion conditions her mother to send 
Memory to a foster home, a gesture that Memory interprets as being sold. 
Memory, therefore, observes that religion does not contribute to people’s 
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self-esteem; the opposite is more often the case. She tells of a church service 
she attended in which the preacher unleashed words that debased rather 
than uplifted the faithful (116). Religion works predominantly from the per-
spective of human nature; it views individuals as predetermined by their 
essences, dictated by a divine being so that what is needed is for society to 
relate to humans accordingly. Memory narrates to liberate herself from the 
totalizing grip of abstraction; she narrates to draw attention to her body 
and its difference and so alert people to the injustice their attitude to her in-
ficts on her. She wants people to have a second look at her, and this second 
look will be achieved the moment the reader begins to listen to her story. In 
effect, Memory initiates a dialogue with the reader like that between two 
lone strangers in a bus station, waiting for a bus that will not arrive. It is her 
quest to be treated fairly, be accepted like a regular human being. 
In The Book of Memory, narration becomes not only a means of under-
standing the self and initiating a relation to others; it also becomes a lifesav-
ing act. We recall that she is condemned for supposedly killing Lloyd. She 
is therefore at the risk of losing her life, and that would constitute a miscar-
riage of justice. She, therefore, hopes that telling her story would bring her 
justice. Memory narrates: 
It was Vernah’s idea that I should tell my story to you. Before she sent 
you to interview me, she told me that I should write down every detail 
that I could remember, that I should record everything that could make 
a sympathetic case. 
(10) 
The judge stands in for the prospective reader, who is asked to understand 
Memory’s condition. It is hoped that if the court hears the details of Mem-
ory’s story, it will consider her case more favorably. Memory is fully aware 
of the lifesaving potential of story. Memory believes that what saved Sche-
herazade, the Persian bride, might also save her. But what does it mean to 
be saved by stories? To narrate is to appeal. It is to plead to be taken into a 
certain hermeneutic community. It is an ethical gesture. The narrator wants 
to be recognized as one capable of existing within that ethical or herme-
neutic community. She is therefore a modern Scheherazade, who must tell 
a story in order to live (87). The reader knows that Memory is not guilty of 
the crime for which she sits in jail; she has been framed by members of a 
nationalist gang. Here then, she narrates to make listeners see reality from 
her perspective and to see her as a person deserving of co-feeling. Listeners 
must put themselves in her position to reach some level of relation. Memory 
fghts for justice on two fronts: in the legal sense, on the court of law, and in 
the moral sense, for acceptance by society as a regular human being. 
To fully understand the context of Memory’s ultimate desire, we recall the 
South African expression, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu—a person is a per-
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specifcally the South African philosopher Thaddeus Metz’s argument that 
ubuntu is about the development of an individual’s moral personhood, 
which begins from the moment an individual becomes aware of the degree 
to which he or she contributes to the affrmation of the other, because, ac-
cording to the saying Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, this other cannot be who 
he or she is without oneself. In this way, community is not an abstract thing; 
instead, it is concretely realized in the relationship between two persons, 
a relationship exemplifed by that between the storyteller and the listener, 
between text and reader—that which Memory seeks in her Scheherazade 
moment. Scheherazade seeks to humanize the king with stories and thereby 
negotiates for her life with stories; she wants the king to recognize her as 
human. 
Gappah set out to turn the racist world on its head. She seems to have 
achieved more than that. She created a character that narrates a story in 
order to turn her oppressive world on its head. Her ultimate goal is to expe-
rience justice, which is purely about the right to live. 
The Albino and recognition 
In Chapter 7 of Black Skin, White Masks, entitled “The Black Man and 
Recognition,” Fanon enhances the understanding of the lived experience of 
the black man. At the core of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic is that the 
slave recognizes the master, whereas the master refuses to extend the same 
recognition to the slave. This condition is what defnes their status. Were the 
master to extend recognition to the slave, the slave would no longer be what 
he is. Fanon agrees with Hegel that humans are what they are because they 
are recognized by others. He states that a person’s “human worth and reality 
depend on this other and on his recognition by the other. It is in this other 
that the meaning of his life is condensed” (Fanon 2008:191). Hegel states that 
the condition of the master and slave is more or less fxed, so that the slave 
does not need to question his status arising out of a primordial battle. Fanon 
disagrees. It is clearly in the nature of humans to be recognized; “each con-
sciousness of self is seeking absoluteness. It wants to be recognized as an 
essential value outside of life, as transformation of subjective certainty (Ge-
wissheit) into objective truth (Wahrheit)” (192). The slave can therefore not 
be satisfed with the condition that denies him or her the absoluteness; he or 
she desires completion. He or she asks that he or she “be taken into consid-
eration on the basis of [his or her] desire” (193). This desire is what makes 
us human. What Fanon says about the Negro’s desire for completion in the 
white world applies without qualifcation to the albino in Africa. I consider 
recognition to be a condition for the fourishing of human rights. 
Recognition is the immediate result of our attention to the practice of
the ordinary. We discover one another as conditioned by our common hu-
manity. Community is where recognition is conferred; that is, in action
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existence would not be possible. This desire for recognition is most poign-
antly expressed by Memory, who states, “I longed to be like all the others.
I tried to get as dark as the other children. I longed to belong” (Gappah
2015:57). She is invisible in a society that acknowledges only dark-skinned
people. She prays for dark skin; otherwise, she would remain invisible.
In Memory, therefore, Gappah pleads for the justice for albinos, who are
the most visible markers of difference and otherness in a country of dark-
skinned people. 
Note 
1 Jenny Robson was born and raised in South Africa. She now lives in Botswana, 
where she teaches music. 
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5 Intimate justice 
Homophobia and human 
dignity 
African postcolonial discourse, which had been largely about African resist-
ance to Western epistemic shaping of Africa, had been devoted to the civil 
spaces in African thought at the expense of intimate spaces, especially of 
women and people of alternative sexualities. African thinkers and freedom 
fghters, who had been predominantly male and heterosexual, had privi-
leged discourse about subjugated black population as a whole, and, in most 
cases, it all centered not only on the violence perpetrated on the male body 
but also on the wishes of that body. The wishes and desires of the African 
female body are often considered secondary or at worse subsumed within 
the imaginary of what was thought to bring about the good of the oppressed 
community. Thus, whereas postcolonial resistance had been about social 
justice, the area of intimate justice was summarily ignored. 
According to Sara McClelland (2014:1010), intimate justice “is a theoreti-
cal framework that links experiences of inequity in the sociopolitical domain 
with how individuals imagine and evaluate the quality of their sexual and 
relational experiences.” Studies about intimate justice, she explains, center 
on how “individuals’ evaluations of their lives—and specifcally their levels 
of satisfaction, well-being, and happiness—should be assessed using meas-
ures and methods that always consider both potential group differences and 
the social conditions that may infuence these appraisals” (1010). The prem-
ise of intimate justice is that the dignity we accord humans in social settings 
is no different from that which we accord them in intimate spheres. If we 
admit that every individual has dignity, then we must extend the implication 
of this fact to their right to moral sphere. 
Intimate injustice comes about because of society’s compulsion to reg-
ulate and control people. In The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault ex-
plains that the body is the means through which society displays its power 
and control. This is done through the control of pleasure, especially in sex: 
when, how, and with whom it is exercised. Strictly speaking, therefore, to 
control sexual practice and relations is to control society. Foucault (1978:155) 
states that: 
The notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it 
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sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive 
relation to power, but as being rooted in a specifc and irreducible ur-
gency which power tries as best it can to dominate. 
Furthering Foucault’s thoughts, Judith Butler (1995) examines how the 
power of heteronormativity frames the relevance of bodies, sex, and gender. 
She argues that power operates by defning what counts as legitimate sex 
and in so doing it contains and constrains sex. Butler characterizes this reg-
ulation and the resultant categorization as “a violent one, a forceful one.” 
For her, “the discursive ordering and production of bodies in accord with 
the category of sex is itself a material violence” (Butler 1995:52). Body nor-
mativity refers to the standardization of certain types of bodies in the social 
and cultural domain (Yep 2017:117). The frst goal of normative structures is 
to impute values to things; it is to categorize and, in so doing, decide which 
is to be accepted or rejected, which is superior or inferior. The issue there-
fore is about power, and wherever it manifests itself, justice is denied. Nor-
mativization ultimately leads to injustice because it considers some bodies 
as surplus. A body is surplus if it is not an essential part of a given normative 
structure or if it is conceived of as means to an end rather than an end in 
itself, when it is not part of the norm. In most African cultures, women and 
people with alternative sexualities do not belong to the normative group. 
Within heteronormative patriarchy, women are constructed as a means to 
an end, while homosexuals are seen as deviant bodies. Within such norma-
tive contexts, these bodies are deemed to possess no dignity, at least, not as 
much as heterosexual male bodies do. 
Religion, public morality, and politics are some of the means through 
which these normative paradigms are maintained. What is considered wor-
thy of dignity is only what complies with the generally accepted order, and 
what is an accepted order is usually defned by those who have the power 
to do so. By defnition, surplus things have little or no value in themselves, 
and losing them makes no difference in the scheme of things. In this chap-
ter as in the next, I consider manifestations of intimate injustice in African 
discourse. I discuss these bodies that fall outside accepted norms in Africa, 
starting with the bodies of members of the LGBTQ community and the hu-
man rights implications of their precarious condition in society. First, I es-
tablish in this chapter the environment that enables the abuse of the rights 
of the LGBTQ community and then I analyze three forms of narratives: 
documentary flm, poetry, and prose fction. 
Religion, politics, and heteronormative violence 
In the late decade of the twentieth century, the world breathed a sigh of relief
at the end of the Cold War and the offcial demise of apartheid. But then
there emerged a new kind of war, or more precisely, a battle for the soul of the
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largely by the Evangelicals in America. Africa had to be liberated from the
stranglehold of the Devil. No other place is this battle more manifested as in
the area of sexuality. According to Kapya Kaoma (2009a), the U.S. political
Right, which had staunchly supported apartheid and was consequently a
pariah in Africa, has now taken a center stage in the new fght for the African
soul. It has successfully conscripted Evangelicalism as the well-known path
of seeking to control the body by capturing the mind. Evangelicalism is now
an integral part of much of Christianity in Africa. As Kaoma writes, 
through their extensive communications networks in Africa, social wel-
fare projects, Bible schools, and educational materials, U.S. religious 
conservatives warn of the dangers of homosexuals and present them-
selves as the true representatives of U.S. evangelicalism, so helping to 
marginalize Africans’ relationships with mainline Protestant churches. 
The champions of religious renewal in Africa promote generally accepted 
values such as respect for lives and harmony in families, but they also de-
monize the body, alienating humans from themselves by insinuating a my-
thology that, in most cases, successfully displaces a person’s experience of 
his or her embodiment. 
Uganda has been the testing ground for the Evangelical battle for the Afri-
can soul. The departure of Idi Amin and the subsequent brutal power strug-
gles that plunged the country into further dysfunction left a wide gap for any
savior, and the Evangelical movement quickly flled the gap. The flm God 
Loves Uganda by Roger Ross Williams engages with the activities of Evan-
gelical missions in the 1990s. It examines, among other issues, the role of
Scott Lively, who had in the past made such wild claims that the Nazi Party
and the United Nations were plots by homosexuals to take over the world
(Blake 2014). Commenting on the flm, Jessica Boutchie (2019) observes that: 
the early 2000s also saw an infux of Christian missionaries from evan-
gelical Christian organizations like the International House of Prayer. 
In 2010, Lou Engle, a former senior leader at IHOP and the founder of 
The Call Ministries, traveled to Uganda to host a rally discussing the 
alleged evils of homosexuality. Engle also used his platform to praise 
Ugandan politicians’ “courage” and “righteousness” in promoting the 
Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2009. 
One of the lasting institutions created by the American Evangelical move-
ment in Uganda is Uganda’s Family Life Network (FLN), which was 
founded in 2002 with the goal of promoting what they called family values, 
and to restore “strong families and youth with strong morals and character, 
through the promotion of value based morals and life skills across the pop-
ulation regardless of gender, race, ethnic, social or religious background” 
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anti-homosexual zealots including many members of the parliament. For 
example, as Kaoma (2009b) writes, “In March 2009, Scott Lively, the Holo-
caust revisionist and author of The Pink Swastika, warned Ugandans that 
gays posed a dire threat to their children and society.” 
Scott Lively and his fellow American Evangelicals were instrumental in 
Uganda’s foray into criminalizing homosexuality with the introduction of 
an infamous bill in 2009 that prescribed death penalty for anyone found to 
be engaging in homosexual activities. The proposed bill provoked interna-
tional outcry, and it was subsequently removed from the political agenda, 
but it was revived in 2013, and, on February 24, 2014, Ugandan President 
Yoweni Museveni signed it into law (Karimi and Thompson 2014). By this 
time, it was no longer a solely Ugandan issue; other African countries had 
taken notice (Gettleman 2010). 
As Nathalie Baptiste (2014) has documented, the epidemic of hate against
people of alternative sexualities has spread all over Africa. There have been
many religious groups propagating this hatred besides the FLN. A known ex-
ample is the “pro-family” advocacy group Family Watch International (FWI),
which was formed in 1999 and headed by Sharon Slater. Baptiste reports that: 
Slater was the keynote speaker at a meeting of the Nigerian Bar Associa-
tion, where she touted her beliefs about homosexuality, telling delegates 
that they would no longer have religious freedom and that homosexuals 
would prey on their children if they supported “fctitious sexual rights.” 
In the early months of 2014, Nigeria enacted a law against homosexual life in 
the infamous Act titled, “Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2014.” It was 
framed as an “Act to prohibit a marriage contract or civil union entered into 
between persons of same sex, solemnization of same; and for related mat-
ters” (Centre for Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2013). The Act mandates
up to fourteen years of imprisonment for those who cohabit, or contract gay 
marriages, and ten years for those who promote any form of gay activities 
or lifestyle. Since then, there have been numerous cases of violence against 
homosexuals, often ending in death (Human Rights Watch 2016). 
At the 1995 Zimbabwean Book Fair, the erstwhile Prime Minister of 
Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe argued that protection of gays from violence 
was not a human right because homosexuality was unnatural. According 
to Chris Dunton and Mai Palmberg (1996:8), some other questions raised 
during the debate that ensued after Mugabe’s intervention were whether the 
universality of human rights applied in Zimbabwe and whether homosex-
uality was natural or an imported Western phenomenon. In his opening 
speech for the book fair, Mugabe dismissed the notion that homosexuality 
ought to be accepted. He stated: 
I fnd it extremely outrageous and repugnant to my human conscience 
that such immoral and repulsive organization, like those of homosexuals 
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who offend both the law of nature and the morals of religious beliefs es-
poused by our society, should have any advocates in our midst and even 
elsewhere in the world. 
(9) 
Of relevance to my discussion here is Mugabe’s justifcation for not extend-
ing human rights to people of alternative sexualities and how in him religion 
and politics have melded to create an environment of human rights abuse.1 
He relies on the “Law of nature” and “the morals of religious belief.” This 
is a particular case of the appeal to nature fallacy, but it is also particularly 
fallacious because homosexuality occurs in nature, is natural. In their po-
litical support for Mugabe, some members of the ruling ZANU-PF and the 
Women’s league issued a statement declaring that “human rights should not 
be allowed to dehumanise us” (12). It is ironic that they described human 
rights, a principle designed to affrm the inherent dignity of every person, 
as capable of dehumanizing Zimbabweans. There is here a fundamental dis-
connect between consideration of the dignity of individuals as human be-
ings and what is constructed as social order, which is indeed the ideological 
extension of the desire of the privileged members of society. Mugabe’s argu-
ment has precedence in history. Presidents Daniel arap Moi of Kenya and 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania had made the same arguments years before (24). 
The consequence of mixing of religion and politics regarding homosexu-
ality is the immediate scapegoating of members of the LGBTQ community. 
For example, in Nigeria, there are now vigilante groups who hunt for people 
suspected of engaging in “gay activities” (PBS News Hour 2015). Richard 
Akuson (2019) writes about the human rights abuses that: 
many Nigerian gay men have too often experienced in the form of lynch-
ings or pillory with tires before they’re set on fre and burnt alive—not 
for terrorism or worse, but for being gay, for being human, in a desper-
ately homophobic country. 
These people of alternative sexualities are considered sacrifceable to avert 
an imagined greater calamity in society. 
Homosexuality and African literature 
The notion that homosexuality is foreign to Africa has also held sway in the 
African literary imagination. This has until recently largely accounted for 
the absence of decidedly homoerotic characters in African narratives. Some 
of the narratives that deal with homosexuality in Africa engaged with the 
topic rather indirectly, in some cases to mock African denial of this aspect 
of being human. Wole Soyinka’s novel The Interpreters is one such narrative. 
In this story, Joe Golder, an African American professor teaching in Nige-
ria, is the one who informs his Nigerian interlocutor, the journalist Sagoe, 
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that homosexuality exists in Nigeria, providing him with convincing anec-
dotes, and yet Sagoe responds in a typical denialist way: “You seem better 
informed than I am. But if you don’t mind I’ll persist in my delusion” (Soy-
inka 1996:199). Through Sagoe Soyinka mocks Africa’s persistent hollow 
claim that Africans cannot be homosexuals, when, in fact, homosexuality 
is not a racial or cultural phenomenon; it is human. Chris Dunton (1989) 
offers a more extensive discussion of Soyinka’s novel as a pioneering text 
that deals with homosexuality in Africa. Neville Hoad (2007) examines the 
contentious public debate on the “Africanness” of homosexuality. He also 
discussed Wole Soyinka’s The Interpreters as one of Africa’s pioneering nov-
els to engage the taboo issue. 
Even twenty-fve years after this important observation, many African 
scholars, perhaps representing the majority of African population, still 
consider homosexuality to be a Western thing. Allwell Abalogu Onukaogu 
and Ezechi Onyerionwu (2009:130) complain that “the Nigerian twenty-frst 
century novelist has exhibited astonishing liberties in the area of blatant 
depiction of sexuality.” They discuss in particular Jude Dibia’s Walking with 
Shadows, asserting that “No Nigerian novel present or past has taken such 
a sacred and blasphemous tangent that has found a home in the West” (131). 
Of note here are the idioms that the authors use to engage with Dibia’s un-
apologetically homoerotic narrative. Their use of religious language reveals 
not only their ideological bias but is also representative of the temperature 
of intolerance. 
It is not my intention here to engage in a detailed outline of the representa-
tion of homosexuality in African literature. Lindsey Green-Simms (2016) 
provides a good overview of such in Nigerian literature. My concern here is 
to explore the structure of politics constructed on the body of the other, who 
is conceived as a scapegoat. The other part of my concern is the representa-
tion of queer bodies as deserving to be seen just as the ordinary bodies that 
they are. As such they deserve the same dignity that others within the nor-
mative realm enjoy. The issue therefore is the question of the body as a space 
of politics; it is the question of who has right to control individual bodies. 
Nathalie Baptiste (2014) has noted that for the antigay religious activ-
ists, “the rights of LGBTQ people are imaginary.” Kenyan American legal 
scholar Makau Mutua (2011:452) argues that the revulsion toward homo-
sexuality can be traced to Christianity and Islam, “the two religious tradi-
tions that express homophobia in their doctrinal teachings.” He states that 
“homophobia has long been a hallmark of the two Abrahamic faiths” (452). 
Perhaps the noun “hallmark” seems a bit too harsh to designate these two 
religions, which are known for more things than their rejection of homo-
sexuality. But Mutua is right to identify the said two religions’ infexible 
positions on gay rights as intimately linked with these messianic faiths that 
are notoriously motivated by a teleology of apocalypse. For one fxated on 
apocalyptic eschatology, individual human beings are mere pawns in the 
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people with such mindsets to accept the dignity of every individual regard-
less of religion or sexual orientation. This is perhaps where narratives of 
bodies in pain can help (Scarry 1988). 
The advantage of narratives of individuals who identify as gays and les-
bians is that such narratives situate the fght for acceptance in the lifeworld 
of concrete, embodied individuals. Narratives cut through the jabber of 
ideologies. If stories can convince enough people in society to imagine the 
pain of others, there might be just enough people in society to understand 
the need for laws that grant members of the LGBTQ their right to be who 
they are. I have argued that narratability makes concrete the universal and 
universalizes the concrete and that the condition of narratability is that 
the story must arise from the human condition, and it must be based on 
the practice of the ordinary; only that can make the characters relatable 
and capable of exciting our sympathy. I have also proposed that all human 
rights discourses in Africa begin with the body—the body that feels pain 
and pleasure, the body that must not be violated, and the body that must be 
respected as if it were one’s own. 
Stories and ownership of queer bodies 
The defeat of the frst (2009) bill to criminalize gay activities in Uganda 
did not prevent the killing of gays and lesbians. This unfortunate effort, 
provoked and supported by American Evangelicals seeking to spread their 
ideology in Africa, however, put the gay community on notice. Well before 
the introduction of the bill, though, David Kato, a Ugandan gay activist, 
who was living in Johannesburg, returned to his home country to help or-
ganize a movement to educate Ugandans about that basic fact of human 
sexuality and of the human condition. Call me Kuchu2 is a documentary flm 
based on such efforts by the members of the LGBTQ community to draw 
international attention to the treatment of homosexuals in Uganda. David 
is murdered by an antigay religious zealot. The flm blurb goes to the heart 
of the narrative: 
David fghts Uganda’s government and tabloids in the courts, on tele-
vision, and at the United Nations. Because, he insists, “if we keep on 
hiding, they will say we’re not here.” But no one is prepared for the bru-
tal murder that shakes the movement to its core and sends shock waves 
around the world. 
(Wright and Zouhali-Worrall 2013) 
David Kato becomes the fulcrum around which the stories of others
revolve. His honesty and untiring activism inspire others to tell their
coming-out stories. In other words, Kato becomes a catalyst that prompts
others to frst recognize themselves for who they are and to stand by it. My
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I argue that their activism and their stories have one simple goal: to situate
their bodies as none other than theirs and as deserving of rights and dig-
nity as other bodies do because they are humans. Their stories read like a
call for all to take article 1 of the (UDHR) seriously. In other words, they
urge society to abandon the abstractions of ideology and teleology and
engage them as fellow humans situated in space and time and not meant
for a specifc goal. 
As Call Me Kuchu begins, we are introduced to David at his home, at the 
end of a dirt road. We see him cultivating his garden and husbanding his an-
imals; we see him living his life the way all humans do. He tells us about his 
life. He had been confused about his sexuality because he had no reference 
point to help him understand what had been going on in his life and why he 
was attracted to men and not women. He fnally discovered his sexuality in 
South Africa at the age of twenty-eight, when he saw other men living out 
what his imagination had been too timid to formulate. As a result, he was 
inspired to return to Uganda specifcally to liberate his people, that is, to 
let those, who were living the kind of life he had lived before traveling to 
South Africa, know that their feelings were exactly right. There, he began 
an initiative to fght cases of discrimination and violence against gay people. 
The most outstanding feature of David’s story is its narrative form. It is 
not forced; it is merely like hearing the story of any heterosexual person 
discovering an aspect of his or her body he or she had not been aware of and 
which does not infringe on the life of any person. It is the simple story of 
self-discovery and affrmation, and it is precisely this aspect of his story that 
links it with those of the other members of the kuchu community. 
Naome Ruzindana is a lesbian. Her true identity as a lesbian is known 
only to the LGBTQ community; in the society at large, though, she is simply 
known as a human rights activist who performs the role of a middle-person 
building a bridge between the public and the LGBTQ community. Naome 
had always felt that her sexual orientation was queer, but she had believed 
she could suppress it. She even had a boyfriend and got pregnant by him and 
the pair married. However, she never felt any sexual attraction to him, or to 
any man, and she walked away from the marriage after fve years of trying 
to be heterosexual. On the wall of her house hangs a pennant bearing the 
inscription: “By God’s Grace I am What I am.” 1 Corinthians 15: 10. The 
pennant is her plea to the world to see her and accept her the way she is. It 
is striking that she cleverly makes her statement in the idiom the people are 
familiar with, in that of the Christian narrative. It is, however, questionable 
whether her people would heed that plea given their ideological frame of 
mind. For the viewer, the two stories thus far convey an air of authenticity. 
One can see that the people are merely telling the stories of who they are, not 
the stories of who they chose to become. So, the outstanding message here is 
that their sexual orientation is not a choice, and just as people are born with 
different skin colors, heights, and genders, so are they born with different 
sexual orientations.3 
 Intimate justice, homophobia, human dignity 117 
The third narrator, Stosh, a trans-man, tells of a corrective rape he en-
dured as a teenager at the hands of a man who worked in her grandparents’ 
farm. The man had caught her having an intimate relationship with a girl. 
He said he would teach her what she was supposed to do with a boy and 
subsequently raped her. She became pregnant, but the child was aborted 
because Stosh was too young to carry the pregnancy to full term and to take 
care of the child. Compounding her misery, the man infected her with HIV 
and she attempted suicide. Stosh concludes her story: “Maybe I was sup-
posed to live for a reason, for a purpose. People want to know our stories. 
That’s one reason I decided to come out.” 
The three stories have two levels of appeal: the purely existential, which 
is the right to exist as a human, and the ethical, which is the right not to 
be hurt because of one’s difference. Admittedly both rest on the need for 
recognition. These people tell their stories because they desire justice from 
their world. 
Many people in the world do not need to see others in pain in order to 
grant them the human attention and the right to be who they are. Many 
others, however, need to understand the degree to which their actions and 
beliefs infict pain on others. Instances of the abuse of human rights such as 
corrective rape and infection with HIV/AIDS ought to move them to raise 
questions about their relations to their fellow humans. The three stories op-
erate on the level of a narratability test. They make human rights and hu-
man dignity immediately palpable and challenge others to respond to the 
condition of queers, especially given that they require nothing of society 
than to be left alone to live their lives. David, Naome, and Stosh narrate hu-
man rights because their stories establish the body’s moral sphere and there-
fore the inviolability of its dignity. The issue therefore is not that their lives 
are in danger, which is the case. The issue is that they perceive themselves as 
having no dignity in their community just because of their difference. Their 
narratives seek to alert their world of that dignity. 
Call me Kuchu is ethically informed as it is aesthetically pleasing. Indeed, 
aesthetics is carefully put to the judicious service of ethics. The producers, 
Katherine Fairfax Wright and Manila Zouhali-Worrall, achieved maximum 
aesthetic and ethical effects by juxtaposing scenes. First, we are shown the 
group of queers celebrating their lives; then we encounter a group of Evan-
gelicals steeped in religious fervor and swearing hellfre on homosexuals. 
Then we hear stories of individuals struggling with their identities. One of 
the contrasting scenes is that of one Pastor Moses Solomon Male invoking 
an imaginary apocalyptic scenario that is sure to come if gays and lesbi-
ans are not eliminated from Uganda. He claims that the youths are being 
taken advantage of; that they are being lured into homosexuality. He yells: 
“Victims are sodomized every day.” Pastor Male’s recourse to abstractions 
and hyperbole is, of course, not a surprise, as these are typical traits of a 
mind steeped in mythological thinking. The constant reference to Sodom 
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acts of violence against real victims, and the need to avert greater calamity” 
(Girard 1989:25). Pastor Male seems to believe that killing gays and lesbians 
would prevent any impending Armageddon. 
Another instance of paralleling of those devoted to abstractness on the 
one side, and people who live their lives, on the other, is the encounter be-
tween Giles Muhame, the managing editor of Rolling Stone, and David 
Kato.4 Both are as opposed to each other’s position in life as could be im-
agined. Muhame is a rabid homophobe, who rouses people to hatred by 
publishing pictures of gays and lesbians and urging people to hang gays. 
In one of such occasions, shortly after El Shabaab militants carried out su-
icide bomb attacks against crowds watching a screening of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup Final, the tabloid spread false information, alleging that gays 
were behind the bombing. It also alleges that gays want to overthrow the 
government. Of course, any average reader knows that David Kato and the 
members of his community, who barely make ends meet, cannot achieve 
such a dastardly feat. Yet the tabloid is able to cleverly exploit the atmos-
phere of fear to sow further seeds of hatred in peoples’ minds. 
Also tempering the noise and hollowness of the fery preachers is Christo-
pher Senyonjo, an octogenarian retired Anglican Bishop. Bishop Senyonjo, 
too, invokes the Bible, but in his case, he does so to assert the uniqueness of 
the lives of the members of the LGBTQ community. In one of his counsel-
ling sessions, he quotes Saint Paul’s letter to Galatians: “There is neither Jew 
nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are 
all one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3:28). 
The fgure of the bishop is of critical importance in the emerging narrative 
surrounding LGBQ community. He makes them appear ordinary, that is, 
normal. He de-exoticizes them. First, he lets us understand that he is not gay, 
which disposes us to see his engagement with them as purely disinterested 
and therefore has high moral credibility. He works from the perspective of a 
universal moral framework, but then we grasp that he fully understands the 
condition of the LGBTQ community. However, for his solidarity with them 
he was excommunicated by his church. For me, therefore, he represents the 
majority of people of good will, who may never have come in contact with 
any member of the LGBTQ community but who are open to engage them in 
humanly more fulflling ways. 
By juxtaposing scenes of concrete lives with those of people whose oper-
ative modus is the abstract world, Wright and Zouhali-Worrall challenge us 
to judge the situations presented to us and to relate to humans according to 
our judgment. In the above instances of parallelism, the flm successfully 
situates the lyricism of the life stories of those duly aware of their vulnera-
bility with the passion and noise of the worshippers, some of whom bay for 
the blood of scapegoats. 
At David’s funeral, the bishop emphasizes what could be called the un-
derlining thread in the narratives of the members of the kuchu community.
He states that God created David the way David was. Kuchu are Christians, 
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regular humans who go about their Christian lives like all others. They 
are brought together by their awareness of the vulnerability of their lives. 
As they face constant threats to their lives, they know that they have to 
come together and strengthen each other’s humanity. Their grief, hope, and 
dreams are presented as ordinary as the grief, hopes, and dreams of all other 
humans. This is what draws us to them. 
Call Me Kuchu was conceived in the spirit of narratability of human 
rights. It believes that the only way to make people understand a thing is 
to present it to them. We hear members of the LGBTQ community say, “we 
are here, we too are humans.” We hear them demand justice. Of far-reaching 
relevance, and, indeed, what remain with us, are the stories that they tell one 
another and the world. As Kay Schaffer and Sidone Smith (2004:3) explain, 
Stories provide necessary evidence and information about violations. 
They put a human face to suffering. They command international atten-
tion, spurring the interest of NGOs and the media, building awareness 
of events at home and in other parts of the world. 
The flm reveals one fundamental thing about the lives of homosexuals in 
relation to human rights. Regardless of whether Uganda is a signatory to the 
UDHR or not, regardless of the state of law in the country, what counts at 
this point in time is whether the ordinary people recognize gays as humans 
deserving to be respected in their difference. This is what the flm seeks 
to achieve. After David Kato’s burial, and surprised by the international 
response, Giles Muhame expressed surprise that people all over the world 
hailed Kato as a hero. He states, “People need to know that human rights 
does not mean gay rights” (Wright and Zouhali-Worrall 2013). He, sadly, 
reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of human rights and what it means 
to be human. He represents a majority of the population in Africa who see 
human rights as a Western thing. But it is not, and the plight of the members 
of the LGBTQ is as much about simple survival as human beings as it is 
about dignity. 
The body as the lyrics of life 
The laws against homosexuality in Uganda and Nigeria unleashed a wave 
of hatred of people of alternative sexualities. According to the editors of 
Kuchu Times, an online forum formed in Uganda in the aftermath of the 
death of David Kato, “On 18th February Nigerian citizen Akkinifesi Oluide 
Olubunmi passed on after being attacked and viciously beaten the previous 
day. Akkinifesi was sent to an early grave by a mob that lynched him on 
suspicions of being gay” (Kuchu Times 2016). Like in Uganda, members of 
the LGBTQ community in Nigeria and other African countries have woken 
up to the fact that their very existence as human beings are under threat 
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sexual orientation. I have already mentioned Jude Dibia’s novel Walking
with Shadows, which has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Romeo 
Oriogun (2017) is a Nigerian queer poet, who describes his parentage as a 
mix of Yoruba and Edo. He is the winner of the 2017 Brunel International 
African Poetry Prize. Some of his poems are obviously hewn from his life as 
a gay person in a largely heterosexual and homophobic society. 
The title of the poem “Invisible Man” is a nod to Ralph Ellison’s famous
novel of the same name. With this poem, Oriogun identifes with Ellison’s
narrator, who speaks from his underground hideout in the basement of a
whites-only apartment. Ellison’s story is, in turn, a tribute to Dostoyevsky’s
existentialist novel, Notes from Underground. Well situated in the existentialist
tradition of both novels, Oriogun’s poem gestures to the undying question
of the place of the individual in an absurd world, a world that has no place
for difference. Ellison’s protagonist lives in a world dictated by the whims of
white racist mythology; he is invisible but desires to be seen. The same goes
for Oriogun’s speaker, whose world has been relegated to the coal cellar of a
homophobic society, and who cries to be heard. The frst two lines bring a boy
and a bird together to create a potent metaphor for entrapment and the desire
for liberation: “And the voice was a lost bird embedded in a boy / like a word
stranded between pages.” The lost bird embedded in a boy is a caged bird,
an allusion to Paul Laurence Dunbar’s poem, “Sympathy,” made popular by
Maya Angelou in her memoir, I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings. We are given
a glimpse into the psyche and emotional state of the speaker, especially in the
third stanza: 
The radio said, a father shot his son for loving another man. 
Marvin Gaye lives in the heart of a black drag queen 
and to be a song of pebbles and water is to run into a city of light 
and surrender your throat to the song of a bird. 
(Oriogun 2017) 
We have thus two principles clashing against each other: freedom and 
death, each as strong as the other. We are reminded of the tragedy of Mar-
vin Gaye’s death, killed by his own father, Rev. Marvin Gaye Sr., 70, an 
Apostolic minister. The speaker is crammed between these two worlds, just 
as a word is stranded between pages and as is the caged bird. If we have not 
already divined what torments the bird (i.e., why that caged bird sings), then 
the seventh stanza makes it more than clear: 
Wet dreams: 
a boy hears the whisper of another boy deep in his bones 
and wonders about the origin of stars, 
his body is a lamp learning how to give light 
in a place where a boy opens his mouth 
from the door of a tomb; 
where a boy takes his frst breath. 
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It is not surprising that the speaker wants to know the origin of stars. He is 
yearning for a boundless freedom and boundary-transcendent solidarity. 
Paul Laurence Dunbar and Ralph Ellison, of course, wrote about the cage 
to which African Americans had been consigned. In making subtle allu-
sions to both, Oriogun exposes an existential and universal yearning for a 
boundless world, a yearning to escape a closed system. He juxtaposes this 
yearning, which is the most natural, life-affrming thing, with being in cage 
and death, which are the opposite of life. It is as if he would challenge us 
to take sides. This ethical challenge is enhanced in the next poem, “Elegy 
for a Burnt Friend,” which expresses the condition of Africa understood as 
a closed system. It is a one-stanza poem in which the powerlessness of the 
speaker is powerfully expressed in the following lines: 
There is nowhere to say enough, 
nowhere to breathe in the open sea 
without salt stinging your throat; 
nowhere to wash our body in water and become free. 
It is heartrending to realize that the speaker desires only to be allowed to be 
free and human. This is obviously impossible or very diffcult, given the nar-
row conception of being in society. He is not seeking to redefne Africa; he is 
asking people to accommodate his difference, to grant him the recognition 
and justice they grant themselves. 
“How to Survive the Fire” has one dominant idea, expressed in the last 
two lines: “before you understand why God turned // his face from Christ 
and whispered, run.” The idea is the fragility of life, which is expressed in 
the conundrum of God telling a nailed Christ to run for his life. Where 
would Christ have run to when he was already nailed to the cross? The ft-
ting metaphor of Christ being abandoned, or not being helped by God de-
spite God’s omnipotence, completes the picture of a closed system that is 
markedly against life, a system in which love of life and human fourishing 
had been extinguished in people by a corrosive mix of traditional and Chris-
tian fundamentalist mythologies. In painting the picture of a closed world, 
Oriogun urges the need for a more expansive reality, or at least for a redef-
nition of the known world that allows for differentiation. 
The poem “The Origin of Butterfies” is just about human fourishing to 
which all humans aspire. It is a one-stanza poem whose core discourse is 
made explicit in these lines: 
Last night I saw a butterfy 
break darkness with the colours of her wings, 
she rose gently to the moon with songs 
within her body. 
Oriogun situates the speaker’s mood on the brighter side of life. It is im-
portant that what breaks the darkness surrounding the speaker’s world is 
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something as dainty, vulnerable, and harmless as the wings of butterfy. 
Equally important is that the butterfy rises to the moon “with her body.” It 
is the resurrection of the body, not of the soul. It is a subtle reference to the 
desire innate in the bodies of homosexuals just as it is in those of heterosex-
uals. This desire is as harmless as a butterfy, and it does not stand in the 
way of society. Oriogun is interested in the triumph of the body as it is. This 
is made more explicit in the last ten lines of the poem: 
There is a place where butterfies live—mother 
said happiness can come from sadness. 
On the next page of my life 
I wrote only one word: Happiness. 
I watched it grew from my book (sic) 
and broke the night into fragments of stars. 
Someone once said, when the sun is dead 
we take light in small sips. 
I do not know what it means, 
I only saw stars falling as butterfies. 
The core of the speaker’s life is seen in the pursuit of the very idea that 
his mother put in his head: happiness. In Oriogun’s understanding, human 
fourishing must be like butterfies in the feld which destroy nothing but 
which live as fulflled a life as they can. A fulflled life is lived in the present, 
not in the abstraction of collective identity or in the thereafter. 
Uses and abuse of difference 
I established in Chapter 1 that Paul Ricoeur’s idea that a plot serves to make 
one story out of multiple incidents. Plot transforms the many incidents into
one coherent story, and, to understand the story, or if you like, the life of a 
person, one has to take the many incidents into account. No single incident 
holds the key to understanding the entire story. Rather, one has to move 
from one incident to another and compare them against the backdrop of 
the whole (Ricoeur 1991:21). In carefully laying out the details of a story and 
bringing together the various aspects of a particular life in such a way that 
they make a coherent narrative, stories compel a certain understanding of 
the world. This understanding is in response to the implicit question raised 
by the character whose life is being laid out in minute details. Such questions 
include: Can you feel what I feel? Can you understand why I am this way 
rather than the other? 
Chinelo Okparanta writes in the Aristotelian tradition mapped out by 
Paul Ricoeur. She belongs to the third generation of Nigerian writers, some-
times casually referred to as Chinua Achebe’s children. But her works are as 
far removed from Achebe’s aesthetic and ideological concerns as is her gen-
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with writing back to the center and thereby proving the humanity of Af-
ricans, like most writers of her age, Okparanta is much more concerned 
with the well-being of individuals. Happiness Like Water (2013), a collection
of short stories, reads like a lyrical exploration of interpersonal relation-
ships. More specifcally, she explores the contours of personal happiness of 
her female characters who are mostly of Igbo ethnic extraction in Nigeria. 
Elsewhere (Eze 2016), I have explored some of her short stories as typical of 
bold feminist writing because of their examination of the fate of women in 
a rampantly patriarchal culture. There, I purposely skipped discussing the 
specifc stories dealing with the concerns of lesbian characters, not because 
I was ignorant of intersectionality but because I wanted to focus on exclu-
sively feminist concerns to the degree that they relate to men in general. 
Okparanta introduced her audience to LGBTQ concerns in her short 
story “America.” In this story, Nneka and Gloria are lesbians. Nneka’s par-
ents catch them making love and warn her that “there are penalties in Nige-
ria for that sort of thing” (Okparanta 2013:89). Gloria settles in America and 
is a successful economist. Nneka eventually rejoins her after several hurdles, 
and they are able live their lives freely. In another story, “Grace,” the char-
acters, Grace and the narrator, a middle-aged professor of Igbo ancestry, 
who fall in love and confde in each other the harsh reality of their having to 
marry men even though they never felt sexual attraction to them. Grace is 
twenty-two; she is about to marry Obinna, a man from her ethnic group, and 
she is scared. She doesn’t love him, or any man. Instead, she loves women. 
Grace’s condition reminds the professor of her own; she, too, had married a 
man even though she is a lesbian. Thankfully both she and Grace are able to 
express their love to each other and promise to be in love as long as it is hid-
den from their families. Mythili Rao (2013) calls Okparanta a “Champion of 
the Stifed.” I endorse this qualifcation. As the foregoing discussion reveals, 
my interest in the representation of homosexuality in African literature lies 
in the degree to which it reveals the human rights struggles of the members 
of the LGBTQ community in Africa. Expressed in the words of Rao, it is to 
the degree that their lives are stifed or rendered disposable by their world. 
The novel, Under the Udala Tree, is an extended study of the stifed lives 
introduced in her short stories. 
Under the Udala Tree is the story of one woman’s struggle to escape the 
boundaries set on her life by her culture. Part One of the fve-part novel 
is set during the period of war between the Igbo and other ethnic groups 
of Nigeria (1967–1970). Impoverished by the war, Ijeoma and her family 
hardly make ends meet. Ijeoma’s mother sends her to the town of Nnewi 
as the house-help to a grammar school teacher. She herself goes to work 
in Aba, one of the rising industrial cities. At Nnewi Ijeoma meets Am-
ina, from the Hausa ethnicity, one of the many others fghting against the 
Igbo. Amina had lost all the members of her family during the war. Ijeoma 
introduces Amina to her host family, which takes her in after initial hesi-
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teacher catches them making love, which he considers to be an abomination. 
He sends Ijeoma to Aba while Amina continues to stay with him because 
she has no family. Per chance Ijeoma and Amina meet again at a boarding 
school, long after the war, and they revive their sexual relationship. How-
ever, Amina later gets married to a man from her ethnicity, and Ijeoma too 
is forced into marriage by circumstance, despite her not feeling any sexual 
love for men. After living with her husband, Chibundu, and giving birth to 
two children, only one of which survives, she fnally summons her courage 
and leaves the marriage. 
Ijeoma’s story is similar to Naome’s in Call Me Kuchu. The novel rightly 
fts into the Bildungssroman genre as explicated by Joseph R. Slaughter 
(2007:3) in Human Rights, Inc: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and Inter-
national Law. Slaughter is not necessarily interested in the plot which, he 
argues, “we could provisionally gloss as the didactic story of an individual 
who is socialized in the process of learning for oneself what everyone else 
(including the reader) presumably already knows.” Instead, he is more inter-
ested in how the Bildungsroman “articulates certain social relations” (7). Ex-
amining the genre’s social function, Slaughter argues, helps us understand 
the relationships between the languages of literature and law. My interest in 
this particular coming-of-age novel lies in the fact that it highlights the so-
cial structures that stife the dignity of the individual. What do those social 
relations reveal about human rights? 
We recall Lynn Hunt’s argument that eighteenth-century European
sentimental novels by authors such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Samuel
Richardson helped to provoke the early stirrings of thoughts about univer-
sal human rights. What Slaughter’s and Hunt’s discussions have in com-
mon is the notion that the narratives are essentially sentimental and often
didactic. Okparanta’s coming-of-age novel is far from being sentimental or
didactic. In fact, it is artistically sophisticated, delineating the conditions
that undercut a particular individual’s dignity and mitigate against hu-
man fourishing. Ijeoma’s recollection of the war and the destruction left
in its wake establishes an overarching metaphor against which the rest of
the story is to be understood. Within that framework, the stifing postwar
period becomes a navigational tool for the whole novel that describes the
conditions from which Ijeoma has to liberate herself. Right after her fa-
ther was killed during an air raid, the narrator, presaging the rough road
ahead for the remaining members of the family, shrewdly explains the
meaning of her name—“Ijeoma (which was just a wish: ‘safe journey’)”
(Okparanta 2015:21). It would indeed be a long journey of self-discovery
and consequent self-affrmation as a person whose sexuality lies outside
the heteronormative structures. Her name is, indeed, a short defnition of
the Bildungsroman. 
With her family’s increasing hardship and widespread hunger Ijeoma’s 
mother begins to see her as a burden, and she makes plans to get rid of 
the girl. Indeed, her mother sends her on a literal journey, to Nnewi. By 
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inserting Ijeoma’s personal story, her simultaneous journey across land and 
to her self-awareness in the war-torn environment, Okparanta prepares the 
reader for the kind of battle Ijeoma is going to engage in shortly, the battle 
for self-affrmation. Perhaps the true journey of self-assertion as a lesbian in 
Africa is like surviving a war. 
Okparanta exposes forms of difference and the uses to which the norma-
tive imagination of their culture puts them. She sets the story of this young 
woman with a different sexual orientation against the backdrop of which is 
ethnic difference. Ijeoma’s mother is vehemently opposed to any relation-
ship with Amina because she hails from the Hausa, a different ethnicity 
than the Igbo. It does not matter to Ijeoma’s mother that Amina is a vic-
tim of the war, having lost her entire family to an air raid attributed to the 
soldiers from her ethnicity. From the look of things, it therefore makes no 
sense that Ijeoma’s mother would be against any affnity between Ijeoma 
and Amina, two victims of the same war. If this does not make sense to the 
reader, Okparanta seems to be suggesting, it also should make no sense that 
Ijeoma’s mother would be against their sexual orientations either. Accord-
ing to her logic, therefore, sexual orientation is just like being born into an 
ethnic group. 
What counts here is not necessarily that Ijeoma’s society does not accept 
her the way she is; it is the justifcation that it uses to stife her expression of 
her being. The justifcation is rooted in the biblical myths, and, thus, we see 
mythic consciousness standing in the way of people engaging with reality 
the way it actually is. Ijeoma’s mother prepares Ijeoma’s mind to accept the 
normative truth about human nature and sexual orientation, which is that 
people of the same sex are not supposed to have intimate sexual relationship 
with one another but rather with people of the opposite sex. She begins with 
reading from the book of Genesis, and specifcally about the creation of 
heaven and earth and then of Adam and Eve. Ijeoma’s mother condemns 
Ijeoma’s love affair with Amina because it does not ft with the biblical in-
junction. She states: “It’s that same behavior that led to the destruction of 
Sodom and Gomorrah, the very same behavior you and that girl—what’s 
her name again?—engaged in” (73). Her mother cites the book of Leviticus 
18: “Thou shall not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an abomi-
nation” (75). 
As I have sought to establish, in Chapter 3, mythic consciousness con-
strues the world in simple binaries and relies on imagination rather than 
on sensory perception to explain it. Mythic consciousness reaches into an 
imagined reality that cannot be challenged by logic because it relies on tra-
dition (ancestors in the case of oral cultures) and authority, including can-
onized texts such as in the Bible. Mythology is thus a mechanism through 
which identity is weaponized. 
In The Colonizer and the Colonized, Albert Memmi (1990:123–133) shows 
that one of the most effective means through which the colonizer maintains 
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to be radically different from the colonizer, which allows the colonizer to 
avoid seeing the colonized as humans, and, therefore, they have no qualms 
in violating the colonized. Second, the invention of the negative image of 
the colonized helps the colonizer to control the colonized psychologically. 
The worst part of colonial conquest therefore was the imposition of negative 
images on the colonized on themselves, for without it imperialism would 
not be possible. These negative images were sustained by the stories that 
the colonizers told about the colonized, but the exploitation of difference is 
not restricted to only colonial societies; it is also an effective apparatus of 
control in postcolonialist religion as well as in secular dimensions of power 
(Anzaldua 2012). Ijeoma’s mother stands for the majority of her society who 
rely on mythic consciousness for their judgment of the world and who are 
against homosexuals. As in Call me Kuchu in which Pastor Moses Solomon 
Male relies on the Bible to argue that homosexuality is un-African, Ijeo-
ma’s mother has no other argument than to repeat the biblical myths. She is 
one of the obstacles that Ijeoma had to surmount if she is to arrive at self-
knowledge, which is what a Bildungsroman is all about. 
Ijeoma seems to have the ability to deconstruct the biblical myths. The 
book of Judges tells of the men who presented their daughters to be raped 
instead of themselves. Ijeoma questions the courage and wisdom of such 
men, who rather than protect their daughters, sacrifced them. She asks her-
self, “What if all these stories were actually only allegories for something 
else, something more than we could easily put our fngers on?” (Okparanta 
2015:80–81). However, the greatest deconstruction of the abstraction of my-
thology is her insistence on her own lived story. She argues that even though 
God meant for there to be Adam and Eve rather than Eve and Eve, there is 
no way she can explain what she feels other than to say that it is also what 
God created. She is as aware of her feelings as she is of the world revealed 
by her senses. She says, 
But we were in love, or at least I believed myself completely to be. I 
craved Amina’s presence for no other reason than to have it. It was cer-
tainly friendship too, this intimate companionship with someone who 
knew me in a way that no one else did. 
(150) 
In insisting on the tangible details of her life, she reveals a solid sense of
self, a sense of her dignity. Human rights are about protecting that moral
sphere. 
In Ijeoma and Amina, Okparanta presents two characters exposed to the 
same mythologies but who react differently and therefore reveal varying ef-
fects of the ideologies that are imprinted upon them. Whereas Ijeoma is able 
to counter the biblical mythologies with a robust awareness of her selfhood, 
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counter that of her society, and so she becomes a victim of the normative 
construct that the mythologies serve. For example, once after they have 
made love and fallen asleep by each other’s sides, Amina has a chain of 
uncoordinated dreams. She dreams of a golden horse chariot with no horse-
man. “People are lining up, marching toward the bright light that encir-
cled the carriage in the sky” (155). A revealing aspect of Amina’s dreams 
is the appearance of hailstones “and fre, pouring down and forming cra-
ters where they landed” (155). Amina makes a direct connection between 
what she and Ijeoma have done and their impending destruction; they are 
doomed to be destroyed as the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah were because 
she and Ijeoma were engaged in “sodomy.” After the dream their friendship 
gets sour, and Amina starts avoiding Ijeoma who tries in vain to get her 
back. Since Sigmund Freud, we know that dreams issue from the Id, a ware-
house of repressed instincts seeking discharge; it is where our fears, desires, 
and libido are encoded. Society controls individuals by tapping into the Id, 
especially with their myths and sacred texts. 
We recall Joseph Campbell’s (1988) discussion of the functions of my-
thology (Chapter 3), especially its power to regulate social hierarchy. It is a
way of maintaining order and thereby preserving conventional knowledge
of the world and therefore power in the hands of those who already wield
it. In Amina, we see the sociological function of mythology as a technol-
ogy of power. In this case, it has effectively interpellated Amina, who had
consumed it without differentiation. Because of the control that the nar-
rative exercises in Amina, she is alienated from her body and does not be-
lieve that it belongs to her. Instead, it is objectifed and belongs to society;
that is, it must be understood in the grammar of traditional society and its
patriarchal logic. She would eventually suppress her feelings and marry a
man from her ethnicity. The euphoria with which Ijeoma’s mother and the
grammar school teacher greet Amina’s marriage and the words with which
they describe it reveal their underlining ideological disposition. Ijeoma
notes that her mother “seemed appeased that Amina had at least known to
marry into her own tribe” (Okparanta 2015:170). The teacher “nodded with
the overenthusiastic effort of a person trying hard to keep things jovial.
‘Indeed. With her own kind. It couldn’t be better,’ he said” (170). Ijeoma’s
mother and the teacher see the world and human relationships through the
prism of nature. They believe in hierarchy and order, in the division be-
tween purity and impurity and the vital necessity of keeping them apart.
Ijeoma’s mother makes a complacent pronouncement in that regard: “It’s
just the way things are done” (171). Okparanta seems to suggest that those
who maintain racial and tribal separateness, that is, a kind of separate but
equal ideology, are more likely to argue for the normative understanding of
sexual orientation and to consider anything outside that norm as a devia-
tion and therefore disposable. However, the human condition is more than
normative human nature. 
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Normativity and the violence of categorization 
How does a racist, sexist, or homophobic system disable the bodies of the 
members of its vulnerable groups and eventually produce disposable bod-
ies? Disposable bodies are those that are overdetermined by the system 
whose operational paradigms constrict the freedom and functions of the 
bodies that fall outside the norm. The system disables the bodies of the vul-
nerable members of society, to use Iris Marion Young’s (1980) terminology. 
The system raises the functions of the bodies of those who control power to 
the norm and considers all the other bodies as abnormal. It therefore forces 
bodies that are categorized as abnormal to exert extra energy and effort 
in order to match the expectations of society, and in so doing those bodies 
infict harm upon themselves. A famous example is that of John Henryism.5 
To be sure, John Henryism is “prolonged, high-effort coping with diffcult 
psychological stressors” (James et al. 1987). John Henryism issues from the 
feeling of worthlessness and the rather superhuman effort to prove one’s 
humanity to those who are ill-disposed to accept that. 
Ijeoma discerns an absence of self-worth in the way the women around her 
see themselves and the women’s superhuman effort to make themselves ap-
pealing to their society. Her mother is the most obvious example, besides, of 
course, Amina. Her mother urges Ijeoma to quickly fnd herself a husband 
because “a woman without a man is hardly a woman at all” (Okparanta 
2015:181). When her mother repeats these words in less than ten minutes, 
Ijeoma observes that “there was something self-deprecating about the way 
she said it” (182). Ijeoma understands that her mother is unconsciously sub-
suming the fourishing of women’s bodies within the dictates of patriarchal 
norms and therefore making them amenable to violation. Insofar as Ijeoma 
does not disown men entirely, she seems to suggest that it should be possible 
for women to exercise their freedom regarding the form of life they want 
to live. This choice is all the more expedient if their sexual orientation is 
not turned toward men. This is obviously the case with Ijeoma. It should 
be possible for her to be happy outside the patronage of men and she is 
not alone in this feeling. There are many more women whose fourishing is 
not eternally tied to men as pleasure-givers and the ultimate guarantors of 
happiness in life. They do not have to deny their own self-esteem in order 
to meet society’s expectation. Yet society constricts their being with mores 
and mythologies. 
After the demise of her love with Amina, Ijeoma falls in love with Ndidi, 
another young woman in Aba, when she returns and helps her mother in her 
shop. It is in the shop that Ijeoma meets Ndidi in whose eyes Ijeoma sees 
some warmth and affection. Ndidi initiates Ijeoma into a secret group of les-
bians who meet in a church building that is ironically called “FRIENDS IN 
JESUS CHURCH OF GOD” (190). Ijeoma is also haunted by dreams. Her 
psyche is, after all, not entirely impervious to society’s normativity. Shortly 
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in love with Ndidi, memories of her Bible class with her mother sweep back 
to her and she thinks of “condemning words falling upon my consciousness 
like a rainstorm, drenching me and threatening to drown me out” (195). 
Then she has a dream in which her mother hollers at her, admonishing her 
that she would eventually perish if she doesn’t comply with the demands 
of the social order. Indeed, soon enough, Ijeoma learns about how precar-
ious the lives of gay people are. Ndidi tells her of an incident in which two 
“sissies”—the name they called themselves—were beaten to death by two 
homophobic men. The police’s response to the call for help is revealing: “Let 
them rot like the faggots they are” (205).6 Not long after the story, ban-
dits raid the church house where the sissies are having a party. They catch 
Adanna, one of the sissies, and burn her to death. 
Lynching and public shaming are just the more spectacular forms of vio-
lence against bodies that fall outside the norm. Gust A. Yep (2017) discusses
the individual and collective pain and anguish produced by non-normativity,
that is, not being part of the norm. These forms of anguish include isolation,
feelings of worthlessness, and shame. In patriarchal societies, where sexuality
is conceived in heteronormative terms, the pain experienced by those whose
sexuality is not accommodated by this defnition is not considered worth
paying attention to precisely because their pain is not in the range of author-
ized experiences; it is considered a result of deviant behavior and is therefore
deemed to be self-inficted. Heteronormativity is the “process that allows het-
erosexuality to become ‘the standard for legitimate, authentic, prescriptive,
and ruling social, cultural, and sexual arrangements’ in a given society at a
particular sociohistorical and geopolitical moment” (116). Heteronormativity
has become a “shorthand for the numerous ways in which heterosexual privi-
lege is woven into the fabric of social life, pervasively and insidiously ordering
everyday existence” (Lloyd 2013:822). In the heteronormative schema: 
gender is conceptualized as naturally following sex (conceived as a nat-
ural substance) and desire is conceptualized as naturally following gen-
der (where maleness entails masculinity and masculinity is expressed 
through sexual desire for the “opposite” sex [i.e., a woman] and female-
ness entails femininity, which is expressed through sexual desire for its 
“opposite” [i.e., man]. 
(Yep 2017:116) 
There is therefore an essential connection between sex, gender, and sexual 
desire. Anything outside this traditional understanding is seen as abnormal 
and thus must be contained. Violence consists in this compulsion to contain 
the unusual, and this compulsion is typically justifed by invoking higher 
authority such as God, morality, and social order. Moya Lloyd (2013:819) 
characterizes heteronormative violence as that which “constitutes and regu-
lates bodies according to conventional notions of sex, gender and sexuality.” 
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of the spectacle involved, normative violence, which is intended to compel 
through pain and terror that people live in a certain way that is contrary to 
their identity and happiness, is also a form of human rights abuse.7 
I have argued that human rights abuses ought to be seen in other ways 
than the widely known forms that attract people’s attention. Human rights 
must also be seen in the microcosmic forms of people’s well-being. Ijeoma 
experiences this muted form of violence frsthand when she succumbs to 
the sociocultural pressures of her society and marries Chibundu, a man for 
whom she has no sexual attraction. Her heart and feelings are with Ndidi 
and that relationship is where her fourishing is located, so when society 
denies it to her, it goes directly against her well-being. The thought of her 
having a child with Chibundu gives her nightmares. She thinks of a child 
that was born deformed and wonders what will happen to it. 
The thoughts on the deformed child is a refection of her condition in her 
society as a malformed body, a body that had been stifed because of its 
difference. She sees her condition refected in all vulnerable bodies. There 
is no way she can escape her marriage to Chibundu. His society has no al-
ternatives to the form of life her mother had envisaged for her. Ijeoma has 
therefore to invent means of personal survival. She imagines herself as a 
“snail protected by its hard shell. Imagine a snail when it is alarmed. Im-
agine the snail retreating into its shell” (Okparanta 2015:234). Probably feel-
ing the effects of pregnancy, she tells her mother that she has the feeling of 
being trapped in her body (243). Even when she gives birth to Chidimma, 
her daughter, she sees the girl as predator and herself as its prey to be eaten 
alive for the supposed beneft of society. In this regard, therefore, she sees 
herself as a means to society’s end. 
As if to drive his society’s programmed violence on Ijeoma, Chibundu 
frmly lets her know that he is disappointed that their child is a girl. He had 
anticipated a boy and had even chosen a name for him (273). His prefer-
ence for boys, predicated on their position as heirs to their fathers’ estates, 
adds to the social and cultural power construction that confers legitimacy 
on some bodies while condemning others. Chibundu’s disappointment can 
be understood within a power structure that sees women only as a means to 
society’s goal of procreation and for men to have heirs. Chibundu does not 
see any dignity in girls, and surely not in Ijeoma, his wife. 
It is, of course, not surprising that Chibundu wants a male heir. Girls 
cannot inherit their father’s estates. Girls and women cannot own anything 
because they are to be owned. He even goes on to demonstrate to Ijeoma 
how her existence is entirely dependent on his. There is no better opportu-
nity to display his ownership of her body than when he intercepts a love let-
ter written by Ndidi. He tells Ijeoma in a patronizing, superfcially merciful 
manner: 
You can even continue to write to her. But don’t you forget for one
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wife, for God’s sake. I can do things to make your life miserable. Do you 
hear me? You are my wife. Whatever you do, don’t provoke me, or I will 
see to it that you pay the price. 
(283) 
Chibundu’s audacity is designed to demonstrate to Ijeoma that she has no
rights—not as a woman and certainly not as a lesbian. She hears this in
Chibundu’s emphasis of the possessive pronoun, my. His threat is an indica-
tion that the possessive pronoun is not meant to be mutual as might be the case
in a regular couple. Ijeoma is his property. Later on, as she lies in bed and pon-
ders the encounter, she thinks she had become “the equivalent of a washrag,
worn and limp, not from overuse, but rather from misuse and manhandling”
(284). She is a surplus body. Strictly speaking, though, Chibundu’s source of
anxiety lies elsewhere; he is losing his position as a master and the norm giver.
He feels his existence threatened by the fact that Ijeoma does not need him
sexually. Second, he believes that his lineage would cease because of the ab-
sence of a male heir. From his perspective, justice is a zero-sum game; he sees
the dignity of his position—the husband/master—as sustainable only by the
other person’s—wife/slave—subordination, servitude, and, fnally, indignity. 
South African scholar Kopana Ratele (2011:401) argues that female same-
sex desire generates confusion in the patriarchal imagination primarily be-
cause it deconstructs the paradigm of male desire and renders male authority 
and utility redundant. He states: “without understanding the psychological 
‘disorder’ and social distress that female same-sex sexuality generates in the 
ruling African masculinity, we would almost certainly misperceive what it 
means to be a man in today’s Africa.” Ratele’s profound observation about 
African male sexual desire supports Adrienne Rich’s (1993:227–254) notion 
of “compulsory heterosexuality.” In “Compulsory Heterosexuality and 
Lesbian Existence,” she states: 
It seems more probable that men really fear not that they will have 
women’s sexual appetite forced on them or that women want to smother 
and devour them, but that women could be indifferent to them alto-
gether, that men could be allowed sexual and emotional—and therefore 
economic—access to women only on women’s terms, otherwise being 
left on the periphery of the matrix. 
Men are fxated on maintaining the social order that assures their position 
as masters. They must desire; it is in this compulsion that power and control 
reside. 
Restoring the dignity of difference 
When Ijeoma realizes her complete vulnerability as a female body in a pa-
triarchal, sexist society, she has no place to go and no force to rely on than 
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on her God. She prays: “Dear God, I am unhappy. Even as I carry my child, 
and even as the thought of this child makes me happy, I am yet unhappy. 
Dear God, I want to be happy” (Okparanta 2015:256–257). This prayer un-
derscores not only the fact that she has been entirely honest to herself about 
her feelings; it is also a plea for the world to empathize with her. She feels like 
a stranger in her body. Her body does not belong to her. It is wasting, and 
it is so because it has been subjected to the aggressions of the system. She 
has to save herself from wasting. She dreams that her daughter is tied to an 
Udala tree with her legs hanging. Chidimma holds her father’s tiny Bible in 
her hand. Ijeoma cannot hear what she was reading (310–312). 
Ijeoma interprets the dream in line with her experience of bondage and 
her desire to free herself. It is to be noted that one of the last places Ijeoma 
saw Amina was under an Udala tree and that was right after Amina had 
announced she was marrying a man from her ethnicity. She remembers the 
legend of Udala tree—that spirit children lived in the tree waiting to settle 
in the wombs of “exceptionally fertile female who comes and stays, for even 
a briefest period of time, under any of the trees” (309). The Udala tree there-
fore becomes a symbol of femininity and female subjection to the patriarchal 
order. Ijeoma knows that Amina was not being true to her being, but she 
had to conform to the norms of society. Thinking about her daughter in the 
same position as Amina becomes too much for her to bear, as is the thought 
of seeing her daughter go through the kind of hardship she herself under-
went. She packs up her things and leaves her husband’s house, determined 
never to return. She has to break the cycle of women’s self-deprecation and 
self-denial. Close to her mother’s house she sits under the Iroko tree think-
ing about how her mother would receive the news. Attention is drawn to the 
difference between Udala and Iroko trees. The Iroko is admired in many 
African cultures for its imposing structure and durability. Ijeoma turns her 
back on the Udala tree that symbolizes her solely utilitarian value in soci-
ety as a woman and embraces the tall, self-assertive Iroko. Luckily for her, 
her mother fnally accepts her the way she is. Her mother’s acceptance of 
Ijeoma’s sexual orientation is underlined by a reference to God. “God, who 
created you, must have known what He did” (323). 
In Ijeoma’s self-affrmation, Okparanta returns attention to the inherent 
dignity of every individual. Earlier on, Ijeoma had noted how women sub-
jected themselves to self-deprecation by believing that their worth is essen-
tially dependent on men (182). She now understands that the only way to 
reverse that is not to seek to change society, but rather to affrm herself. 
Although all humans possess dignity by the mere fact of being human, that 
dignity is only fully realized from the moment individuals affrm themselves 
and seek to protect and preserve who they are. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, the moral understanding conveyed by literature 
is rooted in our imaginative reconstruction of the experience of others. In 
so doing, we literally become part of that life, that is, by the sheer force 
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(1993:x) argument that moral reasoning is basically an imaginative activity 
because it “requires imagination to discern what is morally relevant in situ-
ations, to understand, empathetically, how others experience things, and to 
envision the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular case.” The 
narratives we have considered in this chapter achieve at least one goal: They 
present the people of alternative sexualities as ordinary human beings that 
they are. They are not ogres, and they pose no threat to people and society. 
Their narratives allow us to encounter them, see them as having moral di-
mensions and deserving of respect, and, in many instances, to have a moral 
understanding of the world through them. 
Notes 
1 We see similar manifestation of ideology in the United States among conserva-
tive politicians. 
2 Kuchu is a word (plural: kuchus), apparently of Swahili origin, that lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) Ugandans have minted to describe 
their identities. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-kuchu-beehive. 
3 Of course, one could argue that even if it was the story of who they chose to be-
come, they have right to that. As much as that argument stands, one has to take the
current African context into consideration. Most Africans are yet to grasp the 
fact that sexual orientation is not a choice. Until they overcome that hump,
the question of choice seems secondary. 
4 In the United States, Rolling Stone is a progression publication. This Ugandan 
publication is ironically the exact opposite of the American version. 
5 John Henryism is named after an African American folk hero laborer. 
6 To be sure, “sissy” in English-speaking, Western culture is a derogatory term for 
an effeminate (i.e., stereotypically gay) man and not applied to women. 
7 This is, of course, the defnition of a “hate crime.” What distinguishes it from 
an apparently identical act is its vindictive or—in the Foucauldian sense—
disciplinary intent. 
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6 Dignity of woman 
From misogyny to sex-traffcking 
I have sought to demonstrate in the preceding chapter how heteronorma-
tivity structures the perception of who deserves dignity and what is devi-
ant in terms of sexual desires in most African patriarchal societies. What
I have said of the violence of normative categorization regarding sexual
orientation also goes for gender difference. In the thinking of most peo-
ple in traditional patriarchal societies, dignity is not what every individual
possesses by virtue of being human; it is what society confers upon people.
As a result, respect for an individual’s moral sphere is contingent on the
society’s sociocultural or religious institutions. One therefore has dignity
if one was good, and one was good if one passed the muster set by society.
However, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has a con-
trary opinion and states that the individual already possesses dignity by
the grace of being a human being—and if they have dignity, then they have
rights. Dignity is not contingent on moral probity. I have consistently ar-
gued from the assumption that dignity is inherent in a person and that each
community must provide enabling conditions for the fourishing of indi-
viduals regardless of their ethnicity, religious belief, sexual orientation, or
any other marker of difference. This chapter enhances my line of thinking
with a focus on the most basic and intimate of social structures: that of the
relationship between man and woman in marriage. It states that the dignity
of woman is simple: She determines what happens to her body in the same
way that a man does. 
In “Throwing Like a Girl,” American philosopher Iris Marion Young
(1980:140) argues that patriarchal and sexist societies disable women’s bod-
ies. The disability has nothing to do with the inborn capabilities of these
bodies; it has everything to do with a “set of structures and conditions
which delimit the typical situation of being a woman in a particular so-
ciety.” Some of these disabling structures include norms, expectations of
how a woman ought to behave, the traditional role of women, and rules
of propriety; they “operate to produce in many women a greater or lesser
feeling of incapacity, frustration, and self-consciousness” (144). Eventually,
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begin to police and censure themselves lest they be seen as improper and
deviant. They comport or shrink themselves to the socially desired stature.
Young states that: 
The culture and society in which the female person dwells defnes 
woman as Other, as the inessential correlate to man, as mere object and 
immanence. Woman is thereby both culturally and socially denied by 
the subjectivity, autonomy, and creativity which are defnitive of being 
human and which in patriarchal society are accorded the man. 
(141) 
Young’s insightful observation about women in patriarchal and sexist so-
cieties helps us frame the lead questions for a proper understanding of 
the central argument in this chapter. How does the patriarchal order deny 
women’s bodies justice? We can make a provisional, fairly obvious proposi-
tion: a system that is designed to enhance a particular form of bodies at the 
expense of others considers the advantaged bodies as deserving of dignity, 
and others less so. Those bodies that beneft from the system have no incen-
tive in dismantling it. On the contrary, they exploit the system to their own 
beneft. If for example a man lives in a system that grants men the permis-
sion to marry many wives, he can easily fnd an excuse to ignore the feelings 
of his female partner because women do not deserve consideration in the 
frst place. Sadly, this disabling mechanism of society takes place most pro-
nouncedly in the family. 
Until recently, scholarship on African literature has focused on postco-
lonial concerns. Both the literary world and analyses of them have largely 
been addressed to the center of the empire. The consequence of the “write-
back” literary and cultural attention has been the neglect of pressing moral 
issues that have no direct bearing on the empire. One of the neglected areas 
has been the condition of women in African societies. The assumption has 
been that feminism is a Western thing while Africa has far more egregious 
problems arising from neocolonialism, and until Africa is free, dissipating 
attention elsewhere could be counterproductive. 
African women writers today are no longer ready to take the backseat in 
matters of moral and existential relevance about them; they no longer doc-
ilely accept a system that has no place for their dignity. They alert us to the 
pain and anguish such arrangements infict on them and, therefore, on their 
moral spheres and their dignity. The truth though is that women writers have 
always believed that their bodies deserved as much care and attention as the 
national issues that decolonial and postcolonial discourses were concerned 
with. They have simply not attracted as much ethically informed scholarly 
attention as they deserve. In this chapter, I consider three novels by women 
that engage with the situation of women in a manner that provokes intro-
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The Joys of Motherhood, Mariama Bâ’s So Long a Letter, and Adebayo Ad-
eyemi’s Stay With Me. In the belief that the encroachment in people’s moral 
sphere is already a human rights infringement, I pay particular attention to 
moments when women fnd their dignity as humans ignored. I conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of the phenomenon of sex-traffcking as a form of 
modern-day slavery and therefore an abuse of human rights. 
Slavery as a metaphor of the condition of women 
The Joys of Motherhood is a satirical presentation of the condition of women
as a means to the goals of patriarchal society’s conception of self. In Igbo
society in which the story is set, women are not considered to be valuable in
themselves; rather, they are so only to the degree they serve society—that is,
men. The story is about Nnu Ego’s journey into marriage and motherhood:
two spheres of life that are thought to convey meaning and fulfllment to
Igbo women’s lives. She has two successive marriages and is hardly happy
in either. The frst one collapses because she cannot conceive, whereas her
co-wife, the second wife of her husband, does. She eventually abandons
that marriage and returns to her father’s house. Her second marriage is
different. She conceives and bears a child and therefore gains the respect of
her world. She goes on to have six children, to whom she dedicates her life,
but their world is no longer controlled exclusively by the traditional econ-
omy. Her children pursue their own lives, some of them marrying partners
of different ethnicities while some leave for overseas. She dies in old age,
poor, and abandoned by her children. In the end, the much-touted joys of
motherhood turn out to be the sorrows of being a woman in traditional
Igbo society. 
Emecheta’s concern is to present the condition of women in her native pa-
triarchal society, but she is also conscious of the baggage of feminism in the 
West and African scholars’ decolonial politics of the time. She is therefore 
careful to present nuances in her own brand of feminism, stating that she is 
a feminist with a small “f” and is much more occupied with minor details 
of women’s lives than with global issues (Emecheta 1988:173–185). I under-
stand Emecheta’s goal to be to expose the environment that makes the abuse 
of women not only possible but also seemingly inevitable. By refusing to 
engage in the ideological fghts of her time, but rather in what Ndebele has 
characterized as the “rediscovery of the ordinary,” she exposes the condi-
tions that stife the lives of women in that culture and allows us to judge that 
world in relation to universal moral frameworks. Literary scholar Maggi 
Phillips (1994:90) suggests that The Joys of Motherhood illustrates 
…the social dead-ends constructed against women caught between the
two incompatible value systems of rural Africa and urban colonialism […]
the novel cries out against the construction of Nnu Ego’s selfhood … [it is
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I concur with Phillips’s reading of Emecheta as exposing “the social dead-ends”
to which women are subjected in traditional Igbo society. Indeed, Emecheta
deploys the trope of slavery to explore the fate of women in her narrative. Nnu
Ego is the reincarnation of the slave woman, who was buried alive with her
owner, Agunwa, the frst wife of Agbadi, Nnu Ego’s father. Understanding the
context of the slave’s death can help us analyze the import of the narrative that
Emecheta has crafted. It is customary for a slave to be buried with his or her
owner so that the owner will not be alone in the next world. When Agunwa is
to be buried with all the honors that belong to a “complete woman,” that is, a
woman who has served her husband well by giving him heirs, 
her personal slave was ceremoniously called in a loud voice by the med-
icine man: she must be laid inside the grave frst. A good slave was sup-
posed to jump into the grave willingly, happy to accompany her mistress 
[i.e., owner]; but this young and beautiful woman did not wish to die yet. 
(Emecheta 1979:23) 
The slave begs for her life. Agunwa’s eldest son is offended and angrily asks, 
“So my mother does not even deserve a decent burial? Now we are not 
to send her slave down with her, just because the girl is beautiful?” So 
saying, he gave the woman a sharp blow with the head of the cutlass he 
was carrying. “Go down like a good slave!” he shouted. 
(23) 
Agbadi intervenes, but not to prevent the slave from following her owner 
into the grave. Instead, he does so to prevent the slave from being humili-
ated before she willingly joins her owner in the grave. Before she does that 
she thanks Agbadi for showing some care and promises him to come back 
to his household. Then another relative of the dead woman “gave her a fnal 
blow to the head, and at last she fell into the grave, silenced forever” (23). 
Ona, Agbadi’s mistress who is pregnant at the time of the killing of the slave, 
gives birth to Nnu Ego, the novel’s protagonist, and “it was noticed that 
there was a lump on her head.” The medicine man divined that the “child 
is the slave woman who died with [Agbadi’s] senior wife, Agunwa” (27). It is 
therefore safe to state that the story is about the second coming of the slave. 
Maggi Phillips (1994:94) contends that 
Nnu Ego’s spiritual companion and guide, an elaborated slave woman 
chi, enables Emecheta to write two histories in a single character, or, 
presumably from an Igbo perspective, to tell the story of the complete 
woman which includes her revenging and yet sympathetic chi. 
Nnu Ego is a reincarnation of the slave woman. Sadly, this second coming 
does not augur well for the women in that culture. The slave does not come 
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back to life as anything other than a woman; she comes back to suffer, but 
in a slightly more “acceptable” format. Her fate is still the same, and she 
experiences the same suffering, self-sacrifce, and ignominious death. What 
Nnu Ego and the slave have in common therefore is the ease with which they 
are disposed of once they have served their purpose, a practice that speaks 
to their society’s conception of them in utilitarian paradigms. Unlike men, 
women, like slaves, have no independent existence; their existence is con-
tingent upon that of the masters of their world. Nor do they have acknowl-
edged desires; again they are there only to serve the desires of their masters. 
Nnu Ego becomes a metaphor for the condition of all women as slaves 
in a culture whose paradigms are dictated by patriarchal values and the 
degree to which women are useful. It is therefore not surprising that as soon 
as her father sets his eye on her shortly after her birth, he declares out of 
joy, “This child is priceless, more than twenty bags of cowries. I think that 
should really be her name, because she is a beauty and she is mine. Yes, ‘Nnu 
Ego’ twenty bags of cowries” (Emecheta 1979:26). These words might have 
been uttered in a harmless manner, yet they suggest the subordinate value 
of the newly born child as a girl. No one could ever make such utterance 
at the birth of a boy. Boys cannot be measured in monetary terms because 
their values are innate in them as future men; they are those who attribute 
value to others and to things. As Louise O’Brien reminds us, “in traditional 
culture, women are defned frstly by the men in their lives: initially by their 
fathers, then their husbands, then their sons. They are defned secondly by 
their sexuality and their maternity” (O’Brien 2001:96). It is, therefore, un-
surprising that Agbadi is particularly happy to have transferred his prized 
commodity intact to Amataokwu, the next owner. He declares his pride in 
this feat just in the same way he had at Nnu Ego’s birth. “My daughter has 
been found an unspoiled virgin. Her husband’s people are here to thank us” 
(Emecheta 1979:31). 
Amataokwu (Nnu Ego’s husband) and her people bring kegs of palm wine 
to express their gratitude to Agbadi for the fact that Nnu Ego has been found 
to be a virgin by her husband. The ritual surrounding virginity can be seen 
as a full stamp of ownership by the new husband. Nnu Ego had not “given 
herself” to another person; that is, she has not exercised the full ownership 
of her body because, strictly speaking, her body does not belong to her; it 
belongs to society and the men of the society guard and guide it. The people 
have a proverb on virginity and the ease of childbearing: “When a woman is 
virtuous, it is easy for her to conceive” (31). We recall the social function of 
myth as enforcing social hierarchy (Chapter 3). 
Nnu Ego’s marriage to and membership in Amataokwu’s household is 
contingent upon her ability to produce children—that is, her ability to act 
as a channel through which children, especially males, come into the world. 
She is judged only to the degree that she is useful, frst to her father because 
she will fetch twenty bags of cowries, and second, she will be useful to her 
husband because she will produce children. Nnu Ego is not seen for her in-
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a slave. All of this portrays a culture that ties the dignity of women to their 
utility in society. A woman, like a slave, is worthy of respect only to the de-
gree she fulflls the goals that society has ordained for her. 
Chapter 10, “A Man Needs Many Wives,” depicts the fate of Nnu Ego as a 
good slave, since she is, after all, a reincarnated slave woman. Just as a mas-
ter needs many slaves, so does a man in an African traditional culture need 
many wives. The chapter documents the climax of Nnu Ego’s suffering as 
her second husband, Nnaife, is set to “inherit” Adaku, the wife of his dead 
brother. Nnu Ego dreads the prospect of this coming to pass. She “could not 
believe her eyes when she came home from market one afternoon to see this 
young woman sitting by their doorstep, with a four-year-old girl sleeping on 
her knees” (117–118). Nnu Ego is powerless to prevent this humiliating de-
velopment. Of course, the culture does not see it as humiliation; it sees it as 
normal, a way of assuring that society functions. Yet, in doing so, it allows 
no place for the feelings of women as human beings. 
Nnu Ego accepts her condition, knowing that her father could not come
to her help. He would tell her, “Listen, daughter, I have seven wives of
my own. I married three of them, four I inherited on the deaths of rela-
tives. Your mother was only a mistress who refused to marry me” (119).
The notion of inheriting a woman is a cultural given in Igbo society. It
is harmless considered from the patriarchal perspective because it was
instituted for the good of men and society. However, from the perspective
of women living in the knowledge that they are transferrable from one
man to another without their free consent, it is no less than living in the
knowledge that one has no dignity. Perversely, the condition of women
created within the parameters of patriarchy is such that some women are
grateful to be inherited. Adaku is not perturbed by her fate; she appears
happy to be Nnaife’s second wife. She even goes on to assure Nnu Ego
of her loyalty and cooperation in the new dispensation (Emecheta 1979,
118). In my discussion of Okparanta’s Under the Udala Tree in Chapter 5,
I noted Ijeoma’s observation of the self-deprecation in her mother’s desire
for her (Ijeoma) to get herself a man because women are nothing without
men by their sides. The same strain of self-deprecation can be observed in
Adaku’s eagerness to be the second wife of Nnaife. However, we must not
forget the condition that obligates women to such self-defeatist attitude to
life. They had, indeed, already been defeated by the culture that foresees
no autonomy for them. 
To drive home the indignity surrounding the condition of women in that 
culture, Emecheta allows us a deeper glimpse in Nnu Ego’s feelings, espe-
cially when it is time for Nnaife and Adaku to consummate their marriage. 
Nnu Ego fought back tears as she prepared her own bed for Nnaife 
and Adaku. It was a good thing she was determined to play the role of 
the mature senior wife; she was not going to give herself any heartache 
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Yet Nnu Ego does worry, and the obvious sound of the sexual intercourse 
taking place in the same room unsettles her as it would most people with any 
self-esteem. “Nnu Ego bit her teeth into her baby’s night clothes to prevent 
herself from screaming” (125). 
As Shivaji Sengupta (1996:228) argues, Emecheta is well aware of the link
between sexuality and motherhood; for Emecheta, she states, “being a mother
should not be the only reason for women’s existence.… Emecheta shows how
women themselves adopt the ideals of motherhood created by men, fall into
their traps, and are eventually destroyed.” Besides Nnu Ego’s humiliating
pain of being in the same room while her co-wife and her husband are having
sex, Nnu Ego’s judgment of the condition of women in other instances speaks
volumes. When she gives birth to twin daughters, she feels inadequate be-
cause they are not boys. That incident is an opportunity to ruminate on the
condition of women as means to society’s end and not as ends in themselves.
She asks, “God, when will you create a woman who will be fulflled in herself,
a full human being, not anybody’s appendage?” (Emecheta 1979:186). 
For the frst time in the narrative we get a complete view of Nnu Ego’s 
perception of self as trapped in her gender and her wish that humans of 
her gender could attain the rights and dignity due to every human being. 
Seen within the contours of human rights as they have been established by 
UDHR, Emecheta states her conception of human dignity and autonomy 
in her protagonist’s mouth. Nnu Ego states further: “I am a prisoner of my 
own fesh and blood. Is it such an enviable position? The men make it look as 
if we must aspire for children or die” (187). Emecheta has rightly identifed 
the issue with women and human rights in patriarchal and sexist contexts. 
It is simply that women are not considered as autonomous beings; they are 
seen only through the prism of utility. 
Toward the twilight of her years, Nnu Ego travels back to Ibuza, to her 
natal home, where she lives alone and without the care of her children—
especially not her sons. She wanders the village thinking of her sons, who 
are in America and Canada. 
After such wandering on one night, Nnu Ego lay down by the roadside, 
thinking she had arrived home. She died quietly there with no child to 
hold her hand and no friend to talk to her. She had never really made 
many friends, so busy had she been building up her joys as a mother. 
(224) 
Katherine Fishburn (1995:106) makes an illuminating judgment, regarding 
the feminist thrust of The Joys of Motherhood: “Of all Emecheta’s heroines, 
Nnu Ego seems most capable of generating sympathetic support from West-
ern feminists.” I am not sure Emecheta would be happy to learn that her 
character has attracted sympathetic support from Western feminists. In-
deed, she seems to consciously distance herself from the notion that she 
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To be sure, Emecheta’s denial of Western feminist infuence is fraught with
concerns. Fishburn highlights one of the passages that have engendered two
divergent interpretations from the author and her characters. At Nnu Ego’s
death, the villagers say of motherhood, “the joy of being a mother was the
joy of giving all to your children” (Emecheta 1979:224). Fishburn wonders
whether the villagers’ statement isn’t “the narrator’s ironic commentary on
motherhood” (Fishburn 1995:105). Yet Emecheta appears to debunk this in
her biography in which she equates the joys of motherhood in the novel with
“a beautiful burial” (105). Fishburn’s assessment is insightful and accurate,
and she captures Emecheta’s dilemma about feminism that I have referred to
at the beginning of this chapter. In her already cited essay, “Feminism with
a Small ‘f’!” Emecheta claims that in many cases polygamy can be liberating
to the woman, rather than inhibiting her” (Emecheta 1988:179). This position
does not add up, especially considering the detailed narration of Nnu Ego’s
anguish. In her analysis of Emecheta’s novel Kehinde, Pauline Ada Uwakwe
(1996:399) casts doubt on Emecheta’s claim that polygamy could be benefcial
to women who live in it. She writes, “If Kehinde is meant to illustrate the pos-
itive aspects of polygamy, Emecheta’s depiction of the protagonist reveals a
tension between her feminism and her allegiance to African culture.” 
Perhaps, Emechata’s hesitancy about feminism has to do with the state 
of global politics of feminism in the later part of the twentieth century. 
Emecheta does not want to be at the wrong end of postcolonial politics, and 
there’s no doubt that authors have legitimate right to interpret their world. 
My reading of The Joys of Motherhood, however, relies on the contexts and 
the self-assessment of the characters. I take Nnu Ego’s words and feelings 
seriously. I take seriously the contexts of the lives of women whose existence 
is overdetermined by the structures set up by men and which foresee no dig-
nity for women. As Marie Umeh (1996:xxiv) has rightly observed, “Emeche-
ta’s women for the most part are sacrifced at the altar of male-oriented 
society, and men exploit the sex-gender system to maintain dominance.” 
The truth is that Nnu Ego’s condition appeals to all who have some de-
gree of co-feeling for their fellows. Like Flora Nwapa before her, Emecheta 
is good at painting the ordinary details of women’s lives and allowing them 
to speak for themselves. Neerja Chand (2005:49) states that “Emecheta’s 
unique contribution to world literature lies in her commitment to the rep-
resentation of women’s life stories in order to draw attention to the prob-
lematic of inegalitarian gender and class relations that cut across racial and 
geographical boundaries.” In my judgment though, Emecheta’s main con-
tribution lies in exposing the conditions that enable the abuse of women’s 
human rights, by denying them dignity and autonomy. It is not surprising 
that Emecheta, together with her countrywoman Flora Nwapa, is consid-
ered a pioneering feminist writer in Africa. Mariama Bâ rightly belongs to 
that pioneering group of women writers who are concerned about women’s 
dignity. In the next section, I discuss her engagement with the environment 
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Woman in quest for justice 
One of the questions I raised in the preceding section about determining the 
context of human rights abuse is: who is responsible for the abuse? Whereas 
Emecheta is very good at painting the picture of the environment of abuse, 
Mariama Bâ does not hesitate in establishing the agent responsible for the 
loss of women’s dignity and therefore make it diffcult for women to experi-
ence justice. So Long a Letter is an epistolary novel that recounts the story 
of Ramatoulaye, whose husband of thirty years marries a younger woman 
and dies shortly thereafter, leaving Ramatoulaye to deal with the pain of 
abandonment in poverty. The novel explores the emotional pain and strug-
gle of women living in a polygamous marriage, situating in particular two 
women, Ramatoulaye and Aissatou, whose husbands married second wives; 
while Ramatoulaye decides to stay in the marriage, Aissatou divorces her 
husband. Whereas it is expedient to point out the conditions that militate 
against women’s agency and dignity, of equal importance is the question of 
how women can assert their dignity. My discussion therefore focuses essen-
tially on the two women’s perception of their world and themselves. 
In “‘A Feminist Just like Us?’ Teaching Mariama Bâ’s So Long a Letter,”
John Champagne (1996:30) discusses the novel as, among other things, a 
feminist novel. “Ramatoulaye’s understanding of feminism,” he argues, “is 
particularly indebted to universalist ideology.” Omofolabo Ajayi (1997:35) 
writes: “With her frst novel, So Long a Letter, Mariama Bâ achieved a repu-
tation as a writer who adds a strong, unique, and culturally relevant feminist 
voice to modern African literature.” Ada Uzoamaka Azodo (2003) frames 
So Long a Letter as a pioneer text in African feminist thought, while Gibreel 
Kamara (2001:213) argues that in Bâ: “Black women do not see Black men as 
the enemy. In fact, African and African American feminist critics do realize 
that the issues confronting Africa, including the problems the woman faces, 
require the efforts of both genders.” 
Almost all important commentary on Bâ’s works highlights their feminist 
thrust and seems eager to make a fne difference between Bâ and Western 
feminists, while others underscore Ba’s universal appeal. I belong to this 
latter camp, and my reason for this is rooted in Bâ’s humanistic and sophis-
ticated appeal to the thorny issue of women’s subjugation. In his perceptive 
article on Mariama Bâ’s works, “One Wife Be for One Man: Mariama Bâ’s 
Doctrine for Matrimony,” J. O. J. Nwachukwu-Agbada (1991:564) makes 
a strong case that Bâ’s concern in her novels is about the “humiliation of 
women” by the institution of polygyny. “None of her major female char-
acters accepts it, and where it appears some of them do, it is because of 
the blind alley in which they fnd themselves—the confnes of marriage or 
the limited opportunities available to them out-side of it.” I concur with 
Nwachukwu-Agbada and argue that Bâ draws attention to indignities vis-
ited on women and their general lack of rights; she also suggests how wom-
en’s rights could be restored. 
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A close reading of the novel reveals something unique about Mariama Bâ. 
She is of course not a feminist in the conventional, radical Western under-
standing. In many instances, she (Ramatoulaye) seems supportive of con-
servative institutions that constrict women’s autonomy. Yet she is aware of 
the injustice that women suffer under those institutions. She does not launch 
a frontal attack on polygamy, and, as Nwachukwu Agbada has stated, she is 
undeniably against the indignities it subjects women to. Ramatoulaye seems 
to be particularly stung by the sheer lack of consideration on Modou’s part 
in their marriage. She accuses him of betrayal, of being unfair to her. 
With consternation, I measure the extent of Modou’s betrayal. His 
abandonment of his frst family (myself and my children) was the out-
come of the choice of a new life. He rejected us. He mapped out his 
future without taking us into account. 
(Bâ 1981:9) 
Betrayal is a privation, a deviation from what is normal. Ramatoulaye’s dis-
appointment is rooted in her self-understanding as deserving of elementary 
consideration from the person with whom she had shared her most intimate 
parts of herself: her secrets and her trust. Betrayal of trust might not meas-
ure up to what one could call human rights abuses. Indeed, Modou has not 
done anything that the culture does not permit. That, however, does not 
diminish Ramatoulaye’s feeling of disappointment and of being wronged. 
On the contrary, it points to a deeper issue rooted in ordinary virtues, in the 
simple difference between fairness and unfairness. 
In the introductory chapter, I discussed Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt’s insist-
ence that we understand human rights as being exercised in places close to 
where humans live. She asks: “Where, after all, do universal rights begin? 
In small places, close to home—so close and so small that they cannot be 
seen on any maps of the world” (Horton 2007). Roosevelt is well aware of 
the inescapable link between the violation of trust in the intimate environ-
ment of the household as in society; she knows that ordinary virtues are pre-
requisite for universal human rights. We see this link play out on a deeper 
level in Modou’s disregard for Ramatoulaye. He mortgages the house he 
co-owned with Ramatoulaye in order to secure a bank loan, which he uses 
to build a new house for the new mother in-law. Ramatoulaye comments: 
“Although the title deeds of this house bear his name, it is nonetheless our 
common property, acquired by our joint savings. Insult upon injury!” (Bâ 
1981:10). In mortgaging their common house to fnance his libidinal fan-
cies, Modou goes against the moral framework that Ramatoulaye had taken 
for granted in the three decades of their marriage. In secretly marrying the 
young woman, Binetou, Modou treats Ramatoulaye as readily dispensable. 
It is instructive that Ramatoulaye is not attacking any established institu-
tion. As much as she is not against polygamy, she seems to challenge Modou 
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her position, before he makes any of his decisions supposedly supported by 
tradition. She seems to suggest that if the practice of polygamy were to fall 
apart, it would be brought about by men who value the ordinary virtues in 
regard to women. 
Ramatoulaye poses several questions that underscore the depth of her 
disappointment. “Was it madness, weakness, irresistible love? What inner 
confusion led Modou Fall to marry Binetou?” (11). As much as she is con-
cerned about herself as a person with dignity, her questions are directed at 
their (Ramatoulaye and Modou) common investment, their humanity. She 
concludes the many questions by revealing a hint of remorse and her own 
assessment of the state of affairs. 
And to think that I loved this man passionately, to think that I gave 
him thirty years of my life, to think that twelve times over I carried his 
child. The addition of a rival to my life was not enough for him. In lov-
ing someone else, he burned his past, both morally and materially. He 
dared to commit such an act of disavowal. 
(12) 
Of critical importance is that Ramatoulaye judges Modou in moral terms
and specifcally in the standards established by both of them: respect for
their common humanity in which they have long invested. Modou’s rela-
tionship to Ramatoulaye is, indeed, tinged with violence. There is, to be
sure, no obvious sign of physical violence, yet Modou has not finched
at pulling all the registers of power and privilege open to him as a man
in that society to his advantage and at the detriment of his wife of thirty
years. Like Nnu Ego in The Joys of Motherhood, Ramatoulaye becomes a
body that has served its purpose and can therefore be easily disposed of.
Indeed, the seed of injustice was sown in the system that made it possi-
ble for Modou to ignore the pain his actions and decisions infict on her.
Thus, while Bâ recognizes the active agent responsible for the abuse of
women’s rights, like Emecheta she also exposes the conditions that enable
the abuse. 
Whereas Ramatoulaye is too restrained to center her argument for dig-
nity on herself, her friend Aissatou is not. When her husband Mawdo mar-
ries another woman he expects Aissatou to remain in the marriage, but she 
does not want to be part of that. She writes her husband a letter that under-
lines her heightened awareness of herself as a human who would not allow 
society or any person to infringe upon her dignity. In the last paragraph of 
the letter she writes, “I am stripping myself of your love, your name. Clothed 
in my dignity, the only worthy garment, I go my way” (32). 
It is signifcant that Aissatou mentions the word dignity, which she de-
mands from society no more than what she expects from herself. In empha-
sizing her dignity, she ends the condition that would rob her of her rights. 
In her, Bâ seems to suggest that she who wants others to become aware of 
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her dignity must frst of all demand it of herself. This is indeed how Rama-
toulaye regains the awareness of her dignity. After the prescribed forty-day 
period of mourning her husband, some of the men she had known begin to 
seek her hand in marriage as their second wife. Her deceased husband’s el-
der brother Tamsir wants to assert his authority in inheriting her: “You are 
my good luck. I shall marry you. I prefer you to the other one [her younger 
co-wife], too frivolous, too young” (57). By highlighting Tamsir’s reference 
to his luck in inhering her younger brother’s wife, Ramatoulaye makes us 
understand how women are seen in that society, and she appears to take joy 
in the power that she has discovered. That power lies in her realization that 
women have agency; they have voice. She does not hold back her feelings 
from Tamsir: 
Ah, yes! Your strategy is to get in before any other suitor, to get in before 
Mawdo, the faithful friend, who has more qualities than you and who 
also, according to custom, can inherit the wife. You forget that I have a 
heart, a mind, that I am not an object to be passed from hand to hand. 
(58) 
What Aissatou calls dignity, Ramatoulaye calls “voice.” It is all about the 
condition that underscores an individual human’s autonomy, her right to 
her body as belonging exclusively to her. This, I think, is the fundamental 
assumption of human rights, an assumption on which all others rest. 
Human rights in the ordinary facts of life 
Ramatoulaye’s words about her having a heart and a mind and her not being 
an object provide a background against which we can understand the plight 
of the protagonist in Ayobami Adebayo’s novel, Stay with Me. Adebayo is 
a third-generation Nigerian female writer, who, like Chimamanda Ngozi 
Adichie, Lola Shoneyin, and other better-known contemporary women 
writers, is called an heir to Emecheta and Mariama Bâ. In Stay with Me
(Adebayo 2017) which is set in Nigeria, Akin and Yejide are ostensibly in a 
loving marriage. Yejide is distressed because of her failure to conceive after 
years of marriage. Her mother-in-law arranges a new wife for Akin, but he 
is incapable of consummating the marriage (Yejide does not know this be-
cause she has no understanding of sexual intercourse between a man and a 
woman). Akin then arranges for Dotun, his younger brother, to impregnate 
her. However, the frst two children born as a result of Yejide’s liaison with 
Dotun die in childhood, leaving Yejide racked with guilt over her acts of 
infdelity. After learning from Dotun that his sexual involvement with her 
was instigated by Akin, Yejide feels betrayed by Akin. When her third child, 
Rotimi, becomes sick, Yejide leaves Akin in the belief that her third child, 
Rotimi, will die too, but she does not die; she survives, and Yejide must then 






148 Women’s dignity, misogyny, sex-traffcking 
Even a casual reading of the story reveals the operative principle in the 
relationship between persons in that culture as in the others we have con-
sidered thus far: Much of it is seen through the prism of instrumentality, 
and this applies specifcally to women. A woman exists to produce children; 
anything short of that renders her useless. Their abuse is therefore already 
programmed in the use to which they are put. 
The issue of childless marriages has occupied African women’s writing 
from the pioneering work of Flora Nwapa’s Efuru (1966) to an early-twenty-
frst-century exemplar of Lola Shoneyin, The Secret Lives of Baba Segi’s 
Wives (2010). Childlessness in marriage is seen as a curse; in almost all cases, 
the woman is thought to be the cause of the issue. My interest in Adebayo’s 
Stay with Me is to the degree that it raises profound ethical questions about 
the dignity of women in marriage, especially in such instances as childless-
ness. More pointedly, it is the question of the value of woman’s body to 
her family. Do men and women occupy an equal ethical and political space 
within a family? 
The narrative chronicles series of humiliating incidents that Yejide ex-
periences because her community considers her body to be defcient. As a 
woman in a patriarchal society, she knows that her body does not possess 
the same value as her husband’s. The inferior position her body occupies 
allows people to make judgments about it and determine the use to which it 
must be put. This condition rankles her. She complains, “A number of my 
in-laws had been in our home previously to discuss the same issue. Discus-
sion being: they talked and I listened while on my knees” (Adebayo 2017:7).
Yejide’s sarcastic tone is diffcult to ignore. In it, she ridicules other people’s 
meddling in her marriage and their claim to know her intimate life better 
than she does. In denying her freedom of speech, they give her to under-
stand that she has no autonomy and agency. 
It helps to consider Martin Buber’s notion of an “I-Thou” relationship 
in order to judge Yejide’s condition. Buber differentiates between experi-
ence and relation. One experiences the world of things but stands in rela-
tion to the world of humans. When we relate to people, we cease to see 
them through the lens of utility; rather, we begin to understand that they 
make our existence whole (Buber 1970:50). Relation is not one-way; it is rec-
iprocity, and reciprocity recognizes the dignity of the other. Experience, for 
Buber, is “remoteness from you,” but relation reduces that remoteness (60). 
If the remoteness between me and you is nullifed, there is then the possi-
bility of encounter, which is the basis of actual life and justice (Adebayo 
2017:62). In this encounter, the individual, ‘I,’ could meet the other, Thou, as 
“my You.” The phrase “my You” seeks to present the other, who is otherwise 
an indifferent “You,” as very close to the subjectivity of ‘I’ so that there is no 
longer an estranging distance caused by abstractions such as ideology. The 
result is then the I–Thou rather than the I–It relationship. 
The type of relationship that Buber speaks of is obviously lacking in 
Yejide and Akin’s marriage. The reason for that lack is to be sought in the 
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contexts or the cultural assumptions that foresee a woman not as a “Thou” 
in marriage but as an “It,” a means that serves her society’s teleology. All 
this while Yejide is seen by her world only through that prism; they therefore 
do not consider her as possessing subjectivity and dignity. This condition af-
fects Yejide’s comportment. She describes the smile she wears when she joins 
her husband in the sitting room where his people are gathered to talk about 
her marriage to Akin. It is a smile that says, “Even though you old people 
know nothing about my marriage, I am delighted, no, ecstatic to hear all the 
important things you have to say about it. After all, I am a good wife” (8). 
Her emphasis on her smile alerts the reader to both her desire to speak and 
the impossibility of doing so. Her sarcastic use of the phrase “good wife” 
draws attention to the uses to which women are put. A good woman, like a 
good slave, is one who has no opinion, no desires, and one who serves her 
society’s teleology. 
The ultimate humiliation of Yejide’s body is that even though the reason 
for her inability to conceive lies with Akin, she is still viewed as the cause of 
the problem, and women are paraded before Akin to be made pregnant— 
that is, to be conferred with meaning, and as a man, Akin is the ultimate 
dispenser of meaning (read: justice). Since Yejide is “proven” to be unsatis-
factory, Akin’s mother arranges for a second wife, Funmi. The goal is, of 
course, to ensure that Akin produces a child, preferably a boy, to carry on 
the family name. She and Yejide are simply the means to that predetermined 
end. Ironically, and typically of oppressed people, the condition to which 
both women have been subjected engenders unfair competition and hatred 
between them while Akin pretends to be above the fray. In painting these 
characters who are denied speech by their world, especially in matters relat-
ing to their bodies, Adebayo has constructed a microcosm of the political 
condition of her society in which the privileged and the underprivileged, 
those who have a voice and the voiceless, exist in parallel universes even 
within the same spatial economy. This does not of course mean that her nar-
rative is allegorical; it is rather a portrayal of the human condition in a way 
that initiates an act of interpretive engagement that allows us to determine 
the possibility of realizing human rights and dignity in that home. 
According to tradition, the second wife of a man in a polygamous mar-
riage ingratiates herself to the frst wife so that the frst wife can create a 
space for her in the life of their common husband. But each time Funmi 
seeks to do so, calling Yejide “mother,” Yejide fnds both of them dimin-
ished, and she never hides her contempt for Funmi (30–31). Because Yejide 
has no social or legal mechanism for fghting the condition that erodes her 
dignity, she falls back on what she believes is a proven means through which 
women assert themselves in African patriarchal societies such as hers: “I 
simply had to get pregnant, as soon as possible, and before Funmi did. It 
was the only way I could be sure I would stay in Akin’s life” (38). Becoming 
pregnant increases a woman’s stake in a man’s life and giving birth to a male 
child doubles her worth as a human being (56). The situation thus reduces 
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her to a tool and therefore increases the value and power of the man. The 
profound ethical issue here is that of dignity and with it, rights. If all hu-
mans are equal in dignity, why then is Yejide denied a voice and why is she 
considered only as a means to an end? 
Thus far, in the ordinary practices of the everyday, Adebayo seeks to 
achieve the political goal of placing individuals at the core of interactions 
in society and thereby assert that they should be taken as ends, not means. 
Here, consideration of the feelings of individuals replaces any ideology that 
is thought to serve society. Eventually, we learn that all this is played out 
against the background of military coups and political turmoil (94). It is 
important for our understanding of dignity that Adebayo does not make the 
spectacle of the military regime the centerpiece of the narrative. Instead, 
she enables us to raise questions about the society’s relationship to its vul-
nerable, less privileged members. We see the parallel between the denial of 
dignity and the objectifcation of life in a society ruled by the military and 
one rooted in tradition and ruled by abstract principles. 
I return to the irony of Yejide abandoning Rotimi in the belief that she, 
too, would die like the other two children. Adebayo does not intend Ye-
jide to be perceived as just a victim. Yejide consented to an affair with her 
brother-in-law. She too owes recognition to others. However, the twist in the 
narrative, in regard to dignity, is that she is given that which she sorely needs 
but has been denied to others. When she returns to Akin to attend Akin’s 
father’s burial, she is shocked to learn that Rotimi, her daughter, is alive; 
Rotimi draws her into her arms and calls her Moomi, a Yoruba endearment 
for mother. It is of profound moral signifcance that Rotimi recognizes her 
mother in such an endearing format, given that Yejide had abandoned her. 
Yejide is overwhelmed by the joy of affrmation and recognition (270). 
One of the important scenes in Stay with Me is when Rotimi bonds with 
Akin (222). Akin happily narrates 
one morning she (Rotimi) looked up at me one fst between her chin as 
though she was pondering what she was about to say and said, “Baba.” 
She said it two more times before she went back to sleep, as if she knew 
that I needed to hear the word again. 
(223) 
This moment of encounter encapsulates the most important ethical insight 
in Stay with Me. The child with sickle cell anemia does not die; she stays 
with the man who is not her father and, in calling him father, affrms him, 
just as he has affrmed her. This mutual affrmation provides us the best ex-
ample of affrmation of dignity rooted in the ordinary recognition devoid of 
utilitarian considerations. Both of them confer to each other what Akin and 
Yejide could not confer to one another. Recognition does not necessarily 
have a biological basis; it is our admission of our natality and vulnerability 
and, consequently, our positive response to it. 
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From sexism and misogyny to sex-traffcking 
In this chapter, I have concentrated on conditions that deny women’s auton-
omy, which is essential for human rights. My discussion rested on the prem-
ise that when people are hindered from making decisions about their lives, 
their moral spheres are summarily violated. In exposing the conditions that 
perennially militate against the dignity of women, and make the abuse of 
their rights self-evident, Buchi Emecheta and Mariana Bâ paved the way for 
the subsequent generations of women writers to focus on their bodies. I have 
discussed Abayomi Adebayo as representative of the current generation of 
women writers who have continued in that tradition. 
We recall one of the central premises that underscore my argument in the 
book: Atrocities that constitute the well-known cases of abuse of human 
rights do not start with spectacular forms of violence; they all start with 
some form of gradual disregard for the other, which is nurtured in narra-
tives and are baked in prejudice. There is an easy correlation to draw be-
tween patriarchal and sexist attitudes toward women, that is, the attitude 
that considers them to be disposable on one hand and as commodities in 
sex-traffcking, on the other. As a way to conclude this chapter, I provide 
some thoughts on sex-traffcking also as a prolegomenon for future research 
on sex-traffcking as human rights abuse in Africa. 
There has been increasing awareness of the collective degradation of hu-
man dignity brought about by the resurgence of slavery. David Batstone 
(2007), professor of ethics at the University of San Francisco, sheds light 
on human-traffcking as modern-day slavery in his insightful book, Not for 
Sale. Also Mirjam van Reisen and Munyaradzi Mawere (2017) provide im-
portant information on this heinous form of human rights abuse in their 
book, Human Traffcking and Trauma in the Digital Era. 
Forms of sex slavery have always been in existence in Africa; however, 
globalization, migration, and the mass impoverishment of the populace 
have made it easier to transport (traffcking on) people against their will. 
Sex-traffcking is an aspect of human-traffcking, which the United Nations 
Offce on Drugs and Crimes (United Nations) has defned as 
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of per-
sons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a posi-
tion of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefts 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, 
for the purpose of exploitation. 
Nigerian legal scholar Ine Nnadi (2013:179) writes that sex-traffcking is 
“the fastest growing human rights violation in the world today.… In most 
cases, it involves involuntary servitude and is therefore commonly referred 
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are millions of people across the world who are still subject to slave-like 
conditions. Traffcking is the biggest and fastest means by which people are 
exploited and forced into slavery.” It is therefore one of the worst cases of 
human rights abuses and a threat to collective human dignity. 
Sex-traffcking is a worldwide epidemic. In Africa, it appears to be more 
widespread in Nigeria. According to the CNN report, Nigerian women ar-
rive to Italy in their thousands, lured in part, by the promises of Europe 
as a land of opportunities (Damon et al. 2017). Osita Ogbu reports that in 
one of the instances of the state interventions, the Nigerian security offcers 
intercepted twelve prominent businessmen suspected of traffcking thir-
teen Nigerian women for prostitution abroad at Nigeria’s Seme border with 
Benin. It was revealing that approximately 
500 of such women were practicing prostitution in Bamako, Mali, while 
more than 500 others were … in Burkina Faso. [The women had been 
tricked into believing they were] “traveling outside the country with 
promises of lucrative jobs in Europe. Once they leave, their leaders 
compel them to go into prostitution, ostensibly to fund their journey to 
Europe. Many of these women never get to the promised destination but 
are usually abandoned midway. 
(Agbu 2003:7) 
According to UNESCO (2006) report, “In Nigeria, persons are traffcked
for prostitution, to work as domestic servants, bus conductors, and street
traders. They are exploited in agricultural work, brass melting, stone digging
and scavenging” (UNESCO 27). The report outlines that some of the causes
of traffcking include “poverty, war, lack of information, gender inequality
and high demand for cheap labor [that] put demographic populations such as
women and children at high risk” (UNESCO 25). Other causes of traffcking
on girls and women include “traditional community attitudes and practices,
which tolerate violence against women” (UNESCO 32) and the “devalua-
tion of women and children’s human rights” (UNESCO 33). I am particu-
larly interested in the last of these causes, and I consider them to be of more
strategic importance. People hardly abuse what they appreciate. Slavery in
America lasted as long as it did precisely because of the modernist racist
image of black people as essentially inferior to whites. It is fair to say that the
underlining cause of these cases of gross human rights abuse is the low, or
near-absence of a sense of dignity. Telling stories about those people could
help humanize them and hence make it easier for people to relate with them. 
There have been few fctional works dealing specifcally with sex-
traffcking in Africa. Akachi Adimora-Ezeigbo’s Traffcked (2008) provides 
an important beginning for what is hoped to attract attention to sex-
traffcking in Nigeria. Indeed, the novel has attracted reviews and scholarly 
attention (Odinye 2018). I have already discussed Chika Unigwe’s On Black 
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Anglophone African Women’s Literature. I highlight it here as another sig-
nifcant example of writing on this issue. The story documents the plights 
of African bodies feeing pain and extinction. Sisi, Ama, Efe, and Joyce are 
young women from Nigeria and Sudan. They were lured to Europe not only 
by the promises of a better life. These women work as prostitutes in Belgium.
What their stories have in common is that the disregard for their bodies did 
not begin right at the point they were sold; it began, to use Eleanor Roo-
sevelt’s expression, “in small places, close to home—so close and so small 
that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world” (Horton 2007). 
The human rights situations in Africa is comparable to those in Europe in 
the eighteenth century, and which prompted responses in literature such as 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie or the New Héloïse and Samuel Richardson’s 
Pamela. Those stories, according to Lynn Hunt, inspired Europeans to be-
gin to frame their conception of liberty around the dignity of every human 
being. I hope that attention to the works of these African women writers can 
continue to highlight the abuses of women’s human rights and bring about 
greater appreciation of human dignity. 
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Conclusion 
Politics of love and the  
common good 
In the introductory chapter, I discussed Michael Ignatieff’s notion of the 
ordinary virtues, which, he argues, is a superior alternative to universal hu-
man rights campaigns. The idea of universal human rights, he states, has 
become rather too legalistic, political, and idolatrous. While admitting of 
the crucial importance of the ordinary virtues, I argued that Ignatieff comes 
close to suggesting a narrow sympathy, compared to the more expansive 
forms of solidarity envisaged by Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). However, his particularistic emotions need not be in contest with 
the UDHR; both can complement each other. Narratives, I argued, help us 
to see their compatibility. 
Martha Nussbaum’s conception of political emotions can help to further 
provide examples of the complementarity of the ordinary virtues and the 
ideals of human rights. In Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice
(2013), she asks how we can achieve and sustain a decent liberal society that 
aspires to justice and equal opportunity for all and inspires individuals to 
sacrifce for the common good. Refecting on John Rawls’s notion of justice, 
she asks: Even when you get the principles of justice or politics right, how do 
you get people to follow them? Even the most elevated principles of fairness 
such as envisaged by Rawls can be reached “by a route that tethers them to 
the particularistic imagination and to personal love, and these deep roots 
continue to infuse the principles even when we achieve them” (386). We need 
enabling emotions to not only glue us to these principles but also make them 
function for us all. Emotions such as the ones proposed by Ignatieff, in turn, 
need to be couched in the conceptions of society that go beyond tribal or 
other parochial interests. 
I fnd it of immense importance that Nussbaum speaks of liberal societies, 
which, from a twenty-frst-century perspective, are necessarily multiethnic 
and pluralistic. It therefore goes without saying that any virtue thought to 
contribute to their fourishing must be universal—that is, transcending 
boundaries and not limited to a particular group. For Nussbaum (2013:378), 
“any successful nation needs to be able to demand sacrifce for a common 
good, they had to ask how sacrifce and common effort would be possible 
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of love of the nation, or at least the notion of the common good, which 
that society stands for. To be sure, Nussbaum (382–383) recognizes that such 
emotions, 
are the real emotions of real people: because people are heterogeneous,
having different opinions, histories, and personalities, they can be ex-
pected to love, mourn, laugh, and strive for justice in specifc and personal
ways, particularly if their freedom of expression is protected and valued. 
Yet love must go beyond oneself at least because of the fact that we all live 
in societies of interdependent individuals and groups. We must “cultivate 
the ability to see full and equal humanity in another person, perhaps one 
of humanity’s most diffcult and fragile achievements” (3). Of importance 
in my discussion of Mandela and the South African effort to build a truly 
liberal society is Nussbaum’s notion of cultivation of abilities. Cultivating 
positive emotions or striving toward virtues that enhance the common good 
is indeed the ideal, and, as Nussbaum observes, “ideals are real. Even if we 
don’t attain them, they direct our search” (394). 
Nussbaum is not prescribing an overarching notion of love given that such
prescription is bound to slip into forms of fundamentalism that often charac-
terize nationalism. That love or a political conception that is thought to achieve
an “overlapping consensus among people who may have different religions and
secular views of life … had better be thin in certain ways, not making too many
controversial claims about what is ultimately worthwhile in life” (392). It is then
more important to highlight, as she does, the cultivation of the moral good, a
continuous striving toward a society governed by the principles of justice even
in the knowledge that our efforts will always be imperfect. For her, “the inner
world is relevant to normative assessment, and it makes a difference to our
conception of what we should be like as citizens, even where it doesn’t make
a difference to any actual conduct” (395–396). Nussbaum’s notion of the rel-
evance of positive emotions agrees with what Nelson Mandela had sought to
inculcate in South Africans when he insisted on the importance of empathy for
the new society (Eze 2012). I understand the South African effort to cultivate
what Nussbaum calls “a rich inner life of imaginative and emotional effort”
(Nussbaum 2013:395) as a good example of the bottom-up approach to human
rights and which deploys all the registers of the narrative to build a decent
liberal society. This works especially when the notions of the common good
and human fourishing form the foundation of imaginative and moral efforts. 
Narrating the new society 
Stories about other people achieve at least one thing: They reveal how much
we are all related as humans, how much we have in common. We expand the
horizon of our humanity to include those whom we do not yet know and even
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and that we matter. This last idea sums an important aspect of the South Af-
rican Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). As explained by Abdul-
lah Mohamed Omar, the then South African minister of justice, the TRC was
established, among other reasons, to restore “the human and civil dignity”
of victims of apartheid by “granting them an opportunity to relate their own
accounts of the violations” (Omar n.d.). The underlining assumption here is
that to tell is to feel that we belong; it is to feel affrmed by others. The act of
telling alone, which assumes a listening ear, assures the narrator that he or
she is not alone, which is already a part of the moral expectations of ubuntu. 
The TRC is positioned as the exact opposite of the apartheid ideology of
dehumanization of the non-white population. Whereas apartheid meant the
exclusion of certain humans and the suppression of truth, the TRC meant
openness to all humans and to truth. In inaugurating the TRC, Nelson
Mandela ushered in a new age of humanity for South Africa. Indeed, the
TRC and its signature philosophy of forgiveness and reconciliation is an
extension of his goal of creating a decent society and which involved a mod-
icum of self-sacrifce and an act of love. For example, when he was released
from prison, he went to the Cape Town Parade, shook hands with F.W. de
Klerk and gave an impromptu speech in which he called for reconciliation.
This gesture of reaching out and touching his former archenemy surely had
a calming effect on a nervous nation that was unsure of the present and its
future, and it became a forceful symbol of the nation’s pursuit of a decent
society, one in which all are invested in the pursuit of the common good. 
It must be stated that South Africa has enormous challenges now. The
legacy of economic disparity resulting from the land theft and the massive
transfer of wealth during the decades of apartheid still lingers and in many
instances causes political instability. It does not help that the seven years of
Jacob Zuma’s government also ignored the plight of the majority South Af-
ricans. Nevertheless, it is also true that the TRC established a roadmap for
future efforts at peace and conviviality. Thanks to these efforts, South Africa
can now boast of one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. It is
one of the few countries where human rights are a top priority of government
policies and where they have become an integral part of the people’s vocabu-
lary. As Kay Schaffer and Sidone Smith (2004:56–57) have observed, 
Up until the release of Mandela there was no discourse on human rights 
that extended to blacks within the country, no history of published or 
public storytelling in a human rights context, and no public record of 
the violations of the majority black population’s human rights. 
To be sure there have been many forms of intervention in the literary sphere, 
which include poetry, fction, and autobiographical accounts of human 
rights abuses in South Africa. Works such as Breyten Breytenbach’s The 
True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist (1985), Athol Fugard’s Siswe Bansi 
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Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter, and many others highlight instances of the 
abuse of human rights. 
The fall of apartheid naturally made it possible for narratives of human 
rights to emerge. The establishment of the TRC, as a forum for a ritual of 
public storytelling, was understood as the ultimate gesture of the recogni-
tion of the human rights of those whose humanity had never been recog-
nized within the apartheid dispensation. Desmond Tutu has written of his 
memory of people coming to him testifying to the effect of their having told 
their story. The fnal TRC report was able to announce in a celebratory tone: 
The public hearings were successful in two major aspects. They met 
one of the statutory objectives of the Commission, that of “restoring 
the human and civil dignity of such victims by granting them an oppor-
tunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are 
the victims”; and, together with the public hearings of applications for 
amnesty, they revealed the extent of gross violations of human rights 
and made it impossible for South Africans ever again to deny that such 
violations had indeed taken place. 
(Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report n.d.) 
Despite the few weaknesses of the ritual of storytelling embedded in the 
TRC, and despite the fragility of the peace and reconciliation achieved 
through the processes and Mandela’s political will, it is fair to say that the 
TRC is indeed a great achievement in terms of restoring to the victims of 
apartheid the sense of their humanity that the apartheid state and the racist 
construction of humanity had denied them. 
Aside from the TRC, there are other human rights narratives, among 
which include Antjie Krog’s Country of My Skull, K. Sello Duiker’s The 
Quiet Violence of Dreams. I have discussed some of them in my already men-
tioned book, Race, Decolonization, and Global Citizenship in South Africa
(Eze 2018). In the remaining part of this concluding chapter, I discuss Pumla 
Gobodo-Madikizela’s memoir, A Human Being Died That Night, which I 
consider to be a memorialization of the spirit of reconciliation and South 
Africa’s resolve to the common good and to build an open society in which 
the human rights of every individual are respected. 
Touching the leper, touching humanity 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela is a clinical psychologist and served as a mem-
ber of the committee of the TRC. She is a frm believer in forgiveness, and 
she is devoted to the principles and practice of human rights (Carroll 2003). 
Her inaugural lecture as a professor at the University of Cape Town, en-
titled “The ‘Face of the Other’: Human Dialogue at Solms Delta and the 
Meaning of Moral Imagination” (Gobodo-Madikizela 2010), underscores 
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A Human Being Died That Night is constructed around interviews with 
Eugene de Kock, former commander of the infamous Vlakplaas govern-
ment hit squad, a detested police colonel, torturer, and assassin. “In the 
South African media, Eugene de Kock has been described as a mass killer, 
a psychopath known to the public as ‘Prime Evil’.” It is therefore safe to say 
that he embodies the evils of the past. He is a leper. Yet, he is the one whom 
Gobodo-Madikizela seeks out, interviews, and touches. My analysis of the 
memoir centers especially on the moral and political relevance of this ges-
ture of touching evil. 
When de Kock concluded his public testimony at the TRC in September
1997, he expressed the wish to meet with the wives of the men he had or-
dered killed and to do so in private. That wish excited Gobodo-Madikizela’s
(2003:14) curiosity, and she met with the women to inquire about their meeting
with de Kock. “Both women felt that de Kock had communicated to them
something he felt deeply and had acknowledge their pain.” The women’s testi-
mony about de Kock also made Gobodo-Madikizela to fnd out exactly what
had caused “the loss of de Kock’s moral humanity” in the frst place (15). She
was essentially interested in knowing whether de Kock exhibited any vulner-
ability because, for her, “When violators of human rights allow themselves to
be emotionally vulnerable, they are giving others a chance to encounter them
as human beings” (16). As she states in an article, “genuine remorse humanizes
perpetrators and transforms their evil from the unforgivable into something
that can be forgiven” (Gobodo-Madikizela 2002). Her interest in de Kock’s
story goes to the root and justifcation for the TRC’s preference for restorative
rather than retributive justice. Forgiveness restores humanity to both the in-
jured and the injurer. Her memoir is therefore a mimetic gesture of the TRC;
she narrativizes forgiveness in order to demonstrate her own journey and un-
reserved acceptance of the humanity of all. That however meant touching the
untouchable, the leper; it is self-overcoming for the sake of the common good. 
De Kock stated that talking about his past “was like letting go of his
cloak” (Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:17); it was like being naked, being vul-
nerable, and returning to the original condition of humanity. It was then
that Gobodo-Madikizela reached out to him; she touched “his shaking
hands.” She confesses to having surprised herself by that gesture of reach-
ing out to touch the hand of murderer, a hand that “was clenched, cold,
and rigid, as if he were holding back, as if he were holding on to something
withering but still vital form of his old self” (32). She is also well aware
that she had crossed a line; she had broken taboo, literally defled herself.
She writes: 
In touching de Kock’s hand I had touched his leprosy, and he seemed to 
be telling me that, even though I did not realize it at the time, I was from 
now on infected with the memory of having embraced into my heart the 
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Reaching out to touch the hand that killed her people must have appeared as
if she was trivializing her people’s pain. But she was indeed being true to her
people’s notion of ubuntu, which believes in the inviolability of the humanity
of all and the fact that anyone who abuses any person’s human rights goes
against the core spirit of ubuntu and humanity. She sees the vulnerability of
the other not as a weakness but rather as an open invitation to reach out.
When somebody exposes his vulnerability it is as if the person were totally
naked in the public. It is then the duty of the morally conscious to clothe him
with care. Ironically, the instinct that made her touch de Kock also revealed
to her a stunning truth. The side of him she had touched had not been allowed
to triumph over the side that made him apartheid’s killing machine (34). She
shares Nelson Mandela’s (1994:609) belief that “No one is born hating another
person because of the colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion.
People must learn to hate, and if they can learn to hate, they can be taught
to love.” But of greater importance for her is what the touch means for her. 
The scene of Gobodo-Madikizela touching de Kock, I think, is an instinc-
tual reenactment of that unique, globally relevant moment that Mandela
shook hands with de Klerk, thus establishing for the whole nation the opera-
tive idiom of the new society. On a smaller scale, reaching out to touch others
as Gobodo-Madikizela has done is a simple, essential gesture of empathy. Em-
pathy touches the otherwise untouchable part of others because we occupy,
if only momentarily and imperfectly, their position in life. To empathize is to
draw the other into the common pool of humanity. It is to reach out, to seek
to restore, and it is rooted in the belief that the other is not irretrievably lost. 
The body places us at the center of the world. From Merleau-Ponty we 
learn that the body is aware of its existence because it is in relation to other 
bodies. The body touches because it is being touched; other bodies make 
ours perceptible (Merleau-Ponty 2013). Bodies know that they exist when 
other bodies touch them. As Richard Kearney (2006:16) reminds us, “The 
ancient term for wisdom, sapientia, comes from sapere, to taste. This et-
ymological line speaks legions, reminding us that our deepest knowing is 
tasting and touching.” It is in this respect that we can understand Gobodo-
Madikizela’s gesture as the wisdom that undergirds the new society’s adop-
tion of forgiveness and reconciliation as political emotions. 
The politics of emotions 
Gobodo-Madikizela, like Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela, under-
stands the political importance of what she has done in reaching out to 
touch the moral leper of South African political history. She is signaling to 
herself, and through her narration to the whole nation, that there are virtues 
worth pursuing; virtues that are socially and politically necessary so that 
it is worth touching a leper at the risk of infection. She demonstrates what 
Nussbaum (2013:395) has called “inner moral effort,” which compels us to 
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assessment and it makes a difference to our conception of what we should be 
like as citizens.” Gobodo-Madikizela puts the riches of her emotion to the 
service of greater cause, one that transcends her. In her, Ignatieff’s ordinary 
virtue meets Nussbaum’s overarching quest for a boundary-transcending 
narrative within a liberal society. 
Gobodo-Madikizela knows that her desire to understand de Kock may be 
irrelevant for people who do not have to live as a society with their for-
mer enemies. But for those whose lives are intertwined with those who 
have grossly violated human rights, who sometimes even have to live as 
their neighbors, ignoring the question is not an option. 
(Gobodo-Madikizela 2003:15) 
It therefore seems that she is as committed to the polity as are many other 
actors in the post-apartheid search for peace. She makes sure to underline 
the fact that her gesture toward de Kock is not exclusively altruistic or of a 
high moral principle. She is concerned with the project of rehumanization, 
which is best understood within the context of the common good: 
The victim in a sense needs forgiveness as part of the process of becom-
ing rehumanized. The victim needs it in order to complete himself or 
herself and to wrest away from the perpetrator the fat power to destroy 
or to spare. It is part of the process of reclaiming self-effcacy. Recip-
rocating with empathy and forgiveness in the face of a perpetrator’s 
remorse restores to many victims the sense that they are once again 
capable of effecting a profound difference in the moral community. 
(128) 
It is important that Gobodo-Madikizela is not claiming any moral superiority.
Rather, she understands the precarious nature of rebuilding the South African
society. Still in the tradition established by Mandela and Tutu, she proposes
social interconnectedness, or what Antjie Krog calls “interconnectedness-
towards-wholeness,” as a means to enhance the common good. To be sure,
for Krog (2008:355), interconnectedness-towards-wholeness is 
more than just a theoretical knowledge that all things in the world are 
linked, it means both a mental and physical awareness that one can only 
“become” who one is, or could be, through the fullness of that which is 
around one—both physical and metaphysical. 
Interconnectedness-towards-wholeness is a process of becoming that is ful-
flled in the individual, but only in the presence—physical or spiritual—of 
others, living or dead. It is actualized in a moral community. Gobodo-
Madikizela’s interest in the rehumanization of her former enemy is therefore 
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belief in political emotions in the manner Nussbaum has mapped out. In 
her, storytelling becomes both a symbol and a catalyst of political emotions 
that serve the interest of fourishing communities. It turns out therefore that 
the notion of the common good and fourishing of all is a potent means to 
activate participation in the protection of people’s human rights. 
The recognition of the other’s vulnerability and the instinctive gesture to 
protect him despite this other’s abhorrent past goes to the core of the con-
ception of the human dignity and human rights. Dignity is not dependent 
on one’s moral standing; it is dependent on the fact that one is a human be-
ing. This understanding pervades the thoughts of human rights articulated 
in South Africa’s constitution and which continues to animate discussions 
about human rights. 
Mandela understood that the legal framework of human rights needs a 
strong moral foundation to survive and they, in turn, need strong narratives 
to make them palpable, or to use Gobodo-Madikizela’s idiom, touchable. 
Narratives do not always succeed in making human rights palpable; thank-
fully they are just some of the ways to keep alive the indispensable task of 
alerting ourselves to the unquestionable dignity of every human and the 
duty of all to honor it. Its failure leads to the degradation of humanity itself. 
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